Sex used to rule. Now gender identity is on the throne. Sex survives as a cheap imitation of its former self: assigned at birth, on a spectrum, socially constructed, and definitely not binary. Apparently quite a few of us fall outside the categories male and female. But gender identity is universal—we all have one. Humanity used to be cleaved into two sexes. Now the crucial division depends on whether our gender identity aligns with our body. If it does, we are cisgender; if it does not, we are transgender. The dethroning of sex has meant the threat of execution for formerly noble words like “woman� and “man�. In this provocative, bold, and humane book, the philosopher Alex Byrne pushes back against the new gender revolution. Drawing on evidence from biology, psychology, anthropology, and sexology, Byrne exposes the flaws in the revolutionary manifesto. Accessible and engaging, the book applies the tools of philosophy to gender, sex, transsexuality, patriarchy, our many identities, and our true or authentic selves. The topics of Trouble with Gender are relevant to us all. This is a book for anyone who has wondered “Is sex binary?�, “Why are men and women different?�, “What is a woman?�, or, simply, “Where can I go to know more about these controversies?� Revolutions devour their own children, and the gender revolution is no exception. Trouble with Gender joins the forefront of the counterrevolution, restoring sex to its rightful place, at the centre of what it means to be human.

Eleven distinguished philosophers have contributed specially written essays on a set of topics much debated in recent years, including physicalism, qualia, semantic competence, conditionals, presuppositions, two-dimensional semantics, and the relation between logic and metaphysics. All these topics are prominent in the work of Robert Stalnaker, a major presence in contemporary philosophy, in honour of whom the volume is published. It also contains a substantial new essay in which Stalnaker replies to his critics, and sets out his current views on the topics discussed. Contributors: Richard Heck, Frank Jackson, William Lycan, Vann McGee, John Perry, Paul Pietroski, Sydney Shoemaker, Scott Soames, Daniel Stoljar, Timothy Williamson, and Stephen Yablo.

Introduction by Alex Byrne, Chairman of the IFLA/FAIFE

This brings together papers on professional ethics for library and information services from 17 countries -- from Argentina to Uganda -- approaching professional concerns and responses to their ethical dimensions from a number of different angles. Library associations have considered ethical issues such as freedom of speech, for some time. The first formal code of ethics was the American Library Association's "Code of Ethics for Librarians" from 1938. The current debate emphasises subjects such as, the effects of globalisation and the developing information society; the digital gap between those with free access to information and those who have either limited access or even no access at all; censorship; copyright; and the use of electronic filters. Above all the strict anti-terror legislation introduced in many countries following 11th September 2001, has raised questions concerning freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to access information.

The Second Edition of this ground-breaking collection gives students all the tools they need to understand and engage with major philosophical issues. Students are presented with clear yet thorough topic introductions, historical context, reading guides for challenging selections and exclusive commissioned essays written by leading contemporary philosophers specifically for undergraduates. The Second Edition features a NEW co-author, a NEW focus on diversity within the field and NEW readings and topics relevant to students' lives.

Alex Byrne sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge-knowledge of one's mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans' discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is 'transparent': self-knowledge is achieved by an 'outward glance' at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an 'inward glance' at one's own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from 'p' to 'I believe that p'. One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because 'p' is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to 'I intend to do this', or 'I feel a pain'? Byrne argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one's mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one's mental states (peculiar access).

Alex Byrne sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge-knowledge of one's mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans' discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is 'transparent': self-knowledge is achieved by an 'outward glance' at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an 'inward glance' at one's own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from 'p' to 'I believe that p'. One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because 'p' is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to 'I intend to do this', or 'I feel a pain'? Byrne argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one's mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one's mental states (peculiar access).

Color is an endlessly fascinating subject to philosophers, scientists, and laypersons, as well an an instructive microcosm of cognitive science. In these two anthologies, Alex Byrne and David Hilbert present a survey of the important recent philosophical and scientific writings on color. The introduction to volume 1 provides a philosophical background and links the philosophical issues to the empirical work covered in volume 2. The bibliography in volume 1 is an extensive resource for those doing philosophical work on color. The scientific selections in volume 2 present work in color science that is relevant to philosophical thinking about color; the material is comprehensive and sophisticated enough to be useful to the scientific reader. The introduction to volume 2 is an overview of color science; the volume also contains suggestions for further reading.