However Shuja has made some asertions which can be classified as
serious errors or even distortion of history.On page 71 he asserts
that calling off of Operational Venus by Pakistan's civilian
government was one of the reasons why the 1947-48 war failed.I
state this because the sub title of the chapter is " Why the War
Failed."On the other hand he fails to point out the major fatal
decision when the Pakistani government refused to allow the
armoured cars of 11 PAVO Cavalry to assist the tribesmen in
breaking through to Srinagar.Those who are not familiar should know
that the main reason why the tribals failed to take Srinagar was
because Indian armour counterattacked them and destroyed them at
Shalateng.This fact was discussed by Brig A.A.K Chaudhry also in
his book.Operation Venus plan came much later.At that time the
Indian Army was well established in Kashmir and well poised to meet
any threat.Very few participants of the Kashmir War have left any
written accounts of their war experiences. General Iqbal who
participated in the war and later on rose to the rank of full
general and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, long after
the Kashmir War made one very thought provoking remark about the
Kashmir War in an article in the Pakistan Army Green Book 1992.
This particular publication was sub titled 'Year of the Senior
Field Commanders'. Iqbal wrote; 'During 1948 Kashmir Operations I
saw one senior officer sitting miles behind the frontline and
counting availability of mules and rations. He had relegated the
fighting to a senior battalion commander .In 1963 once Major
General Fazal I Muqueem Khan in his book The Story of Pakistan Army
.Fazal thus wrote; 'To the Army's horror, Pakistan during her
greatest hour of triumph in Kashmir agreed to accept the
ceasefire...it was difficult to understand why Pakistan let that
opportunity pass. Was it assumed weakness; or as a result of
pressing advice; or from misplaced chivalry towards an unfriendly
neighbour in distress? Whatever the reason, Pakistan's reluctance
to accept the risks of continuing the war, cost her Kashmir at that
time. It was a risk worth taking." The Pakistani attack force
collected for Operation Venus consisted of about six infantry
battalions and two armoured regiments. To oppose this the Indians
had two infantry brigades (50 Para Brigade and 80 Infantry Brigade)
.In addition there were two armoured regiments in the same area
i.e. Central India Horse and the Deccan Horse . In addition the
Indians also possessed more than 10 other armoured regiments which
were not in Kashmir but in Punjab or Western UP and could move to
Kashmir. We shall see in 1965 how Pakistani armour functioned and
the reader can keep that as a yardstick in order to appreciate how
Pakistani armour and infantry would have behaved in Operation
Venus; had it been ever launched Fazal does not explain how capture
Of Beri Pattan bridge would have led to complete collapse of Indian
hold over Kashmir, apart from temporary severing of the line of
communication to Poonch.Greater part of the Central India Horse was
at Nowshera close to Beri Pattan while Deccan Horse in Chamb-Akhnur
area was also within striking range and the battle would have been
a hotly contested affair Shaukat Riza did not take the extreme
viewpoint similar to Fazal's when he wrote his book on Pakistan
Army.He merely said that 'On December 30 both sides saw the wisdom
of cease-fire'. Lately in an article General K.M Arif adopted a
more rational viewpoint, when he stated that the Kashmir War of
1948 was mismanaged simply because Pakistan was not in a position
to fight it
General
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