• How should political communities govern their relations with animals?
• Are animals owed justice?
• What might justice for animals involve?
  Alasdair Cochrane introduces the most prominent schools in contemporary political theory - utilitarianism, liberalism, communitarianism, Marxism and feminism - and examines their implications for issues such as meat-eating, intensive agriculture, animal experimentation, religious slaughter and hunting.
  "An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory" explores the debates and discusses controversies over what makes an entity worthy of justice: is it rationality, the ability to contribute to society, sentience, or something else? It also introduces and engages with debates about what our political obligations to animals might entail: is it simply not to cause them unnecessary suffering, or do we have much more demanding obligations not to kill, own, or even use non-human animals?
  

• How should political communities govern their relations with animals?
• Are animals owed justice?
• What might justice for animals involve?
  Alasdair Cochrane introduces the most prominent schools in contemporary political theory - utilitarianism, liberalism, communitarianism, Marxism and feminism - and examines their implications for issues such as meat-eating, intensive agriculture, animal experimentation, religious slaughter and hunting.
  "An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory" explores the debates and discusses controversies over what makes an entity worthy of justice: is it rationality, the ability to contribute to society, sentience, or something else? It also introduces and engages with debates about what our political obligations to animals might entail: is it simply not to cause them unnecessary suffering, or do we have much more demanding obligations not to kill, own, or even use non-human animals?
  

Alasdair Cochrane introduces an entirely new theory of animal rights grounded in their interests as sentient beings. He then applies this theory to different and underexplored policy areas, such as genetic engineering, pet-keeping, indigenous hunting, and religious slaughter. In contrast to other proponents of animal rights, Cochrane claims that because most sentient animals are not autonomous agents, they have no intrinsic interest in liberty. As such, he argues that our obligations to animals lie in ending practices that cause their suffering and death and do not require the liberation of animals.

Cochrane's "interest-based rights approach" weighs the interests of animals to determine which is sufficient to impose strict duties on humans. In so doing, Cochrane acknowledges that sentient animals have a clear and discernable right not to be made to suffer and not to be killed, but he argues that they do not have a prima facie right to liberty. Because most animals possess no interest in leading freely chosen lives, humans have no moral obligation to liberate them. Moving beyond theory to the practical aspects of applied ethics, this pragmatic volume provides much-needed perspective on the realities and responsibilities of the human-animal relationship.

There is now widespread agreement that many non-human animals are sentient, and that this fact has important moral and political implications. Indeed, most are in agreement that animal sentience ought to constrain the actions of political institutions, limiting the harms that can be perpetrated against animals. The primary aim of this book is to show that the political implications of animal sentience go even further than this. For this book argues that sentience establishes a moral equality and a shared set of rights amongst those creatures who possess it. Crucially, this worth and these rights create a duty on moral agents to establish and maintain a political order dedicated to their interests. This book is devoted to sketching what this 'sentientist politics' might look like. It argues in favour of a ' sentientist cosmopolitan democracy': a global political system made up of overlapping local, national, regional and global communities comprised of human and non-human members who exist within shared 'communities of fate'. Furthermore, the institutions of those communities should be democratic - that is to say, participative, deliberative and representative. Finally, those institutions should include dedicated representatives of non-human animals whose job should be to translate the interests of animals into deliberations over what is in the public good for their communities.