Multi Billion US Dollar Oil & Gas Opportunities in Pakistan CASA 1000 Failure of World Bank and Asian Development Bank CASA 1000 Power Project Afghanistan - An Overview-Tall Claims, indecision and near zero outputs Pakistans Mystery Oil Reserves In 2007 a top Pakistani official addressed command and staff college officers and spoke about a trillion barrel oil discovery in Baluchistan's Kolhu District . It appears that Pakistani state has no intention of exploring this strategic discovery . 2012 Oil exploration licenses did not put up this place for sale .Pakistani states Baluchistan economic policy does not seem to have any rationale and is certainly not geared to benefit Baluchistan's masses ? The multi trillion barrel area has nominal security issues barring Kahan sub district ? Perhaps an intelligence analyst alone can answer reasons for such irrational behavior ? The only explanation I see is that Pakistans ruling establishment comprising Punjabis, Pastuns and some Urdu Speaking Mohajirs view any mineral project which benefits Baloch as politically incorrect ? Security issues for Oil and gas Companies in Pakistan Oil and gas companies in Pakistan have suffered because of security issues . Security in Pakistan is largely a manageable issue. Logar Threat Perception for an oil and gas company Divestment of GoP shareholding in Oil & Gas Development Co. Ltd (OGDCL) Pakistan Petroleum Ltd (PPL) Secondary Public Offering (SPO) Privatisation of National Power Construction Corporation (NPCC) Divestment with Management Control Faisalabad Electric Supply Co. Ltd (FESCO) Northern Power Generation Co. Ltd. (NPGCL-GENCO-III)- Thermal Power Station-(TPS)Muzaffargarh(1350 MW) Divestment with Management Control Lahore Electric Supply Company Limited (LESCO) Restructuring followed by divestment of 26% GoP equity stakes to strategic partner with Management control of Pakistan International Airlines Corp (PIAC Divestment of Government Shareholding in Habib Bank Limited (HBL) Divestment of Government Shareholding in United Bank Limited(UBL) Divestment of Government Shareholding in Allied Bank Limited (ABL) Divestment Heavy Electrical Complex (HEC)"

The rebel sepoys also had no plans and were actually fearing a British response but no such thing happened. Finally after few hours of loot, arson and slaughter the 3rd Light Cavalry rode towards Delhi. The 11 and 20 Native Infantry also followed them. No effort was made by the British officers at Meerut to either pursue the sepoys or to even send a message to Delhi which was the most likely place where the sepoys could go. On the way to Delhi however the sepoys destroyed the telegraph line156 The rebellion of the Bengal Army had its origins in a century long series of actions and counter actions which were perceived by the Sepoys as unjust. However there is nothing inevitable in history. If one British Troop leader by virtue of his force of personality could keep his troop of 3rd Light Cavalry loyal, why was it that men in position of authority could not act decisively in pursuing the sepoys. Later on at Allahabad or at Lucknow where the British were much more weak in numbers great miracles were achieved and seemingly hopeless situations were retrieved in face of impossible odds. The Meerut outbreak was a major failure in command and the miscarriages that occurred were not beyond the control of Hewitt or Archdale Wilson had they not lacked the decisiveness and resolution, the very qualities because of which the EEIC conquered India in addition to naval power. THE SEIZURE OF DELHI After leaving Meerut at night the sepoys of 3rd Light Cavalry moved towards Delhi which they reached around seven in the morning.

However Shuja has made some asertions which can be classified as serious errors or even distortion of history.On page 71 he asserts that calling off of Operational Venus by Pakistan's civilian government was one of the reasons why the 1947-48 war failed.I state this because the sub title of the chapter is " Why the War Failed."On the other hand he fails to point out the major fatal decision when the Pakistani government refused to allow the armoured cars of 11 PAVO Cavalry to assist the tribesmen in breaking through to Srinagar.Those who are not familiar should know that the main reason why the tribals failed to take Srinagar was because Indian armour counterattacked them and destroyed them at Shalateng.This fact was discussed by Brig A.A.K Chaudhry also in his book.Operation Venus plan came much later.At that time the Indian Army was well established in Kashmir and well poised to meet any threat.Very few participants of the Kashmir War have left any written accounts of their war experiences. General Iqbal who participated in the war and later on rose to the rank of full general and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, long after the Kashmir War made one very thought provoking remark about the Kashmir War in an article in the Pakistan Army Green Book 1992. This particular publication was sub titled 'Year of the Senior Field Commanders'. Iqbal wrote; 'During 1948 Kashmir Operations I saw one senior officer sitting miles behind the frontline and counting availability of mules and rations. He had relegated the fighting to a senior battalion commander .In 1963 once Major General Fazal I Muqueem Khan in his book The Story of Pakistan Army .Fazal thus wrote; 'To the Army's horror, Pakistan during her greatest hour of triumph in Kashmir agreed to accept the ceasefire...it was difficult to understand why Pakistan let that opportunity pass. Was it assumed weakness; or as a result of pressing advice; or from misplaced chivalry towards an unfriendly neighbour in distress? Whatever the reason, Pakistan's reluctance to accept the risks of continuing the war, cost her Kashmir at that time. It was a risk worth taking." The Pakistani attack force collected for Operation Venus consisted of about six infantry battalions and two armoured regiments. To oppose this the Indians had two infantry brigades (50 Para Brigade and 80 Infantry Brigade) .In addition there were two armoured regiments in the same area i.e. Central India Horse and the Deccan Horse . In addition the Indians also possessed more than 10 other armoured regiments which were not in Kashmir but in Punjab or Western UP and could move to Kashmir. We shall see in 1965 how Pakistani armour functioned and the reader can keep that as a yardstick in order to appreciate how Pakistani armour and infantry would have behaved in Operation Venus; had it been ever launched Fazal does not explain how capture Of Beri Pattan bridge would have led to complete collapse of Indian hold over Kashmir, apart from temporary severing of the line of communication to Poonch.Greater part of the Central India Horse was at Nowshera close to Beri Pattan while Deccan Horse in Chamb-Akhnur area was also within striking range and the battle would have been a hotly contested affair Shaukat Riza did not take the extreme viewpoint similar to Fazal's when he wrote his book on Pakistan Army.He merely said that 'On December 30 both sides saw the wisdom of cease-fire'. Lately in an article General K.M Arif adopted a more rational viewpoint, when he stated that the Kashmir War of 1948 was mismanaged simply because Pakistan was not in a position to fight it