This book provides an account of the development of the European Union, from a relatively specialized organ of economic cooperation in the 1960s to the complex, quasi-federal entity that today governs over an increasingly diverse set of policy domains. The book is a must for anyone interested in understanding the past and future of European integration and supranational governance.

This volume elaborates a theory of constitutional politics, the process through which the discursive practices and techniques of constitutional adjudication come to structure the work of governments, parliaments, judges, and administrators. Focusing on the cases of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the European Union, the book examines the sources and consequences of the pan-European movement to confer constitutional review authority on a new governmental institution, the constitutional court. Detailed case studies illustrate how and to what extent legislative processes have been placed under the influence of constitutional judges. In a growing number of policy domains, these judges function as powerful, adjunct legislators. As constitutional courts have consolidated their position as authoritative interpreters of the constitutional law, and especially of human rights provisions, the work of the judiciary, too, has gradually been constitutionalised. Today, ordinary judges seek to detect violations of the constitution in their application of the various codes, and to rewrite statutes that they deem unconstitutional Alec Stone Sweet argues that constitutional adjudication construct

There is a growing interest in delegation to non-majoritarian institutions in Europe, following both the spread of principal-agent theory in political science and law and increasing delegation in practice. During the 1980s and 1990s, governments and parliaments in West European nations have delegated powers and functions to non-majoritarian bodies - the EU, independent central banks, constitutional courts and independent regulatory agencies. Whereas elected policymakers had been increasing their roles over several decades, delegation involves a remarkable reversal or at least transformation of their position. This volume examines key issues about the politics of delegation: how and why delegation has taken place; the institutional design of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions; the consequences of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions; the legitimacy of non-majoritarian institutions. The book addresses these questions both theoretically and empirically, looking at central areas of political life - central banking, the EU, the increasing role of courts and the establishment and impacts of independent regulatory agencies.

The law and politics of European integration have been inseparable since the 1960s, when the European Court of Justice rendered a set of foundational decisions that gradually served to 'constitutionalize' the Treaty of Rome. In this book, Alec Stone Sweet, one of the world's foremost social scientists and legal scholars, blends deductive theory, quantitative analysis of aggregate data, and qualitative case studies to explain the dynamics of European integration and institutional change in the EU since 1959.

Two of the world's leading political scientists present the best of their research, focusing on how to build and test a social science of law and courts. Written for a broad, scholarly audience, the book is also recommended for use in graduate and advanced undergraduate courses in law and the social sciences.

In 1950, a European political space existed, if only as a very primitive site of international governance. Today, the European Union governs in an ever-growing number of policy domains. Increasingly dense networks of transnational actors representing electorates, member state governments, firms, and specialized interests operate in arenas that are best understood as supranational. At the same time, the capacity of European organizations - the Bank, the Commission, and the Court of Justice - to make authoritative policy decisions has steadily expanded, profoundly transforming the very nature of the European policy. This book, a companion volume to "European Integration and Supranational Governance", offers readers a sophisticated theoretical account of this transformation, as well as original empirical research. The editors elaborate an synthesis of institutionalist theory that contributors use to explain the sources and consequences of the emergence and institutionalization of European political arenas. The text examines the evolution of integration and supranational governance across time and policy domain.

The European Union began in 1957 as a treaty among six nations but today constitutes a supranational polity - one that creates rules that are binding on its 15 member countries and their citizens. In this majesterial study, a team of distinguished scholars offers a fresh and coherent explanation of the remarkable development of the EU, drawing evidence from both broad data and focused case studies.

The law and politics of European integration have been inseparable since the 1960s, when the European Court of Justice rendered a set of foundational decisions that gradually served to 'constitutionalize' the Treaty of Rome. In this book, Alec Stone Sweet, one of the world's foremost social scientists and legal scholars, blends deductive theory, quantitative analysis of aggregate data, and qualitative case studies to explain the dynamics of European integration and institutional change in the EU since 1959. He shows that the activities of market actors, lobbyists, legislators, litigators, and judges became connected to one another in various ways, giving the EU its fundamentally expansionary character. He then assesses the impact of Europe's unique legal system on the evolution of supranational governance, tracing outcomes in three policy domains: free movement of goods, sex equality, and environmental protection. The book integrates diverse themes, including: the testing of hypotheses derived from regional integration theory; the 'judicialization' of legislative processes; the path dependence of precedent and legal argumentation; the triumph of the 'rights revolution' in the EU; delegation, agency, and trusteeship; balancing as a technique of judicial rulemaking and governance; and why national administration and justice have been steadily 'Europeanized'. Written for a broad audience, the book is also recommended for use in graduate and advanced undergraduate courses in law and the social sciences.

The development of international arbitration as an autonomous legal order is one of the most remarkable stories of institution building at the global level over the past century. Today, transnational firms and states settle their most important commercial and investment disputes not in courts, but in arbitral centres, a tightly networked set of organizations that compete with one another for docket, resources, and influence. In this book, Alec Stone Sweet and Florian Grisel show that international arbitration has undergone a self-sustaining process of institutional evolution that has steadily enhanced arbitral authority. This judicialization process was sustained by the explosion of trade and investment, which generated a steady stream of high stakes disputes, and the efforts of elite arbitrators and the major centres to construct arbitration as a viable substitute for litigation in domestic courts. For their part, state officials (as legislators and treaty makers), and national judges (as enforcers of arbitral awards), have not just adapted to the expansion of arbitration; they have heavily invested in it, extending the arbitral order's reach and effectiveness. Arbitration's very success has, nonetheless, raised serious questions about its legitimacy as a mode of transnational governance. The book provides a clear causal theory of judicialization using original data and analysis, and a broad, relatively non-technical overview of the evolution of the arbitral order. Each chapter compares international commercial and investor-state arbitration, across clearly specified measures of judicialization and governance. Topics include: the evolution of procedures; the development of precedent and the demand for appeal; balancing in the public interest; legitimacy debates and proposals for systemic reform. This book is a timely assessment of how arbitration has risen to become a key component of international economic law and why its future is far from settled.

This volume focuses, comparatively and dynamically, on the reception of the ECHR regime within the national legal orders of the Member States of the Council of Europe. The definition of "legal order" used is expansive, including the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and any public authority established through constitutional and public law that produces or applies legal norms. The central inquiry of the book is how, through what mechanisms, and to what extent, the national legal orders of the Member States are coordinated with, adapted to, or adjusted by the ECHR - emphasizing both the cooperative and conflictive aspects of reception.
The book brings together a series of structured-focused comparisons: each chapter undertaking a comparative case study which collects and analyzes basic data on the reception of the ECHR within national legal orders. These structured-focused comparisons, whose purpose is not so much to test theory, but to develop appropriate theoretical concepts and to generate hypotheses, work on the assumption that comparing two, relatively like cases offer a better opportunity to build more general theoretical frameworks.
Through an examination of a set of general questions about how national decision-makers - governments, legislators, and judges - have reacted to the evolution of European human rights law, the chapters enquire how various actors within national legal orders could take decisions to either hinder or to enhance the status of the ECHR. What interests or values, individual or corporate, are judges maximizing? How has this affected the evolution of the ECHR? How do national constitutions take into account treaty law (or international lawgenerally)? Do separation of powers doctrines (or other explicit provisions of public law) permit or prohibit the judicial review of the legal validity of legislative and executive acts with reference to "higher" norms? To what extent should the federal or unitary nature of a Member State make a difference to reception? That is, should we expect the territorial distribution of powers and competences - judicial, legislative, administrative - to have an effect on the status or effectiveness of the ECHR, and if so, how?

In this book, Stone Sweet and Ryan provide an accessible introduction to Kantian constitutional theory and the law and politics of European rights protection. Part I sets out Kant's blueprint for achieving Perpetual Peace and constitutional justice within and beyond the nation state. Part II applies these ideas to explain the gradual constitutionalization of a Cosmopolitan Legal Order: a transnational legal system in which justiciable rights are held by individuals; where public officials bear the obligation to fulfil the fundamental rights of all who come within the scope of their jurisdiction; and where domestic and transnational judges supervise how officials act. Such an order was instantiated in Europe through the combined effects of Protocol no. 11 (1998) to the ECHR and the incorporation of the Convention into national law. The authors then describe and assess the strengthening of the European Court's capacities to meet the challenge of chronic failures of protection at the domestic level; its progressive approach to the "qualified" rights covering privacy and family life, and the freedoms of expression, conscience, and religion; the robust enforcement of the "absolute" rights, including the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment; and its determined efforts to render justice to all people that come under its jurisdiction, including non-citizens whose rights are violated beyond Europe. Today, the Strasbourg Court is the most active and important rights-protecting court in the world, its jurisprudence a catalyst for the construction of a cosmopolitan constitution in Europe and beyond.

Across the globe, the domain of the litigator and the judge has radically expanded, making it increasingly difficult for those who study comparative and international politics, public policy and regulation, or the evolution of new modes of governance to avoid encountering a great deal of law and courts. In On Law, Politics, and Judicialization, two of the world's leading political scientists present the best of their research, focusing on how to build and test a social science of law and courts.
Chosen empirical settings include the United States, the GATT-WTO, France and Germany, Imperial China and Islam, the European Union, and the transnational world of the Lex Mercatoria.

Constitutional Politics in Europe is the first comparative study written by a social scientist on the topic of European constitutional courts, and their role in protecting human rights and defending new democratic institutions. Focusing on France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the European Union, the author traces the enormous impact of these courts on both legislative and judicial processes and outcomes, and explains why this impact continues to expand.

In this book, Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews focus on the law and politics of rights protection in democracies, and in human rights regimes in Europe, the Americas, and Africa. After introducing the basic features of modern constitutions, with their emphasis on rights and judicial review, the authors present a theory of proportionality that explains why constitutional judges embraced it. Proportionality analysis is a highly intrusive mode of judicial supervision: it permits state officials to limit rights, but only when necessary to achieve a sufficiently important public interest. Since the 1950s, virtually every powerful domestic and international court has adopted proportionality analysis as the central method for protecting rights. In doing so, judges positioned themselves to review all important legislative and administrative decisions, and to invalidate them as unconstitutional when such policies fail the proportionality test. The result has been a massive - and global - transformation of law and politics. The book explicates the concepts of 'trusteeship', the 'system of constitutional justice', the 'effectiveness' of rights adjudication, and the 'zone of proportionality'. A wide range of case studies analyse: how proportionality has spread, and variation in how it is deployed; the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court has evolved and resisted similar doctrines; the role of proportionality in building ongoing 'constitutional dialogues' with the other branches of government; and the importance of the principle to the courts of regional human rights regimes. While there is variance in the intensity of proportionality-based dialogues, such interactions are today at the very heart of governance in the modern constitutional state and beyond.

In this book, Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews focus on the law and politics of rights protection in democracies, and in human rights regimes in Europe, the Americas, and Africa. After introducing the basic features of modern constitutions, with their emphasis on rights and judicial review, the authors present a theory of proportionality that explains why constitutional judges embraced it. Proportionality analysis is a highly intrusive mode of judicial supervision: it permits state officials to limit rights, but only when necessary to achieve a sufficiently important public interest. Since the 1950s, virtually every powerful domestic and international court has adopted proportionality analysis as the central method for protecting rights. In doing so, judges positioned themselves to review all important legislative and administrative decisions, and to invalidate them as unconstitutional when such policies fail the proportionality test. The result has been a massive - and global - transformation of law and politics. The book explicates the concepts of 'trusteeship', the 'system of constitutional justice', the 'effectiveness' of rights adjudication, and the 'zone of proportionality'. A wide range of case studies analyse: how proportionality has spread, and variation in how it is deployed; the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court has evolved and resisted similar doctrines; the role of proportionality in building ongoing 'constitutional dialogues' with the other branches of government; and the importance of the principle to the courts of regional human rights regimes. While there is variance in the intensity of proportionality-based dialogues, such interactions are today at the very heart of governance in the modern constitutional state and beyond.

The development of international arbitration as an autonomous legal order comprises one of the most remarkable stories of institution building at the global level over the past century. Today, transnational firms and states settle their most important commercial and investment disputes not in courts, but in arbitral centres, a tightly networked set of organizations that compete with one another for docket, resources, and influence. In this book, Alec Stone Sweet and Florian Grisel show that international arbitration has undergone a self-sustaining process of institutional evolution that has steadily enhanced arbitral authority. This judicialization process was sustained by the explosion of trade and investment, which generated a steady stream of high stakes disputes, and the efforts of elite arbitrators and the major centres to construct arbitration as a viable substitute for litigation in domestic courts. For their part, state officials (as legislators and treaty makers), and national judges (as enforcers of arbitral awards), have not just adapted to the expansion of arbitration; they have heavily invested in it, extending the arbitral order's reach and effectiveness. Arbitration's very success has, nonetheless, raised serious questions about its legitimacy as a mode of transnational governance. The book provides a clear causal theory of judicialization, original data collection and analysis, and a broad, relatively non-technical overview of the evolution of the arbitral order. Each chapter compares international commercial and investor-state arbitration, across clearly specified measures of judicialization and governance. Topics include: the evolution of procedures; the development of precedent and the demand for appeal; balancing in the public interest; legitimacy debates and proposals for systemic reform. This book is a timely assessment of how arbitration has risen to become a key component of international economic law and why its future is far from settled.

The essays comprising this volume are the outcome of a major and unique project which looks in detail at the application of EC law by national courts and the interaction of the demands of EC law with the constraints imposed by national legal orders and, especially, national constitutional orders. The volume comprises seven country studies which are shaped around a common research protocol. These are supplemented by three cross-cutting studies which draw on the country studies as well as on broader contextual research work aimed at trying to understand the role of the European Court of Justice in the round. The results of this multi-national research are certain to provoke widespread interest among scholars of European law, international law and European politics, for they offer the first systematic and rigorous attempt to assess the impact of the ECJ among the leading member states of the European Union.

There is a growing interest in delegation to non-majoritarian institutions in Europe, following both the spread of principal-agent theory in political science and law and increasing delegation in practice. During the 1980s and 1990s, governments and parliaments in West European nations have delegated powers and functions to non-majoritarian bodies - the EU, independent central banks, constitutional courts and independent regulatory agencies. Whereas elected policymakers had been increasing their roles over several decades, delegation involves a remarkable reversal or at least transformation of their position. This volume examines key issues about the politics of delegation: how and why delegation has taken place; the institutional design of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions; the consequences of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions; the legitimacy of non-majoritarian institutions. The book addresses these questions both theoretically and empirically, looking at central areas of political life - central banking, the EU, the increasing role of courts and the establishment and impacts of independent regulatory agencies.

The European Union began in 1957 as a treaty among six nations but today constitutes a supranational polity - one that creates rules that are binding on its 15 member countries and their citizens. In this majesterial study, a team of distinguished scholars offers a fresh and coherent explanation of the remarkable development of the EU, drawing evidence from both broad data and focused case studies.