This book explores the British Army's response on the Western Front
to a period of seminal change in warfare. In particular it examines
the impact of the pre-war emphasis on worldwide garrison,
occupation and policing duties for the Empire's defence of the
mindset of the Army's leadership and its lack of preparation for a
continental war involving a massive, unplanned increase in men and
material. The reasons for the poor performance in the early years
of the war, notably professionalism within the British Army,
including poor staff work, 'trade unionism', careerism within the
high command, and the tendency of an overconfident hierarchy to
ignore the need for reform to tackle the tactical stalemate prior
to 1916, are analyzed. The high command rapidly learnt from the
defeats of 1915-16 and performed much better in 1916-18, an
especially formative period resulting in the promotion of a
younger, more professional leadership and the development of the
first truly modern system of tactics which has dominated wars ever
since. During 1917-18 the Army's commanders and staff evolved and
improved these new methods; developing a doctrine of combined arms
to overcome the tactical stalemate bedevilling Allied offensives.
General
Imprint: |
Routledge
|
Country of origin: |
United Kingdom |
Series: |
Military History and Policy |
Release date: |
May 2006 |
First published: |
2005 |
Authors: |
Simon Robbins
|
Dimensions: |
234 x 156 x 16mm (L x W x T) |
Format: |
Paperback
|
Pages: |
272 |
ISBN-13: |
978-0-415-40778-6 |
Categories: |
Books >
Humanities >
History >
General
Books >
History >
General
|
LSN: |
0-415-40778-8 |
Barcode: |
9780415407786 |
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