Nature's Metaphysics argues that a satisfactory philosophy of science requires a metaphysics that is based on the understanding that causal properties are essentially dispositional properties. Alexander Bird develops and defends a dispositional essentialist account of the laws of nature, and also examines dispositional accounts of explanation, causation, ceteris paribus laws, substances and kinds. Professional philosophers and advanced students working in metaphysics and the philosophy of science will find this book both provocative and stimulating.

While the phrase "metaphysics of science" has been used from time to time, it has only recently begun to denote a specific research area where metaphysics meets philosophy of science-and the sciences themselves. The essays in this volume demonstrate that metaphysics of science is an innovative field of research in its own right. The principle areas covered are: The modal metaphysics of properties: What is the essential nature of natural properties? Are all properties essentially categorical? Are they all essentially dispositions, or are some categorical and others dispositional? Realism in mathematics and its relation to science: What does a naturalistic commitment of scientific realism tell us about our commitments to mathematical entities? Can this question be framed in something other than a Quinean philosophy? Dispositions and their relation to causation: Can we generate an account of causation that takes dispositionality as fundamental? And if we take dispositions as fundamental (and hence not having a categorical causal basis), what is the ontological ground of dispositions? Pandispositionalism: Could all properties be dispositional in nature? Natural kinds: Are there natural kinds, and if so what account of their nature should we give? For example, do they have essences? Here we consider how these issues may be illuminated by considering examples from reals science, in particular biochemistry and neurobiology.

Arguing About Science is an outstanding, engaging introduction to the essential topics in philosophy of science, edited by two leading experts in the field. This exciting and innovative anthology contains a selection of classic and contemporary readings that examine a broad range of issues, from classic problems such as scientific reasoning; causation; and scientific realism, to more recent topics such as science and race; forensic science; and the scientific status of medicine.

The editors bring together some of the most influential contributions of famous philosophers in the field, including John Stuart Mill and Karl Popper, as well as more recent extracts from philosophers and scientists such as Ian Hacking, Stephen Jay Gould, Bas van Fraassen, Nancy Cartwright, and John Worrall. The anthology is organised into nine clear sections:

• science, non science and pseudo-science
• race, gender and science
• scientific reasoning
• scientific explanation
• laws and causation
• science and medicine
• probability and forensic science
• risk, uncertainty and science policy
• scientific realism and anti-realism.

The articles chosen are clear, interesting, and free from unnecessary jargon. The editors provide lucid introductions to each section in which they provide an overview of the debate, as well as suggestions for further reading.

While "metaphysics of science" is a phrase that has been used from time to time, it has only recently been used to denote a specific research area where metaphysics meets philosophy of science and the sciences themselves. The purpose of this volume is to bring together essays by researchers that demonstrate that metaphysics of science is a field of research in its own right which is at the forefront of innovative ideas in philosophy. The principle areas covered are: * The modal metaphysics of properties: What is the essential nature of natural properties? Are all properties essentially categorical? Are they all essentially dispositions, or are some categorical and others dispositional? * Realism in mathematics and its relation to science: What does a naturalistic commitment of scientific realism tell us about our commitments to mathematical entities? Can this question be framed in something other than a Quinean philosophy? * Dispositions and their relation to causation: Can we generate an account of causation that takes dispositionality as fundamental? And if we take dispositions as fundamental (and hence not having a categorical causal basis), what is the ontological ground of dispositions? * Pandispositionalism: Could all properties be dispositional in nature? * Natural kinds: Are there natural kinds, and if so what account of their nature should we give? For example, do they have essences? Here we consider how these issues may be illuminated by considering examples from reals science, in particular biochemistry and neurobiology.

Thomas Kuhn (1922-96) transformed the philosophy of science. His seminal 1962 work "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" introduced the term 'paradigm shift' into the vernacular and remains a fundamental text in the study of the history and philosophy of science. This introduction to Kuhn's ideas covers the breadth of his philosophical work, situating "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" within Kuhn's wider thought and drawing attention to the development of his ideas over time. Kuhn's work is assessed within the context of other philosophies of science notably logical empiricism and recent developments in naturalized epistemology. The author argues that Kuhn's thinking betrays a residual commitment to many theses characteristic of the empiricists he set out to challenge. Kuhn's influence on the history and philosophy of science is assessed and where the field may be heading in the wake of Kuhn's ideas is explored.

An up-to-date, clear but rigorous introduction to the philosophy of science offering an indispensable grounding in the philosophical understanding of science and its problems. The book pays full heed to the neglected but vital conceptual issues such as the nature of scientific laws, while balancing and linking this with a full coverage of epistemological problems such as our knowledge of such laws.

An up-to-date, clear but rigorous introduction to the philosophy of science offering an indispensable grounding in the philosophical understanding of science and its problems. The book pays full heed to the neglected but vital conceptual issues such as the nature of scientific laws, while balancing and linking this with a full coverage of epistemological problems such as our knowledge of such laws.

Thomas Kuhn (1922-96) transformed the philosophy of science. His seminal 1962 work "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" introduced the term 'paradigm shift' into the vernacular and remains a fundamental text in the study of the history and philosophy of science. This introduction to Kuhn's ideas covers the breadth of his philosophical work, situating "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" within Kuhn's wider thought and drawing attention to the development of his ideas over time. Kuhn's work is assessed within the context of other philosophies of science notably logical empiricism and recent developments in naturalized epistemology. The author argues that Kuhn's thinking betrays a residual commitment to many theses characteristic of the empiricists he set out to challenge. Kuhn's influence on the history and philosophy of science is assessed and where the field may be heading in the wake of Kuhn's ideas is explored.

Arguing About Science is an outstanding, engaging introduction to the essential topics in philosophy of science, edited by two leading experts in the field. This exciting and innovative anthology contains a selection of classic and contemporary readings that examine a broad range of issues, from classic problems such as scientific reasoning; causation; and scientific realism, to more recent topics such as science and race; forensic science; and the scientific status of medicine.

The editors bring together some of the most influential contributions of famous philosophers in the field, including John Stuart Mill and Karl Popper, as well as more recent extracts from philosophers and scientists such as Ian Hacking, Stephen Jay Gould, Bas van Fraassen, Nancy Cartwright, and John Worrall. The anthology is organised into nine clear sections:

• science, non science and pseudo-science
• race, gender and science
• scientific reasoning
• scientific explanation
• laws and causation
• science and medicine
• probability and forensic science
• risk, uncertainty and science policy
• scientific realism and anti-realism.

The articles chosen are clear, interesting, and free from unnecessary jargon. The editors provide lucid introductions to each section in which they provide an overview of the debate, as well as suggestions for further reading.

Nature's Metaphysics argues that a satisfactory philosophy of science requires a metaphysics that is based on the understanding that natural properties are essentially dispositional. Alexander Bird develops a dispositional essentialist account of the laws of nature, defending the claim that laws are metaphysically necessary. Professional philosophers and advanced students working in metaphysics and the philosophy of science will find this book both provocative and stimulating.

Thomas S. Kuhn (1922-1996) transformed the philosophy of science. His seminal 1962 work, "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions," sold over one million copies and was translated into more than a dozen languages. It introduced the term "paradigm shift" into the vernacular and remains a fundamental text in the study of the history and philosophy of science. This introduction to Kuhn's ideas situates "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" within the development of his thought over time.

Alexander Bird explains Kuhn's central distinction between normal and revolutionary science and then examines in detail the role played by the key notion of a paradigm in his account of radical scientific change. The book considers Kuhn's claim that the scientist's world changes when paradigms change and relates this thought to his views on perception, incommensurability, and meaning.

The author engages with the main criticisms of Kuhn's philosophy. Examining Kuhn's thought in relation to its historical context as well as other more recent philosophies of science, Alexander Bird argues that Kuhn's thinking betrays a residual commitment to many theses characteristic of the empiricists he set out to challenge. His book concludes by looking at Kuhn's influence on the history and philosophy of science and asks where the field may be heading in the wake of Kuhn's ideas.

Accessible to those with little formal philosophy training, this is an assured and engaging read for anyone interested in Kuhn's pivotal ideas.

Reflections on the metaphysics and epistemology of classification from a distinguished group of philosophers. Contemporary discussions of the success of science often invoke an ancient metaphor from Plato's Phaedrus: successful theories should "carve nature at its joints." But is nature really "jointed"? Are there natural kinds of things around which our theories cut? The essays in this volume offer reflections by a distinguished group of philosophers on a series of intertwined issues in the metaphysics and epistemology of classification. The contributors consider such topics as the relevance of natural kinds in inductive inference; the role of natural kinds in natural laws; the nature of fundamental properties; the naturalness of boundaries; the metaphysics and epistemology of biological kinds; and the relevance of biological kinds to certain questions in ethics. Carving Nature at Its Joints offers both breadth and thematic unity, providing a sampling of state-of-the-art work in contemporary analytic philosophy that will be of interest to a wide audience of scholars and students concerned with classification.

In Knowing Science, Alexander Bird presents an epistemology of science that rejects empiricism and gives a central place to the concept of knowledge. Science aims at knowledge and progresses when it adds to the stock of knowledge. That knowledge is social knowing-it is known by the scientific community as a whole. Evidence is that from which knowledge can be obtained by inference. From this, it follows that evidence is knowledge, and is not limited to perception, nor to observation. Observation supplies evidence that is basic relative to a field of enquiry and can be highly non-perceptual. Theoretical knowledge is typically gained by inference to the only explanation, in which competing plausible hypotheses are falsified by the evidence. In cases where not all competing hypotheses are refuted, scientific hypotheses are not known but instead possess varying degrees of plausibility. Plausibilities in the light of the evidence are probabilities and link eliminative explanationism to Bayesian conditionalization. Bird argues that scientific realism and anti-realism as global metascientific claims should be rejected-the track record gives us only local metascientific claims.