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Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program (CRT) in 1991 so that the United States could assist the
former Soviet Republics with the safe and secure transportation,
storage and elimination of nuclear weapons. The CRT program seeks
to reduce the threat these weapons pose to the United States and to
reduce the proliferation risks from nuclear weapons and materials
in the former Soviet Union. Congress has authorised and
appropriated around USD300-USD400 million each year for CTR. have
questioned whether all of the proposed and ongoing projects
contribute to US national security. Some have questioned Russia's
commitment, both political and financial to some of the projects.
This book reviews many of the concerns that have been raised in
Congress during debates over CTR. It also provides a summary of the
funding for different CTR projects and presents an analysis of CTR
and its structure and impact. Contents: Preface; Overview of the
CTR Program; Evolving Rationale, Program Implementation, Focus of
the CTR Programs, Value of U.S. Assistance under CTR, Scope of the
CTR Programs, Russia's Financial Commitment to CTR Programs,
Linkage between U.S. Assistance and Russian Policies. Subject
Index.
During the Senate debate on the new U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (New START) in 2010, many Senators raised
questions about Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons and noted
their absence from the treaty limits. The United States and Russia
have not included limits on these weapons in past arms control
agreements. Nevertheless, Congress may press the Administration to
seek solutions to the potential risks presented by these weapons in
the future.
Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat
reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991,
after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet
Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet
nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400 million in
the DOD budget to over $1 billion per year across three
agencies-DOD, DOE, and the State Department. It has also evolved
from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union,
to a more comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation
effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and
into the hands of rogue nations or terrorist groups, to a global
program to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction.
The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April
8, 2010. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Armed
Services Committee both held hearings on the treaty. The U.S.
Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22,
2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament-the
Duma and Federation Council- approved the treaty in late January
2011, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011, after
Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged
the instruments of ratification.
The United States and Russia signed a new START Treaty on April 8,
2010, and the treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011. Many
analysts, both in the United States and Russia, supported
negotiations on a new treaty so that the two sides could continue
to implement parts of the complex monitoring and verification
regime in the 1991 START Treaty. This regime was designed to build
confidence in compliance with the START and to provide transparency
and cooperation during the treaty's implementation. The
verification regime in the new START Treaty differs in some
respects from the regime in START. These differences reflect an
interest in reducing the cost and complexity of the regime,
updating it to account for changes in the relationship between the
United States and Russia, and tailoring it to address the
monitoring and verification complexities presented by the new
limits in the new treaty. The verification regime received scrutiny
in both the Senate, which voted on December 22, 2010, to consent to
ratification, and the public.
During discussions about the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, Congress
reviewed and discussed the plans for maintaining and modernizing
U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Although the United States plans to
reduce the number of warheads deployed on its long-range missiles
and bombers, consistent with the terms of the New START Treaty, it
also plans to develop new delivery systems for deployment over the
next 20-30 years. As a result, the 112th Congress will continue to
review these programs during the annual authorization and
appropriations process. During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear
arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for nuclear
weapons. The longer-range systems, which included long-range
missiles based on U.S. territory, long-range missiles based on
submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets
from their bases in the United States, are known as strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles. At the end of the Cold War, in 1991, the
United States deployed more than 10,000 warheads on these delivery
vehicles. That number has declined to less than 6,000 warheads
today, and is slated to decline to 1,550 warheads by the year 2017
if the New START Treaty enters into force. At the present time, the
U.S. land-based ballistic missile force (ICBMs) consists of 450
Minuteman III ICBMs, each deployed with between one and three
warheads; they will all be reduced to only one warhead over the
next few years. The Air Force has deactivated all 50 of the
10-warhead Peacekeeper ICBMs and 50 Minuteman III missiles. The Air
Force is also modernizing the Minuteman missiles, replacing and
upgrading their rocket motors, guidance systems, and other
components. The Air Force had expected to begin replacing the
Minuteman missiles around 2018, but has decided, instead, to
continue to modernize and maintain the existing missiles, so that
they can remain in the force through 2030. The U.S. ballistic
missile submarine fleet currently consists of 14 Trident
submarines; each carries 24 Trident II (D-5) missiles. The Navy
converted 4 of the original 18 Trident submarines to carry
non-nuclear cruise missiles. The remaining submarines currently
carry around 1,200 warheads in total; that number will decline as
the United States implements the New START Treaty. The Navy has
shifted the basing of the submarines, so that nine are deployed in
the Pacific Ocean and five are in the Atlantic, to better cover
targets in and around Asia. It also has undertaken efforts to
extend the life of the missiles and warheads so that they and the
submarines can remain in the fleet past 2020, and to begin design
work on a new submarine. The U.S. fleet of heavy bombers includes
19 B-2 bombers and 94 B-52 bombers. The B-1 bomber is no longer
equipped for nuclear missions. The fleet will decline to around 60
aircraft in coming years, as the United States implements New
START. The Air Force has also begun to retire the nuclear-armed
cruise missiles carried by B-52 bombers, leaving only about half
the B-52 fleet equipped to carry nuclear weapons. The Air Force
plans to procure both a new long-range bomber and a new cruise
missile over the next 20 years. The Obama Administration is
completing a review of the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear
force, and a review of U.S. nuclear employment policy, as it
implements the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. It is also implementing
the New START Treaty with Russia that will limit the number of
deployed missiles and warheads in the U.S. strategic force.
Congress will review the Administration's plans for U.S. strategic
nuclear forces during the annual authorization and appropriations
process, and as it assesses U.S. plans under New START and possible
future arms control treaties with Russia.
Prompt global strike (PGS) would allow the United States to strike
targets anywhere on Earth with conventional weapons in as little as
an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and
defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack
high-value targets or "fleeting targets" at the start of or during
a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but
it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for
specific programs.
Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that
have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security
strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain
the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain
U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them
as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military
planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and
surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced
formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and
cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of
implementation for many of these agreements slowed during the
Clinton Administration, and the Bush Administration usually
preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and
agreements to address U.S. security concerns. But the Obama
Administration resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and
pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and
nonproliferation efforts.
During the first Obama Administration, Congress reviewed the 2010
Nuclear Posture Review, the 2012 New START Treaty, and funding
plans for the U.S. nuclear enterprise. Specifically, even though
the United States plans to reduce the number of warheads deployed
on its long-range missiles and bombers, consistent with the terms
of the New START Treaty, it also plans to develop new delivery
systems for deployment over the next 20-30 years. The 113th
Congress will continue to review these programs during the annual
authorization and appropriations process. During the Cold War, the
U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for
nuclear weapons. The longer-range systems, which included
long-range missiles based on U.S. territory, long-range missiles
based on submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet
targets from their bases in the United States, are known as
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. At the end of the Cold War, in
1991, the United States deployed more than 10,000 warheads on these
delivery vehicles. That number has declined to less than 2,000
warheads today, and is slated to decline to 1,550 warheads by the
2018, after the New START Treaty completes implementation.
On May 24, 2002, President Bush and Russia's President Putin signed
the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (known as the Moscow
Treaty). It mandated that the United States and Russia reduce their
strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by
December 31, 2012. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to
ratification on March 6, 2003; the Russian Parliament did the same
on May 14, 2003. The treaty entered into force on June 1, 2003, and
lapsed on February 5, 2011, when the New START Treaty entered into
force.
The Bush Administration conducted a review of U.S. nuclear weapons
force posture during its first year in office. Although the review
sought to adjust U.S. nuclear posture to address changes in the
international security environment at the start of the new century,
it continued many of the policies and programs that had been a part
of the U.S. nuclear posture during the previous decade and during
the Cold War. This report, which will be updated as needed,
provides an overview of the U.S. nuclear posture to highlight areas
of change and areas of continuity.
Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat
reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991,
after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet
Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet
nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400 million in
the DOD budget around $1.1 billion across three agencies -- DOD,
DOE and the State Department. It has also evolved from an emergency
response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a more
comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation effort, to a
broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and into the
hands of rogue nations or terrorist groups. The Department of
Defense manages the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program,
which provides Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with
assistance in transporting, storing, and dismantling nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons. U.S. assistance has helped these
nations eliminate the delivery systems for nuclear weapons under
the START I Treaty, secure weapons storage areas, construct a
storage facility for nuclear materials removed from weapons,
construct a destruction facility for chemical weapons, and secure
biological weapons materials. The State Department manages the
International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev.
These centers provide research grants to scientists and engineers
so that they will not sell their knowledge to other nations or
terrorist groups. The State Department has also provided assistance
with export and border control programs in the former Soviet
states. The Department of Energy manages programs that seek to
improve the security of nuclear materials at civilian, naval, and
nuclear weapons complex facilities. It also funds programs that
help nuclear scientists and engineers find employment in commercial
enterprises. DOE is also helping Russia dispose of plutonium
removed from nuclear weapons and shut-down its remaining
plutonium-producing reactors by replacing them with fossil-fuel
plants. Analysts have debated numerous issues related to U.S.
nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance. These include
questions about the coordination of and priority given to these
programs in the U.S. government, questions about Russia's
willingness to provide the United States with access to its weapons
facilities, questions about the President's ability to waive
certification requirements so that the programs can go forward, and
questions about the need to expand the efforts into a global
program that receives funding from numerous nations and possibly
extends assistance to others outside the former Soviet Union.
Non-proliferation assistance programs are a relatively new tool in
combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The
Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs, funded by the
Department of Defense (DOD), are the most visible of these
programs. Begun in 1991, CTR initially aimed to help Russia meet
its START obligations to reduce strategic nuclear weapons; 1.
Within a decade, however, CTR took on the goal of reducing the
threat of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 2.
Experts realised that Russia needed to protect its Cold War
overhang of WMD materials, scientists, and equipment from those who
might exploit insider opportunities and who had incentives
(particularly financial) to sell WMD technology to anyone. Now,
however, many analysts support expanding co-operative threat
reduction programs beyond Russia to other geographic areas. The
Bush Administration itself stated in early 2003, that it had
'expanded the strategic focus of the CTR program' to support the
war on terrorism. This book surveys options for applying CTR
programs to states that pose a WMD and terrorism threat.
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