In this authoritative discussion of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, A. W. Price considers four related areas: eudaimonia, or living and acting well, as the ultimate end of action; virtues of character in relation to the emotions, and to one another; practical reasoning, especially from an end to ways or means; and acrasia, or action that is contrary to the agent's own judgement of what is best. The focal concept is that of eudaimonia, which both Plato and Aristotle view as an abstract goal that is valuable enough to motivate action. Virtue has a double role to play in making its achievement possible, both in proposing subordinate ends apt to the context, and in protecting the agent against temptations to discard them too easily. For both purposes, Price suggests that virtues need to form a unity--but one that can be conceived in various ways. Among the tasks of deliberation is to work out how, and whether, to pursue some putative end in context. Aristotle returns to early Plato in finding it problematic that one should consciously sacrifice acting well to some incidental attraction; Plato later finds this possible by postulating schism within the soul. Price maintains that it is their emphasis upon the centrality of action within human life that makes the reflections of these ancient philosophers perennially relevant.

In this illuminating study of the moral psychology of Plato and Aristotle, A. W. Price considers four related areas: eudaimonia, or living and acting well, as the ultimate end of action; virtues of character in relation to the emotions, and to one another; practical reasoning, especially from an end to ways or means; and acrasia, or action that is contrary to the agent's own judgement of what is best. The focal concept is that of eudaimonia, which both Plato and Aristotle view as an abstract goal that is valuable enough to motivate action. Virtue has a double role to play in making its achievement possible, both in proposing subordinate ends apt to the context, and in protecting the agent against temptations to discard them too easily. For both purposes, Price suggests that virtues need to form a unity-but one that can be conceived in various ways. Among the tasks of deliberation is to work out how, and whether, to pursue some putative end in context. Aristotle returns to early Plato in finding it problematic that one should consciously sacrifice acting well to some incidental attraction; Plato later finds this possible by postulating schism within the soul. Price maintains that it is their emphasis upon the centrality of action within human life that makes the reflections of these ancient philosophers perennially relevant.

Mental conflict is the condition of a divided mind consciously torn between contrary desires or beliefs. For Greek philosophers it is a puzzle provocative of theory; they accommodate it with different structurings of the mind's operations. Socrates focuses all a man's desires upon a single goal taken to constitute the human good. This permits vacillation between varying conceptions of the end or devisings of the means, and consequent regret; but judgement, or misjudgement, is always in control. Plato comes instead to find a disunity in desire, which means that reason may fail to be master within its own house. Unity is to be worked for in the convergence of all desires through the persuasions of reason. Aristotle assents to rather the same view, but supposes that, when reason fails to win out in action, it also loses out in judgement, ceasing to perceive the demands of the situation. Plato's practical reason is a child of heaven, whose voice is not stilled by being unheeded, while Aristotle's is a creature of earth, emergent out of desire and eclipsed by desires in effective revolt.

Mental conflict is the condition of a divided mind consciously torn between contrary desires or beliefs. For Greek philosophers it is a puzzle provocative of theory; they accommodate it with different structurings of the mind's operations. Socrates focuses all a man's desires upon a single goal taken to constitute the human good. This permits vacillation between varying conceptions of the end or devisings of the means, and consequent regret; but judgement, or misjudgement, is always in control. Plato comes instead to find a disunity in desire, which means that reason may fail to be master within its own house. Unity is to be worked for in the convergence of all desires through the persuasions of reason. Aristotle assents to rather the same view, but supposes that, when reason fails to win out in action, it also loses out in judgement, ceasing to perceive the demands of the situation. Plato's practical reason is a child of heaven, whose voice is not stilled by being unheeded, while Aristotle's is a creature of earth, emergent out of desire and eclipsed by desires in effective revolt.

A. W. Price explores the varying ways in which context is relevant to our reasoning about what to do. He investigates the role of context in our interpretation and assessment of practical inferences (especially from one intention to another), practical judgements (especially involving the term "ought"), inferences from conditional "ought"-judgements, and the ascription to agents of reasons for action. Practical inferences are subject not to a special logic, but to a teleology that they share with action itself. Their inherent purpose is to forward an end of action, and not to be logically valid. Practical judgments are commonly to be understood relatively to an implicit context of goals and circumstances. Apparently conflicting or imprudent "oughts" can show up as true once they are interpreted contextually, with an eye to different ends, and different aspects of a situation. This makes acceptable certain patterns of inference that would otherwise license counter-intuitive conclusions. What reasons for action are ascribable to an agent depends both on the context of action, and on the deliberative context. Facts tell in favor of actions against a background of particular circumstances, and in ways whose relevance to an ascription to an agent of a reason for action depends upon the perspective within which the ascription is made.

This book fully explores for the first time an idea common to Plato and Aristotle, which unites their treatments - otherwise very different - of love and friendship. The idea is that although persons are separate, their lives need not be. One person's life may overflow into another's, and as such, helping another person is a way of serving oneself. The author shows how their view of love and friendship, within not only personal relationships, but also the household and even the city-state, promises to resolve the old dichotomy between egoism and altruism. Expanded paperback edition published 1997 with corrections and new afterword.