Not since the 1960s have U.S. politicians, Republican or
Democrat, campaigned on platforms defending big government, much
less the use of regulation to help solve social ills. And since the
late 1970s, "deregulation" has become perhaps the most ubiquitous
political catchword of all. This book takes on the critics of
government regulation. Providing the first major alternative to
conventional arguments grounded in public choice theory, it
demonstrates that regulatory government can, and on important
occasions does, advance general interests.
Unlike previous accounts, "Regulation and Public Interests"
takes agencies' decision-making rules rather than legislative
incentives as a central determinant of regulatory outcomes. Drawing
from both political science and law, Steven Croley argues that such
rules, together with agencies' larger decision-making environments,
enhance agency autonomy. Agency personnel inclined to undertake
regulatory initiatives that generate large but diffuse benefits
(while imposing smaller but more concentrated costs) can use
decision-making rules to develop socially beneficial regulations
even over the objections of Congress and influential interest
groups. This book thus provides a qualified defense of regulatory
government. Its illustrative case studies include the development
of tobacco rulemaking by the Food and Drug Administration, ozone
and particulate matter rules by the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Forest Service's "roadless" policy for national
forests, and regulatory initiatives by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.
General
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