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The third volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series
focuses on one of the most fiercely contested issues in
contemporary legal philosophy: the question of the importance of
legal reasoning and how to properly engage with it. This book
considers legal reasoning from two different angles: it revolves,
on the one hand, around debates concerning interpretation and
balancing, but it also asks, on the other, whom we ought to entrust
with decision-making based on legal reasoning and how this relates
to the very concept of law. The book approaches these underlying
problems from a variety of perspectives and against the backdrop of
different academic traditions, showcasing the rich landscape of
critical debates around contemporary legal reasoning.
This book provides a selective and somewhat cheeky account of
prominent positions in legal theory, such as American legal
realism, modern legal positivism, sociological systems theory,
institutionalism and critical legal studies. It presents a
relational approach to law and a new perspective on legal sources.
The book explores topics of legal theory in a playful manner. It is
written and composed in a way that refutes the widespread prejudice
that legal theory is a dreary subject, with a cast of characters
that occasionally interact in order to illustrate the claims of the
book. Legal experts claim to know what the law is. Legal
theory—or jurisprudence—explores whether such claims are
warranted. The discipline first emerged at the turn of the 20th
century, when the self-confidence of both legal scholarship and
judicial craftsmanship became severely shattered, but the crisis
continues to this day.
In an age of widespread cutbacks on social spending, the prospects
of social policy generally appear to be grim. If noticeable
progress has been recently made in the European Union, then it is
in regard to rooting out discrimination. Indeed,
anti-discrimination law and policy appears to be the one sphere of
social policy whose success is causally connected to the European
Union.
But how successful can anti-discrimination law be? This book uses
legal analysis in order to expose the intrinsic shortcomings of
common approaches. Anti-discrimination law fails to provide
adequate legal guidance and therefore invites constant
supplementation by pedagogical projects of social engineering.
This book offers a genuinely leftist critique on
anti-discrimination law, and concludes with a discussion of
alternative models of solidarity in the Union.
What is law? The usual answer is that the law is a system of norms.
But this answer gives us at best half of the story. The law is a
way of relating to one another. We do not do this as lovers or
friends and not as people who are interested in obtaining guidance
from moral insight. In a legal context, we are cast as 'character
masks' (Marx), for example, as 'buyer' and 'seller' or 'landlord'
and 'tenant'. We expect to have our claims respected simply because
the law has given us rights. We do not want to give any other
reason for our behavior than the fact that we have a legal right.
Backing rights up with coercive threats indicates that we are
willing to accept legal obligations unwillingly. This book offers a
conceptual reconstruction of the legal relation on the basis of a
critique of legal positivism.
This second volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy
series presents 11 chapters which are dedicated to normativist and
anti-normativist approaches to law. The book focuses on the
question: What is law? Is it a set of obligations imposed on courts
and officials to guide their conduct and to assess the conduct of
others? Or is it the result of settlements reached by opposing
sides that accept arrangements and understandings to sustain
peaceful cooperation? If law is the former its significance and
meaning are independent of a shifting constellation of forces; if
it is not, then what the law says depends on the relative power and
prestige of the actors involved. With contributions from some of
the leading scholars in the field, the collection presents a
balanced and nuanced assessment of what is perhaps the most
controversial debate in contemporary legal philosophy today.
Moralische Vorwürfe verletzen oder verärgern, vor allem wenn sie
einen unvermutet und aus dem Hinterhalt treffen. Plötzlich gilt
man als Rassist, Sexist oder gar als elitär. Die Daumen werden
nach unten gekehrt und die Menge schreit "Buh". In den Chor
einzustimmen verspricht den Teilnehmenden Statusgewinn, denn wer
andere verurteilt, reiht sich damit sofort unter die Guten ein.
Aber dieses Gutsein ist perfide. Die unbeirrbar auftretende Moral
erweist sich bei näherer Betrachtung oftmals als boshaft. Sie
macht Mehrdeutiges eindeutig und erzeugt so, was sie anprangert.
Sie vermeidet Begründungen, belohnt das Ducken und vertraut auf
die blanke Macht der Entrüsteten. Inhaltlich lässt sie sich nicht
verallgemeinern, denn sie mutet Menschen zu, Verhaltensmaßstäben
zu genügen, denen sie nicht genügen müssen. Die Bosheit dieser
Moral gilt es zu begreifen und das Recht von ihrem Einfluss
freizuhalten.
This book provides a selective and somewhat cheeky account of
prominent positions in legal theory, such as American legal
realism, modern legal positivism, sociological systems theory,
institutionalism and critical legal studies. It presents a
relational approach to law and a new perspective on legal sources.
The book explores topics of legal theory in a playful manner. It is
written and composed in a way that refutes the widespread prejudice
that legal theory is a dreary subject, with a cast of characters
that occasionally interact in order to illustrate the claims of the
book. Legal experts claim to know what the law is. Legal theory-or
jurisprudence-explores whether such claims are warranted. The
discipline first emerged at the turn of the 20th century, when the
self-confidence of both legal scholarship and judicial
craftsmanship became severely shattered, but the crisis continues
to this day.
This second volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy
series presents 11 chapters which are dedicated to normativist and
anti-normativist approaches to law. The book focuses on the
question: What is law? Is it a set of obligations imposed on courts
and officials to guide their conduct and to assess the conduct of
others? Or is it the result of settlements reached by opposing
sides that accept arrangements and understandings to sustain
peaceful cooperation? If law is the former its significance and
meaning are independent of a shifting constellation of forces; if
it is not, then what the law says depends on the relative power and
prestige of the actors involved. With contributions from some of
the leading scholars in the field, the collection presents a
balanced and nuanced assessment of what is perhaps the most
controversial debate in contemporary legal philosophy today.
The first volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy
illustrates the remarkable scope of contemporary legal philosophy.
It introduces methodological questions rooted in national academic
discourses, discusses the origin of legal systems, and contrasts
constitutionalist and monist approaches to the rule of law with the
institutionalist approach most prominently and vigorously defended
by Carl Schmitt. The issue at the core of these topics is which of
these perspectives is more plausible in an age defined both by a
'postnational constellation' and the re-emergence of nationalist
tendencies; an age in which the law increasingly cancels out
borders only to see new frontiers erected.
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Wissen des Rechts (Paperback)
Alexander Somek; Commentary by Andreas Funke, Thomas Vesting
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R527
Discovery Miles 5 270
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Ships in 12 - 17 working days
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Das positive Recht ist das Objekt des rechtlichen Wissens. Aber wer
oder was ist sein Subjekt? Ist es "die" Rechtswissenschaft? Ist es
die jeweils zu einer Entscheidung befugte Stelle? Oder ist es gar
"das Recht selbst"? Im Hauptbeitrag dieses Bandes wird die
provokante These entfaltet, dass das Recht nicht bloß Gegenstand
der Erkenntnis, sondern auch Subjekt des Erkennens ist. Den
Schlüssel zum Verständnis dieser These bildet eine Theorie der
Rechtsquellen. Diese lassen sich als Formen des Urteilens
begreifen, etwa in der Form der Behauptung, etwas gehe nicht an,
weil es das noch nie gegeben habe (Gewohnheitsrecht), oder etwas
sei unerlaubt, weil das so entschieden worden sei (Gesetzesrecht).
Keine Quelle kann für sich selbst sprechen. Sie bedarf der
Vermittlung durch eine andere. Zwischen den Quellen entsteht
solcherart ein spannungsreiches Verhältnis von wechselseitiger
Anerkennung und Zurückweisung. Im Fall der Beziehung zwischen der
hoheitlichen Rechtsanwendung und der wissenschaftlichen
Rechtserkenntnis lässt sich dieses Verhältnis unter Anknüpfung
an Hegel als Dialektik von Herrschaft und Knechtschaft beschreiben.
Aus der Sackgasse, in die das rechtliche Wissen damit gerät,
lässt sich ein Ausweg nur finden, indem man die Theorie der
Rechtsquellen zur Theorie des Rechtsverhältnisses erweitert. Auf
deren Grundlage lässt sich die Rechtsgeltung als Konstrukt
begreifen, dessen wir uns bedienen, um mit moralischen
Auffassungsunterschieden fertig zu werden.
The first volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy
illustrates the remarkable scope of contemporary legal philosophy.
It introduces methodological questions rooted in national academic
discourses, discusses the origin of legal systems, and contrasts
constitutionalist and monist approaches to the rule of law with the
institutionalist approach most prominently and vigorously defended
by Carl Schmitt. The issue at the core of these topics is which of
these perspectives is more plausible in an age defined both by a
'postnational constellation' and the re-emergence of nationalist
tendencies; an age in which the law increasingly cancels out
borders only to see new frontiers erected.
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