Counterinsurgency is seemingly not of great concern to the U.S.
Army today. This may represent a period of remission rather than
the apparent abandonment of the mission. It is possible that the
U.S. military may again become engaged in counterinsurgency support
in the future. In this study, Steven Metz argues that the way the
Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when
counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American
national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they
react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If
analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the
military is better prepared for the reconstitution of capabilities.
If it ignores global developments in insurgency and
counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more
difficult. Today, there is no pressing strategic rationale for U.S.
engagement in counterinsurgency but history suggests that if the
United States remains involved in the Global South, one may emerge.
American counterinsurgency strategy has unfolded in a distinct
pattern over the past 50 years. At times, policymakers saw a
strategic rationale for engagement in counterinsurgency. When they
did, the military and Department of Defense formed or reconstituted
counterinsurgency doctrine, concepts, and organizations. When the
strategic rationale faded, these capabilities atrophied. This
pattern may be repeated in the future. During the last decade of
the Cold War, the U.S. military developed an effective approach to
insurgency and implemented it in El Salvador, but this focused on
one particular type of insurgency: Maoist "people's war." The El
Salvador model may not apply to post-Cold War forms of insurgency.
Moreover, many of the basic assumptions of American
counterinsurgency strategy appear obsolete. Trends such as
ungovernability, the routinization of violence, and the mutation of
insurgency change the costs/benefits calculus that undergirded Cold
War-era strategy and doctrine. During the current period of
remission in insurgency, the Army should use its intellectual
resources to analyze ongoing mutations in insurgency and to open a
debate on the nature of a cogent post-Cold War counterinsurgency
strategy. This strategy should expand its conceptual framework and
stress three principles: selectivity, multilateralism, and
concentration on secondary support functions including indirect or
second-tier engagement. Such efforts will pave the way for the
reconstitution of American counterinsurgency should it be required.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!
Welcome to Loot.co.za!
Sign in / Register |Wishlists & Gift Vouchers |Help | Advanced search
(4)
