"Internal war does not create politics or processes of government. This is likely to be the most tragic aspect of the war in Vietnam. When the guns are silent, the political analyst will find essentially the same political forces and governmental institutions intact as when the conflict began."

"Politics in War" deals mainly with the years 1967-1970 but bears on the problems South Vietnam faces now that American forces are no longer active. The book provides an understanding of Vietnamese politics, the forces underlying it, and the bases upon which political community and a future political settlement might be achieved.

Mr. Goodman has based his analysis on first-hand research. He conducted over 300 interviews with Vietnamese political leaders and government officials. His field work in South Vietnam encompassed three years and he presents materials from such sources as South Vietnam's National Assembly, its Ministry of Interior, and the U.S. Department of State's Vietnam Working Group.

"Politics in War" presents the untold story of how the Vietnamese saw the period of deepest American involvement. Goodman supplies background material on the Thieu government, its motivations, and its response to the people.

Students of politics who have been concerned about what the Vietnam involvement meant to America can now better assess what the last decade has meant to the Vietnamese.

This book provides a representation of a world in which none of us have lived and of its potential dynamics. It looks at the interaction of tendencies such as democratization, technological expansion, regional integration, and the obsolescence of war, and discusses U.S. role in changing world order.

As recent conflicts in Panama and the Persian Gulf demonstrate, we know much more about making war than we do about making peace. Such conflicts are not likely to disappear, and this volume reviews what has and hasn't worked in negotiating an end to war. Six case studies-ranging from World War I to the Persian Gulf crisis-illustrate a variety of actors, stakes, and strategies involved in the peacemaking process. Key turning points toward peace or deadlock are identified along the way. Making Peace also provides discussion questions, historical backgrounds, and theoretical introductions to show different-and differentially successful-avenues to peace.

Each year, 700,000 students from around the world come to the United States and Canada to study. For many, the experience is as challenging as it is exciting. Far from home, they must adapt to a new culture, new university system, and, in many cases, a new language. The process can be overwhelming, but as Charles Lipson's Succeeding as an International Student in the United States and Canada assures us, it doesn't have to be."Succeeding" is designed to help students navigate the myriad issues they will encounter - from picking a program to landing a campus job. Based on Lipson's work with international students as well as extensive interviews with faculty and advisers, "Succeeding" includes practical suggestions for learning English, participating in class, and meeting with instructors. In addition it explains the rules of academic honesty as they are understood in U.S. and Canadian universities.Life beyond the classroom is also covered, with handy sections on living on or off campus, obtaining a driver's license, setting up a bank account, and more. The comprehensive glossary addresses both academic terms and phrases heard while shopping or visiting a doctor. There is even a chapter on the academic calendar and holidays in the United States and Canada.Coming to a new country to study should be an exciting venture, not a baffling ordeal. Now, with this trustworthy resource, international students have all the practical information they need to succeed, in and out of the classroom.

Bruce Berkowitz and Allan Goodman draw on historical analysis, interviews, and their own professional experience in the intelligence community to provide an evaluation of U.S. strategic intelligence.

Confronted by the new challenges of the information age and the post-Soviet world, the U.S. intelligence community must adapt and change. And marginal change is not enough, the authors of this provocative book insist. Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman call for fundamental, radical reforms in the organization and approach of America's intelligence agencies. They show why traditional approaches to intelligence fall short today, and they propose thoughtful alternatives that take into account recent changes in information technology and intelligence requirements. An information-age intelligence service would move away from a rigid, hierarchical structure toward a more fluid, networked organization, the authors explain. They recommend a system that would utilize the private sector-with its access to more capital and its ability to move more quickly than a government organization. At the same time, this system would encourage government intelligence operations to concentrate on the specialized, high-risk activities they are uniquely able to perform. Berkowitz and Goodman examine recent failures of the intelligence community, discuss why traditional principles of intelligence are no longer adequate, and consider the implications for such broad policy issues as secrecy, covert action, and the culture of the intelligence community.

This unique history offers the most detailed and best documented account of the early years of the CIA currently available. It reveals the political and bureaucratic struggles that accompanied the creation of the modern U. S. intelligence community. In addition, it proposes a theory of effective intelligence organization, applied both to the movement to create the CIA and to the form it eventually took.

The period covered by this study was crucially important because it was during this time that the main battles over the establishment, responsibilities, and turf of the agency were fought. Many of these disputes framed the forty years, such as the relationship of the CIA to other government agency intelligence operations, the role of covert action, and Congressional oversight of the intelligence community.

The sources upon which Darling drew for this study include the files of the National Security Council, the wartime files of the OSS, and interviews and correspondence with many of the principal players.