The aim of this book is to specifically, expose the conceptual origins of the American failure to deter Japan, to a higher level of understanding regarding the general limits of deterrence and of coercive diplomacy will be achieved. It is similarly hoped that by underscoring the role which certain basic cognitive (and bureaucratic) processes played

In an effort to resolve a facet of the Arab-Israel predicament, this book analyzes the concept of an international conference as referred to by the major parties involved in the dispute. It focuses on Lausanne Peace Conference and Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East.

This book demonstrates that the origins of the US-Israeli alliance lay in the former's concern over Egyptian influence in Jordan, contrasting with the widely-held view of the significance of the Six Day War.

The American-Israeli Alliance will be of great interest to students of Middle East studies, history, and politics.

The aim of this book is to specifically, expose the conceptual origins of the American failure to deter Japan, to a higher level of understanding regarding the general limits of deterrence and of coercive diplomacy will be achieved.

This book demonstrates that the origins of the US-Israeli alliance lay in the former's concern over Egyptian influence in Jordan, contrasting with the widely-held view of the significance of the Six Day War.

The American-Israeli Alliance will be of great interest to students of Middle East studies, history, and politics.

Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel seeks to reconstruct and elucidate the processes behind the decisions made by the Johnson Administration during the years 1965-68 to sell Israel M-48 tanks, A-4 Skyhawk planes and F-4 Phantom planes. This examination is based on a distinction between three factions which competed for influence within Washington's high-policy elite: the traditionalists (whose major representative was Secretary of State Dean Rusk); the pragmatists (whose most outspoken representative was Robert Komer of the National Security Council); and the domestically oriented policymakers (the central decision-maker who quintessentially exemplifies this category being President Johnson). This book is a sequel to John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Arms to Israel, which examined the first arms deal between the US and Israel.

In this volume, the author seeks to fully reconstruct the process by which the Kennedy administration decided to sell to Israel Hawk surface-to-air missiles. He argues that such domestic considerations as the approaching congressional elections, and such political calculations as the administration's desire to promote a Palestinian settlement, were all part of a highly complex decisional setting which affected the thinking and behaviour of members of Washington's high policy elite on the very eve of the Hawk decision, albeit not to the same degree. Ultimately, a winning coalition was formed between the Middle Eastern experts of the National Security Council and the president's liaison to the Jewish community, Myer Feldman. President Kennedy's decision to join this coalition and to approve the sale without any prior Israeli concessions to the Palestinians, determined the outcome of this process. This sealed the fate of the Department of State's efforts to prevent the sale or later to make it dependent upon an Israeli commitment to soften its traditional Palestinian posture.
This book identifies the individuals and groups involved in each phase of the decision-making process of the sale of Hawk missiles, examines their relative power and capacity to mobilize support for their respective positions, and assesses the immediate and middle-range consequences of the sale, both in the context of American-Israeli relations and Washington's relations with the Arab Middle East.

In this volume, the author seeks to fully reconstruct the process by which the Kennedy administration decided to sell to Israel Hawk surface-to-air missiles. He argues that such domestic considerations as the approaching congressional elections, and such political calculations as the administration's desire to promote a Palestinian settlement, were all part of a highly complex decisional setting which affected the thinking and behaviour of members of Washington's high policy elite on the very eve of the Hawk decision, albeit not to the same degree. Ultimately, a winning coalition was formed between the Middle Eastern experts of the National Security Council and the president's liaison to the Jewish community, Myer Feldman. President Kennedy's decision to join this coalition and to approve the sale without any prior Israeli concessions to the Palestinians, determined the outcome of this process. This sealed the fate of the Department of State's efforts to prevent the sale or later to make it dependent upon an Israeli commitment to soften its traditional Palestinian posture.
This book identifies the individuals and groups involved in each phase of the decision-making process of the sale of Hawk missiles, examines their relative power and capacity to mobilize support for their respective positions, and assesses the immediate and middle-range consequences of the sale, both in the context of American-Israeli relations and Washington's relations with the Arab Middle East.

Throughout his distinguished academic career Professor David Vital has in one way or another sought to emphasize, and to analyze, one of the truly revolutionary changes of our time: the re-engagement of the Jewish people - as a collective entity - in contemporary world affairs and international politics. Whether as a nation (the diaspora) or as a state (Israel), after a hiatus of nearly 2000 years, world Jewry is once again a recognized global factor, possessing both status and influence, to be reckoned with on the chessboard of diplomacy and statecraft.

This book analyzes the concept of an international conference as referred to by the major parties involved to resolve at least one facet of the Arab-Israel predicament. The restrictive type of conference has proved to be effective in resolving or stabilizing certain elements of the conflict.

Reconstructing the often volatile US-Israeli relationship, this study examines the extent to which various coercive measures made by the USA between 1953 and 1991 proved effective in influencing Israeli policy.

Historians have long held that the Kennedy administration forged the American alliance with Israel as a way of courting political support from American Jews. In contrast, the Eisenhower administration is believed to have considered Israel a political and strategic liability. In this text, Abraham Ben-Zvi challenges these assumptions and offers a different account of Eisenhower's true agenda. Ben-Zvi now shows that the Eisenhower years were an "incubation period" during which the groundwork was laid for the eventual American-Israeli alliance. As a result, President Kennedy's Israeli policy is understood as not the beginning, but a continuation of a process with foundations in the prior administration.

Historians have long held that the Kennedy administration forged the American alliance with Israel as a way of courting political support from American Jews. In contrast, the Eisenhower administration is believed to have considered Israel a political and strategic liability. In "Decade of Transition, " Abraham Ben-Zvi now shows that the Eisenhower years were an "incubation period" during which the ground-work was laid for the eventual American-Israeli alliance. As a result, President Kennedy's Israeli policy is understood as not the beginning, but a continuation of a process with foundations in the prior administration.

Focusing on the period between Eisenhower's inauguration and Kennedy's landmark decision to sell the Hawk anti-aircraft missile to Israel, Ben-Zvi shows how the warming of American-Israeli diplomatic relations began with Eisenhower's second term. In his first administration, relations between the two countries reached a nadir with the Suez War, but in 1958, Israel's reaction to an intensifying crisis in Jordan caused Eisenhower to reevaluate Israel's strategic potential. Amid growing fears of unrest in the Middle East and a perceived Soviet threat, Israel could now become a useful ally and a new base of stability in the region.

Ben-Zvi argues that both Eisenhower and Kennedy sought an alliance with Israel not to satisfy domestic political concerns, but to invest in Israel's growing strength and political stability. He analyzes Eisenhower's initial perceptions of Israel, and shows how they evolved along with his estimate of the increasing significance of the Middle East on the world stage. Ben-Zvi traces the process of deterrence and coercion used by both presidents to transform Israel into a strategic asset for the United States, from American insistence on inspecting Israel's nuclear weapons facilities to failed attempts to influence Israel's policy on Palestinian refugees.

Thoroughly researched and drawing on thousands of documents-many only recently made public- "Decade of Transition" provides a significant reevaluation of the nature and origins of the American-Israeli relationship and the shaping of the modern Middle East.

Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel seeks to reconstruct and elucidate the processes behind the decisions made by the Johnson Administration during the years 1965-68 to sell Israel M-48 tanks, A-4 Skyhawk planes and F-4 Phantom planes. This examination is based on a distinction between three factions which competed for influence within Washington's high-policy elite: the traditionalists (whose major representative was Secretary of State Dean Rusk); the pragmatists (whose most outspoken representative was Robert Komer of the National Security Council); and the domestically oriented policymakers (the central decision-maker who quintessentially exemplifies this category being President Johnson). This book is a sequel to John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Arms to Israel, which examined the first arms deal between the US and Israel.