The third volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series focuses on one of the most fiercely contested issues in contemporary legal philosophy: the question of the importance of legal reasoning and how to properly engage with it. This book considers legal reasoning from two different angles: it revolves, on the one hand, around debates concerning interpretation and balancing, but it also asks, on the other, whom we ought to entrust with decision-making based on legal reasoning and how this relates to the very concept of law. The book approaches these underlying problems from a variety of perspectives and against the backdrop of different academic traditions, showcasing the rich landscape of critical debates around contemporary legal reasoning.

This book provides a selective and somewhat cheeky account of prominent positions in legal theory, such as American legal realism, modern legal positivism, sociological systems theory, institutionalism and critical legal studies. It presents a relational approach to law and a new perspective on legal sources. The book explores topics of legal theory in a playful manner. It is written and composed in a way that refutes the widespread prejudice that legal theory is a dreary subject, with a cast of characters that occasionally interact in order to illustrate the claims of the book. Legal experts claim to know what the law is. Legal theory—or jurisprudence—explores whether such claims are warranted. The discipline first emerged at the turn of the 20th century, when the self-confidence of both legal scholarship and judicial craftsmanship became severely shattered, but the crisis continues to this day.

In an age of widespread cutbacks on social spending, the prospects of social policy generally appear to be grim. If noticeable progress has been recently made in the European Union, then it is in regard to rooting out discrimination. Indeed, anti-discrimination law and policy appears to be the one sphere of social policy whose success is causally connected to the European Union.
But how successful can anti-discrimination law be? This book uses legal analysis in order to expose the intrinsic shortcomings of common approaches. Anti-discrimination law fails to provide adequate legal guidance and therefore invites constant supplementation by pedagogical projects of social engineering.
This book offers a genuinely leftist critique on anti-discrimination law, and concludes with a discussion of alternative models of solidarity in the Union.

What is law? The usual answer is that the law is a system of norms. But this answer gives us at best half of the story. The law is a way of relating to one another. We do not do this as lovers or friends and not as people who are interested in obtaining guidance from moral insight. In a legal context, we are cast as 'character masks' (Marx), for example, as 'buyer' and 'seller' or 'landlord' and 'tenant'. We expect to have our claims respected simply because the law has given us rights. We do not want to give any other reason for our behavior than the fact that we have a legal right. Backing rights up with coercive threats indicates that we are willing to accept legal obligations unwillingly. This book offers a conceptual reconstruction of the legal relation on the basis of a critique of legal positivism.

This second volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series presents 11 chapters which are dedicated to normativist and anti-normativist approaches to law. The book focuses on the question: What is law? Is it a set of obligations imposed on courts and officials to guide their conduct and to assess the conduct of others? Or is it the result of settlements reached by opposing sides that accept arrangements and understandings to sustain peaceful cooperation? If law is the former its significance and meaning are independent of a shifting constellation of forces; if it is not, then what the law says depends on the relative power and prestige of the actors involved. With contributions from some of the leading scholars in the field, the collection presents a balanced and nuanced assessment of what is perhaps the most controversial debate in contemporary legal philosophy today.

Moralische Vorwürfe verletzen oder verärgern, vor allem wenn sie einen unvermutet und aus dem Hinterhalt treffen. Plötzlich gilt man als Rassist, Sexist oder gar als elitär. Die Daumen werden nach unten gekehrt und die Menge schreit "Buh". In den Chor einzustimmen verspricht den Teilnehmenden Statusgewinn, denn wer andere verurteilt, reiht sich damit sofort unter die Guten ein. Aber dieses Gutsein ist perfide. Die unbeirrbar auftretende Moral erweist sich bei näherer Betrachtung oftmals als boshaft. Sie macht Mehrdeutiges eindeutig und erzeugt so, was sie anprangert. Sie vermeidet Begründungen, belohnt das Ducken und vertraut auf die blanke Macht der Entrüsteten. Inhaltlich lässt sie sich nicht verallgemeinern, denn sie mutet Menschen zu, Verhaltensmaßstäben zu genügen, denen sie nicht genügen müssen. Die Bosheit dieser Moral gilt es zu begreifen und das Recht von ihrem Einfluss freizuhalten.

This book provides a selective and somewhat cheeky account of prominent positions in legal theory, such as American legal realism, modern legal positivism, sociological systems theory, institutionalism and critical legal studies. It presents a relational approach to law and a new perspective on legal sources. The book explores topics of legal theory in a playful manner. It is written and composed in a way that refutes the widespread prejudice that legal theory is a dreary subject, with a cast of characters that occasionally interact in order to illustrate the claims of the book. Legal experts claim to know what the law is. Legal theory-or jurisprudence-explores whether such claims are warranted. The discipline first emerged at the turn of the 20th century, when the self-confidence of both legal scholarship and judicial craftsmanship became severely shattered, but the crisis continues to this day.

This second volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series presents 11 chapters which are dedicated to normativist and anti-normativist approaches to law. The book focuses on the question: What is law? Is it a set of obligations imposed on courts and officials to guide their conduct and to assess the conduct of others? Or is it the result of settlements reached by opposing sides that accept arrangements and understandings to sustain peaceful cooperation? If law is the former its significance and meaning are independent of a shifting constellation of forces; if it is not, then what the law says depends on the relative power and prestige of the actors involved. With contributions from some of the leading scholars in the field, the collection presents a balanced and nuanced assessment of what is perhaps the most controversial debate in contemporary legal philosophy today.

The first volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy illustrates the remarkable scope of contemporary legal philosophy. It introduces methodological questions rooted in national academic discourses, discusses the origin of legal systems, and contrasts constitutionalist and monist approaches to the rule of law with the institutionalist approach most prominently and vigorously defended by Carl Schmitt. The issue at the core of these topics is which of these perspectives is more plausible in an age defined both by a 'postnational constellation' and the re-emergence of nationalist tendencies; an age in which the law increasingly cancels out borders only to see new frontiers erected.

Das positive Recht ist das Objekt des rechtlichen Wissens. Aber wer oder was ist sein Subjekt? Ist es "die" Rechtswissenschaft? Ist es die jeweils zu einer Entscheidung befugte Stelle? Oder ist es gar "das Recht selbst"? Im Hauptbeitrag dieses Bandes wird die provokante These entfaltet, dass das Recht nicht bloß Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, sondern auch Subjekt des Erkennens ist. Den Schlüssel zum Verständnis dieser These bildet eine Theorie der Rechtsquellen. Diese lassen sich als Formen des Urteilens begreifen, etwa in der Form der Behauptung, etwas gehe nicht an, weil es das noch nie gegeben habe (Gewohnheitsrecht), oder etwas sei unerlaubt, weil das so entschieden worden sei (Gesetzesrecht). Keine Quelle kann für sich selbst sprechen. Sie bedarf der Vermittlung durch eine andere. Zwischen den Quellen entsteht solcherart ein spannungsreiches Verhältnis von wechselseitiger Anerkennung und Zurückweisung. Im Fall der Beziehung zwischen der hoheitlichen Rechtsanwendung und der wissenschaftlichen Rechtserkenntnis lässt sich dieses Verhältnis unter Anknüpfung an Hegel als Dialektik von Herrschaft und Knechtschaft beschreiben. Aus der Sackgasse, in die das rechtliche Wissen damit gerät, lässt sich ein Ausweg nur finden, indem man die Theorie der Rechtsquellen zur Theorie des Rechtsverhältnisses erweitert. Auf deren Grundlage lässt sich die Rechtsgeltung als Konstrukt begreifen, dessen wir uns bedienen, um mit moralischen Auffassungsunterschieden fertig zu werden.

The first volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy illustrates the remarkable scope of contemporary legal philosophy. It introduces methodological questions rooted in national academic discourses, discusses the origin of legal systems, and contrasts constitutionalist and monist approaches to the rule of law with the institutionalist approach most prominently and vigorously defended by Carl Schmitt. The issue at the core of these topics is which of these perspectives is more plausible in an age defined both by a 'postnational constellation' and the re-emergence of nationalist tendencies; an age in which the law increasingly cancels out borders only to see new frontiers erected.