In this fundamental analysis, Rapoport asks: Why do we have wars? Doesn't humanity always seem on the verge of self-annihilation? Is there something in human genetic structure that makes people want to kill each other? Perhaps this impulse is a matter of good versus evil, or just plain human nature. Rapoport moves beyond cliches by claiming that the sources of modern violence reside in the imbalance between a lag in the system of values inherited from the past and the structure of science and technology that awaits no revision of values to move ahead. As a result, Rapoport argues that the study of war and peace should be considered a science, just like biology or, for that matter, political science. The same rules of empirical engagement and experimentation should apply. Before we can have a theory of peace, we need a methodology of conflict. Using the writings of thinkers who have made significant contributions to the predominant ideas and ideals of our society, Rapoport weaves together the strands of independent thought and research into a single, thought-provoking work. After investigating the whys of violence, using ideological, psychological, strategic, and systemic perspective, Rapoport moves to an in-depth analysis of possible varieties of conflict resolution. He explores such mechanisms as mediation, education, and applying the results of scientific research. He documents the impact of ideologies countervailing dominant ones that place obstacles in the way of peacemaking. Rapoport argues that conciliation and game theories can be utilized to replace the concept of winner take all or total victory. The Origins of Violence is a needed contribution to our understanding of warfare, and provides a forward-looking perspective that can be of wide use to each of the policy sciences, starting with military strategy and ending with international development.

This book reports our research on detection of change processes that underlie psychophysical, learning, medical diagnosis, military, and pro duction control situations, and share three major features. First, the states of the process are not directly observable but become gradually known with the sequential acquisition of fallible information over time. Second, the mechanism that generates the fallible information is not stationary; rather, it is subjected to a sudden and irrevocable change. Thirdly, in complete, probabilistic information about the time of change is available when the process commences. The purpose of the book is to characterize this class of detection of change processes, to derive the optimal policy that minimizes total expected loss, and, most importantly, to develop testable response models, based on simple decision rules, for describing detection of change behavior. The book is theoretical in the sense that it offers mathematical models of multi-stage decision behavior and solutions to optimization problems. However, it is not anti-empirical, as it aims to stimulate new experimental research and to generate applications. Throughout the book, questions of experimental verification are briefly considered, and existing data from two studies are brought to bear on the validity of the models. The work is not complete; it only provides a starting point for investigating how people detect a change in an uncertain environment, balancing between the cost of delay in detecting the change and the cost of making an incor rect terminal decision."

Following upon the first two volumes in this series, which dealt with a broad spectrum of topics in the environment and behavior field, ranging from theoretical to applied, and including disciplinary, interdisciplinary, and professionally oriented approaches, we have chosen to devote sub sequent volumes to more specifically defined topics. Thus, Volume Three dealt with Children and the Environment, seen from the combined perspective of researchers in environmental and developmental psy chology. The present volume has a similarly topical coverage, dealing with the complex set of relationships between culture and the physical environment. It is broad and necessarily eclectic with respect to content, theory, methodology, and epistemological stance, and the contributors to it represent a wide variety of fields and disciplines, including psy chology, geography, anthropology, economics, and environmental de sign. We were fortunate to enlist the collaboration of Amos Rapoport in the organization and editing of this volume, as he brings to this task a particularly pertinent perspective that combines anthropology and ar chitecture. Volume Five of the series, presently in preparation, will cover the subject of behavioral science aspects of transportation. Irwin Altman Joachim F. Wohlwill ix Contents Introduction 1 CHAPTER 1 CROSS-CULTURAL ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN AMOS RAPOPORT Introduction 7 Culture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Environmental Design 10 The Relationship of Culture and Environmental Design . . . . . . . . . 15 The Variability of Culture-Environment Relations 19 Culture-Specific Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Designing for Culture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Implications for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 CHAPTER 2 CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH METHODS: STRATEGIES, PROBLEMS, ApPLICATIONS RICHARD W."

The reality around us constantly demonstrates physical and social processes in which the interests of the participants are not diametrically opposed, though they by no means always coincide. The study of such processes (interesting in itw own right) is essential for working out ways of making decisions, that is, for choosing among available parameters of the processes. If, in view of certain considerations, a participant i h 1 f 0 h' . b c ooses a va ue Xi 0 a parameter Xi' ~s act~on can e formally described as an attempt to maximize the function f. = -llx. - x~ll. For this reason any decision on the part of ~ ~ ~ the i-th participant in the process can be treated (at least a posteriori) as agoal-directed act, aimed at increasing the value of some function w. (a criterion of efficiency, a payoff, a gain, etc.), wfiich generally depends on the choices of all n participants in the process. That is w = f. (x ' ..* ,x ), i = 1, 2, ..* ,n. 1 i ~ n A process described in this manner, involving several participants, each pursuing different interests and constrained in his choices of parameters by the condition X E x. is called a game - a term firmly entrenched though evide~tly not felicitous.

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, July 2-13, 1979

This book presents the content of a year's course in decision processes for third and fourth year students given at the University of Toronto. A principal theme of the book is the relationship between normative and descriptive decision theory. The distinction between the two approaches is not clear to everyone, yet it is of great importance. Normative decision theory addresses itself to the question of how people ought to make decisions in various types of situations, if they wish to be regarded (or to regard themselves) as 'rational'. Descriptive decision theory purports to describe how people actually make decisions in a variety of situations. Normative decision theory is much more formalized than descriptive theory. Especially in its advanced branches, normative theory makes use of mathematicallanguage, mode of discourse, and concepts. For this reason, the definitions of terms encountered in normative decision theory are precise, and its deductions are rigorous. Like the terms and assertions of other branches of mathematics, those of mathematically formalized decision theory need not refer to anything in the 'real', i. e. the observable, world. The terms and assertions can be interpreted in the context of models of real li fe situations, but the verisimilitude of the models is not important. They are meant to capture only the essentials of adecision situation, which in reallife may be obscured by complex details and ambiguities. It is these details and ambiguities, however, that may be crucial in determining the outcomes of the decisions.

This book is about a new and different way of approaching and studying the history of the built environment and the use of historical precedents in design. However, although what I am proposing is new for what is currently called architectural history, both my approach and even my conclusions are not that new in other fields, as I discovered when I attempted to find supporting evidence. * In fact, of all the disciplines dealing with various aspects of the study of the past, architectural history seems to have changed least in the ways I am advocating. There is currently a revival of interest in the history of architecture and urban form; a similar interest applies to theory, vernacular design, and culture-environment relations. After years of neglect, the study of history and the use of historical precedent are again becoming important. However, that interest has not led to new approaches to the subject, nor have its bases been examined. This I try to do. In so doing, I discuss a more rigorous and, I would argue, a more valid way of looking at historical data and hence of using such data in a theory of the built environment and as precedent in environmental design. Underlying this is my view of Environment-Behavior Studies CEBS) as an emerging theory rather than as data to help design based on current "theory. " Although this will be the subject of another book, a summary statement of this position may be useful.

This book presents the content of a year's course in decision processes for third and fourth year students given at the University of Toronto. A principal theme of the book is the relationship between normative and descriptive decision theory. The distinction between the two approaches is not clear to everyone, yet it is of great importance. Normative decision theory addresses itself to the question of how people ought to make decisions in various types of situations, if they wish to be regarded (or to regard themselves) as 'rational'. Descriptive decision theory purports to describe how people actually make decisions in a variety of situations. Normative decision theory is much more formalized than descriptive theory. Especially in its advanced branches, normative theory makes use of mathematicallanguage, mode of discourse, and concepts. For this reason, the definitions of terms encountered in normative decision theory are precise, and its deductions are rigorous. Like the terms and assertions of other branches of mathematics, those of mathematically formalized decision theory need not refer to anything in the 'real', i. e. the observable, world. The terms and assertions can be interpreted in the context of models of real li fe situations, but the verisimilitude of the models is not important. They are meant to capture only the essentials of adecision situation, which in reallife may be obscured by complex details and ambiguities. It is these details and ambiguities, however, that may be crucial in determining the outcomes of the decisions.

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, July 2-13, 1979

Following upon the first two volumes in this series, which dealt with a broad spectrum of topics in the environment and behavior field, ranging from theoretical to applied, and including disciplinary, interdisciplinary, and professionally oriented approaches, we have chosen to devote sub sequent volumes to more specifically defined topics. Thus, Volume Three dealt with Children and the Environment, seen from the combined perspective of researchers in environmental and developmental psy chology. The present volume has a similarly topical coverage, dealing with the complex set of relationships between culture and the physical environment. It is broad and necessarily eclectic with respect to content, theory, methodology, and epistemological stance, and the contributors to it represent a wide variety of fields and disciplines, including psy chology, geography, anthropology, economics, and environmental de sign. We were fortunate to enlist the collaboration of Amos Rapoport in the organization and editing of this volume, as he brings to this task a particularly pertinent perspective that combines anthropology and ar chitecture. Volume Five of the series, presently in preparation, will cover the subject of behavioral science aspects of transportation. Irwin Altman Joachim F. Wohlwill ix Contents Introduction 1 CHAPTER 1 CROSS-CULTURAL ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN AMOS RAPOPORT Introduction 7 Culture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Environmental Design 10 The Relationship of Culture and Environmental Design . . . . . . . . . 15 The Variability of Culture-Environment Relations 19 Culture-Specific Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Designing for Culture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Implications for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 CHAPTER 2 CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH METHODS: STRATEGIES, PROBLEMS, ApPLICATIONS RICHARD W."

Game theory could be formally defined as a theory of rational decision in conflict situations. Models of such situations, as they are conceived in game theory, involve (1) a set of decision makers, called players; (2) a set of strategies available to each player; (3) a set of outcomes, each of which is a result of particular choices of strategies made by the players on a given play of the game; and (4) a set of payoffs accorded to each player in each of the possible outcomes. It is assumed that each player is 'individually rational', in the sense that his preference ordering of the outcomes is determined by the order of magnitudes of his (and only his) associated payoffs. Further, a player is rational in the sense that he assumes that every other player is rational in the above sense. The rational player utilizes knowledge of the other players' payoffs in guiding his choice of strategy, because it gives him information about how the other players' choices are guided. Since, in general, the orders of magnitude of the payoffs that accrue to the several players in the several outcomes do not coincide, a game of strategy is a model of a situation involving conflicts of interests.

Game theory could be formally defined as a theory of rational decision in conflict situations. Models of such situations, as they are conceived in game theory, involve (1) a set of decision makers, called players; (2) a set of strategies available to each player; (3) a set of outcomes, each of which is a result of particular choices of strategies made by the players on a given play of the game; and (4) a set of payoffs accorded to each player in each of the possible outcomes. It is assumed that each player is 'individually rational', in the sense that his preference ordering of the outcomes is determined by the order of magnitudes of his (and only his) associated payoffs. Further, a player is rational in the sense that he assumes that every other player is rational in the above sense. The rational player utilizes knowledge of the other players' payoffs in guiding his choice of strategy, because it gives him information about how the other players' choices are guided. Since, in general, the orders of magnitude of the payoffs that accrue to the several players in the several outcomes do not coincide, a game of strategy is a model of a situation involving conflicts of interests.

This book is the product of a collective effort by some members of the Group of 78. The name of the group derives from the number of its founding members. Its activities comprise studies of and analysis of public issues which seem at the time to be of crucial importance not only to Canadians but to all the inhabitants of the planet. The issues are discussed at annual conferences and some of the discussions have been edited and published. The present effort was stimulated by the rapid changes in the political landscape of Eastern Europe and the consequent demise of the Cold War. It seemed at the time that those changes were about to usher in a new historical era, rich in unprecedented opportunities of improving human life, in particular of freeing humanity from the threats generated by the burgeoning arsenals of weapons of total destruction and by the degradation of the environment. It seemed that global collective effort directed at solving urgent global problems became suddenly possible. One could speak hopefully of an "agenda" for such collective effort. The following members of the Group of 78 and friends sympathetic to its aims contributed to this work by submitting copy, directing us to sources, making cogent suggestions for substantive revisions or stylistic improvements: Newton R. Bowles Soonoo Engineer Shirley Farlinger Ann Gertler Leonard Johnson Peter Meincke Gwen Rapoport Ronald Shirtliff Anne Williams Pat Woodcock

‘War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to our will’

Writing at the time of Napoleon’s greatest campaigns, Prussian soldier and writer Carl von Clausewitz created this landmark treatise on the art of warfare, which presented war as part of a coherent system of political thought. In line with Napoleon’s own military actions, Clausewitz illustrated the need to annihilate the enemy and to make a strong display of one’s power in an ‘absolute war’ without compromise. But he was also careful to distinguish between war and politics, arguing that war could only be justified when debate was no longer adequate, and that if undertaken, its aim should ultimately be to improve the wellbeing of the nation. Combining military theory and pratice, On War has had a profound influence on subsequent thinking on warfare.

This edition contains a detailed introduction examining Von Clausewitz’s skill and reputation as a writer, philosopher and political thinker, as well as bibliography, notes and a glossary.

Lewis F. Richardson's Mathematical Theory Of War And Lewis Fry Richardson, 1881-1953, A Personal Biography.

N-person game theory analyzes contests in which there are more than two sets of conflicting interests, e.g. a hand of poker or wide-scale warfare. In this sequel to his Two-Person Game Theory, the author introduces the necessary mathematical notation (mainly set theory), presents basic concepts, discusses a variety of models, and provides applications to social situations.

The term "Prisoner's Dilemma" comes from the original anecdote used to illustrate this game of strategy. Two prisoners, held incommunicado, are charged with the same crime. They can be convicted only if either confesses. If both prisoners confess, their payoff is minus one. If neither confesses, it is plus one. If only one confesses, he is set free for having turned state's evidence and is given a reward of plus two to boot. The prisoner who holds out is convicted on the strength of the other's testimony and is given a more severe sentence than if he had confessed. His payoff is minus two. It is in the interest of each to confess no matter what the other does, but it is in their collective interest to hold out. There is no satisfactory solution to the paradox of this game. Its simplicity is misleading. What seems rational from your own point of view, turns out to be detrimental in the end. This book is an account of many experiments in which Prisoner's Dilemma was played. Analyzing the results, one can learn how people are motivated to trust or distrust their partners, to keep faith or to betray, to be guided by joint or selfish interest. The method represents an important step toward building a bridge between psychology which is based on hard data and reproducible experiments and psychology which is concerned with internal conflict.