As the US Army shifts from being a forward-deployed force to a
continental United States (CONUS)-based force, it must concurrently
develop new plans and methods for rapidly deploying large numbers
of units to contingency areas outside CONUS. Historically, the US
Army has often been challenged in trying to rapidly deploy large
forces from CONUS to the theater of operations. One need only
review the Army's deployments to Cuba in 1898, to France in 1917,
to Saudi Arabia in 1990, or most recently to Afghanistan and Iraq
since 11 September 2001 and the enormous complexities associated
with such operations to see that the Army has not always met its,
and the nation's, expectations. Dr. Stephen D. Coats's study of the
Army's efforts to assemble a contingency force at San Francisco for
deployment to the Philippines in 1898 is an example of how the Army
got it mostly right. One could argue that 1898 was a much simpler
time and that the complexity associated with deploying ground
forces has grown dramatically since then, and that would be
correct. However, the Army of 1898 was not professionally trained
to deploy and fight wars overseas. Additionally, the force that
assembled at San Francisco was not a professional army. It was
largely a volunteer force led by a few Regular Army generals and
managed by a handful of Regular Army staff officers, none of whom
had any appreciable experience in deployment operations. Yet they
succeeded. As in all facets of military art, there are timeless
principles that, if applied correctly, will go a long way toward
helping planners achieve success. A careful reading of Dr. Coats's
work will illuminate many of those principles. Today, as the US
military prepares units for conflicts abroad and deploys forces
overseas, it is instructive to examine how the Army coped with
similar challenges in the late 19th century. This study analyzes
efforts during the Spanish-American War to mobilize expeditions in
San Francisco for the Army's first major overseas deployment:
destination, the Philippines. Not since the Mexican War, fought a
half-century earlier, had the American military attempted to
prepare a large force to move to a foreign land. No prewar plans
existed to provide a blueprint for this endeavor in 1898. To
compound deployment challenges on the West Coast, the Army had
already moved most of its Regular organizations and logistics
support to Southern assembly areas oriented on objectives in the
Caribbean. President William McKinley assigned two general
officers, Wesley Merritt and Elwell S. Otis, to quarter, organize,
train, and equip designated forces in San Francisco, the port of
embarkation. Drawing on available, but limited, logistics resources
from military organizations in the area, Merritt's command received
thousands of Regulars and Volunteers who poured into the Golden
Gate region for duty overseas. Units initially camped on military
reservations but eventually spilled over into several locations in
the city. Given the paucity of medical and morale support available
to the troops through the military, the San Francisco community
rallied behind local relief societies and religious organizations
on behalf of the expeditionary forces. Citizens donated money,
food, goods, and services through the Red Cross, Young Men's
Christian Association, and Catholic Truth Society. Each
organization established shelters in the encampments to better
assist those in uniform. This study finds that to mobilize
effectively, the Army depended on fundamentals then that are still
prized to this day: leadership, initiative, and resourcefulness. It
also reveals the vital role that private volunteer organizations
and the civilian community played in supporting the military forces
assembling at the Golden Gate. Together the American Army and San
Francisco community succeeded in sustaining and deploying
expeditionary forces that fought the battle of Manila in August
1898.
General
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