Cimbala and Scouras examine the issues related to the control of
nuclear weapons in the early 21st century. These issues are both
technical and policy oriented; science and values are commingled.
This means that arguments about nuclear strategy, arms control, and
proliferation are apt to be contentious and confusing. The authors
seek to provide readers with a fuller, more accurate understanding
of the issues involved.
They begin by analyzing the crazy mathematics of nuclear arms
races and arms control that preoccupied analysts and policymakers
during the Cold War. After examining stability modeling, they argue
for a more comprehensive definition of strategic stability and they
relate this more inclusive concept to the current relationship
between the United States and Russia--one characterized by
cooperation as well as competition. They then use the concept of
friction to analyze how the gap between theory and practice might
influence nuclear force operations and arms control. The problem of
nuclear weapons spread or proliferation is then considered from the
vantage point of both theory and policy. They conclude with an
analysis of whether the United States might get by in the 21st
century with fewer legs of its strategic nuclear triplet than
weapons based on land, at sea, and airborne. A provocative analysis
for arms control policymakers, strategists, and students, scholars,
and other researchers involved with nuclear weapons issues.
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