Modern option pricing theory was developed in the late sixties and early seventies by F. Black, R. e. Merton and M. Scholes as an analytical tool for pricing and hedging option contracts and over-the-counter warrants. How ever, already in the seminal paper by Black and Scholes, the applicability of the model was regarded as much broader. In the second part of their paper, the authors demonstrated that a levered firm's equity can be regarded as an option on the value of the firm, and thus can be priced by option valuation techniques. A year later, Merton showed how the default risk structure of cor porate bonds can be determined by option pricing techniques. Option pricing models are now used to price virtually the full range of financial instruments and financial guarantees such as deposit insurance and collateral, and to quantify the associated risks. Over the years, option pricing has evolved from a set of specific models to a general analytical framework for analyzing the production process of financial contracts and their function in the financial intermediation process in a continuous time framework. However, very few attempts have been made in the literature to integrate game theory aspects, i. e. strategic financial decisions of the agents, into the continuous time framework. This is the unique contribution of the thesis of Dr. Alexandre Ziegler. Benefiting from the analytical tractability of contin uous time models and the closed form valuation models for derivatives, Dr."

This book considers the impact of incomplete information and heterogeneous beliefs on investor's optimal portfolio and consumption behavior and equilibrium asset prices. After a brief review of the existing incomplete information literature, the effect of incomplete information on investors' exptected utility, risky asset prices, and interest rates is described. It is demonstrated that increasing the quality of investors' information need not increase their expected utility and the prices of risky assets. The impact of heterogeneous beliefs on investors' portfolio and consumption behavior and equilibrium asset prices is shown to be non-trivial. Heterogeneous beliefs can explain a number of observed phenomena, such as the fact that equilibrium state-price densities are not log-normal, the "smile" in option implied volatility, and the patterns of implied risk aversion reported recently in the literature. It is also demonstrated that financial markets in general do not aggregate information efficiently, a fact that can explain the equity premium puzzle.

Modern option pricing theory was developed in the late sixties and early seventies by F. Black, R. e. Merton and M. Scholes as an analytical tool for pricing and hedging option contracts and over-the-counter warrants. How ever, already in the seminal paper by Black and Scholes, the applicability of the model was regarded as much broader. In the second part of their paper, the authors demonstrated that a levered firm's equity can be regarded as an option on the value of the firm, and thus can be priced by option valuation techniques. A year later, Merton showed how the default risk structure of cor porate bonds can be determined by option pricing techniques. Option pricing models are now used to price virtually the full range of financial instruments and financial guarantees such as deposit insurance and collateral, and to quantify the associated risks. Over the years, option pricing has evolved from a set of specific models to a general analytical framework for analyzing the production process of financial contracts and their function in the financial intermediation process in a continuous time framework. However, very few attempts have been made in the literature to integrate game theory aspects, i. e. strategic financial decisions of the agents, into the continuous time framework. This is the unique contribution of the thesis of Dr. Alexandre Ziegler. Benefiting from the analytical tractability of contin uous time models and the closed form valuation models for derivatives, Dr."

After a brief review of the existing incomplete information literature, the effect of incomplete information on investors' exptected utility, risky asset prices, and interest rates is described. It is demonstrated that increasing the quality of investors' information need not increase their expected utility and the prices of risky assets. The impact of other factors is discussed in detail. It is also demonstrated that financial markets in general do not aggregate information efficiently, a fact that can explain the equity premium puzzle.