There have been two major models of the mind's relation to its environment in Western though, both of which employ the term 'representation', but in quite different ways. The newer one, dominant today in philosophy, takes the mind to have states about its environment. The older concept, originating with Aristotle but still present in every day speech and in the new sciences of the mind, takes the mind to sample its environment. This book clarifies the old notion, solves some serious problems it faces, and explores the implications for philosophy of an awareness of the view of the mind emerging from cognitive neuroscience. Topics covered include concepts, perception, emotions, beliefs and actions.

Going beyond the hype of recent fMRI "findings," this interdisciplinary collection examines such questions as: Do women and men have significantly different brains? Do women empathize, while men systematize? Is there a "feminine" ethics? What does brain research on intersex conditions tell us about sex and gender?

Drawing on a wide range of resources, including the history of philosophy, her role as director of a cognitive neuroscience group, and her Wittgensteinian training at Oxford, Jacobson provides fresh views on representation, concepts, perception, action, emotion and belief.

Going beyond the hype of recent fMRI 'findings', thisinterdisciplinary collection examines such questions as: Do women and men have significantly different brains? Do women empathize, while men systematize? Is there a 'feminine' ethics? What does brain research on intersex conditions tell us about sex and gender?

This book is the first collection of feminist essays on one of the central figures in the history of English-speaking philosophy. Besides providing a rich variety of feminist viewpoints on a wide range of Hume's writings, the contributors introduce new themes into the scholarship on Hume, including gendered metaphors in his metaphysical texts, the role of society in the conception of the human mind, and his conception of human nature in relation to recent rejections of essentialism.

Hume scholarship as a whole still reflects the relative neglect in mainstream analytic philosophy of alternative--and so feminist--perspectives on philosophy. The essays in this volume show that the standard, narrow view of philosophy excludes valuable perspectives.

These essays cover a great diversity of subjects in Hume's work. They discuss his theory of knowledge; his conception of human inquiry and the human mind; his views on our knowledge of the external world and the future; his treatments of the passions, emotions and virtue; his conception of moral education; his views on aesthetics and religion; and his historical work.

The contributors, members of philosophy, political science, theology, and English departments, employ a variety of critical techniques. The result is a volume that stands in enlightening contrast to the standard collections on David Hume.

Contributors are Annette C. Baier, Jennifer A. Herdt, Nancy J. Hirschmann, Sheridan Hough, Anne Jaap Jacobson, Joyce Jenkins, Genevieve Lloyd, Susan A. Martinelli-Fernandez, Robert Shaver, Aaron Smuts, Christine Swanton, Jacqueline Taylor, Kathryn Temple, and Christopher Williams.