Can the Supreme Court be free of politics? Do we want it to be?
Normative constitutional theory has long concerned itself with the
legitimate scope and limits of judicial review. Too often,
theorists seek to resolve that issue by eliminating politics from
constitutional decisionmaking. In contrast, Terri Peretti argues
for an openly political role for the Supreme Court.
Peretti asserts that politically motivated constitutional
decisionmaking is not only inevitable, it is legitimate and
desirable as well. When Supreme Court justices decide in accordance
with their ideological values, or consider the likely political
reaction to the Court's decisions, a number of benefits result. The
Court's performance of political representation and
consensus-building functions is enhanced, and the effectiveness of
political checks on the Court is increased. Thus, political motive
in constitutional decision making does not lead to judicial
tyranny, as many claim, but goes far to prevent it. Using pluralist
theory, Peretti further argues that a political Court possesses
instrumental value in American democracy. As one of many diverse
and redundant political institutions, the Court enhances both
system stability and the quality of policymaking, particularly
regarding the breadth of interests represented.
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