The second of a series, this study analyzes the historical
relationships between the provision of military assistance and
success in achieving Soviet aims during the Cold War. Mott looks at
Soviet donor-recipient relationships across seventeen case studies
to identify the generalities or regularities that relate the
classical wartime relationship to achievement of donor Cold War
aims. He refines the four critical features of the wartime
donor-recipient relationship--convergence of donor and recipient
aims, donor control, commitment of donor military forces, and
coherence of donor policies and strategies--to reflect the unique
political economic constraints of the Cold War. Findings challenge
orthodox separation of politics, history, military science, and
economics, and refute the common wisdom that economic aid is a more
effective policy instrument than military assistance.
Mott contends that both successes and failures of Cold War
Soviet military assistance were predictable, explicit consequences
of donor policies and strategies and of convergence of donor and
recipient aims. This book presents a pattern for both policy
development and theoretical analysis in which military assistance
is a viable, robust policy option and bilateral relationship with a
clear set of requirements, features, processes, and predictable
results. Its primary methodology is the search for uniformities
across historical observations through low-level, ordinary,
multivariate regressions. Each chapter focuses on Soviet military
assistance in a region and refines the relevant features of the
observed relationships into a tentative pattern for comparison with
other regions.
General
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