This work examines tax policies and tax systems as they arise from
democratic choices, set against the background of a market economy.
Professors Hettich and Winer find that democratic institutions
yield complex tax systems with features that follow a varied but
predictable pattern. In developing their analysis, the authors use
formal modelling of voting behavior, emphasizing recent advances in
the theory of probabilistic voting. This book differs from the
available tax literature by relating fiscal choices directly to
voting and by examining tax systems in democratic countries from a
variety of perspectives. While the authors primarily focus on
explaining observed features of tax systems, they also devote
considerable space to the discussion of the welfare and efficiency
effects of taxation in the presence of collective choice, and to a
review of other models and of the related literature. In addition,
they use computational general equilibrium analysis and statistical
research on national and state governments in the US and Canada to
link theory to empirical data.
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