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Intelligence Success and Failure - The Human Factor (Paperback)
Loot Price: R1,091
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Intelligence Success and Failure - The Human Factor (Paperback)
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The study of strategic surprise has long concentrated on important
failures that resulted in catastrophes such as Pearl Harbor and the
September 11th attacks, and the majority of previously published
research in the field determines that such large-scale military
failures often stem from defective information-processing systems.
Intelligence Success and Failure challenges this common assertion
that catastrophic surprise attacks are the unmistakable products of
warning failure alone. Further, Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott
approach this topic uniquely by highlighting the successful cases
of strategic surprise, as well as the failures, from a
psychological perspective. This book delineates the critical role
of individual psychopathologies in precipitating failure by
investigating important historical cases. Bar-Joseph and McDermott
use six particular military attacks as examples for their analysis,
including: "Barbarossa," the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR
(failure); the fall-winter 1941 battle for Moscow (success); the
Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure); and the second
Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). From these
specific cases and others, they analyze the psychological
mechanisms through which leaders assess their own fatal mistakes
and use the intelligence available to them. Their research examines
the factors that contribute to failure and success in responding to
strategic surprise and identify the learning process that central
decision makers use to facilitate subsequent successes.
Intelligence Success and Failure presents a new theory in the study
of strategic surprise that claims the key explanation for warning
failure is not unintentional action, but rather, motivated biases
in key intelligence and central leaders that null any sense of
doubt prior to surprise attacks.
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