This monograph examines the fundamental argument that America's
adversaries are shifting more toward irregular methods due to the
demonstrated prowess of the U.S. military at conventional warfare.
This argument is based on a what one might call a paradoxical
logic, not unlike that described by Edward Luttwak in his classic
work, Strategy. Among other things, the monograph concludes that
few genuine paradoxes exist in war; most principles that appear
paradoxical are completely linear. Moreover, those adversarial
states and nonstate actors employing irregular methods today were
doing so long before the U.S. military demonstrated its superiority
at conventional warfare, and will likely continue to do so.
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