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Challenging Retrenchment - The United States, Great Britain & the Middle East 1950-1980 (Paperback)
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Challenging Retrenchment - The United States, Great Britain & the Middle East 1950-1980 (Paperback)
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What to make of the British and American experience in the Middle
East? Simon Smith compares British and American foreign policy in
the Far East and the Persian Gulf, explaining that the
Anglo-American relationship was far from harmonious. Both powers
tried manipulate the other to its own advantage. While Washington
was clearly the stronger power, London, as Simon Smith argues, was
never reduced to subservience. Michael Thornhill demonstrates by
contrast that even during the height of imperial British influence
in the Middle East it was never easy for Britain to always
manipulate events for its own benefit. By examining the often
neglected role of king Farouk, Thornhill argues that Egypt was
forced to contend with 'an imperial power which could, at a few
hours notice, overwhelm or undermine Egypt's supposed sovereign
institutions'. Withdrawing support from king Farouk 'while still
having 80,000 troops three hours drive away from Cairo-amounted to
intervention by other means', may have had the short term benefits
for the British, but in turn, London was unwilling or unable to
prevent Gamal Abdul Nasser and his revolutionary officers from
seizing power in 1952. While London perhaps mishandled the transfer
of power in Egypt, by contrast Clea Bunch points out how the
British managed the transition from being the dominant power in
Jordan to preserving a substantial influence by inviting American
participation in securing regime legitimacy. 'In the end, American
dollars supported the Hashemite regime while British influence
remained, just as British officials wished.' James Worrall argues
that by the mid 1970s there was an Anglo-American understanding
'that the Northern Gulf was America's responsibility and that the
southern Gulf was Britain's.' Clive Jones examines how intelligence
and clandestine operations were used and abused by the British in
pursuit of their strategic interests, first somewhat unsuccessfully
in Yemen in the 1960s, but with more tangible success in Oman in
the 1970s.
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