Selecting an appropriate balance in the law between autonomy and paternalism is an important and difficult task, requiring a careful consideration of moral, political and economic values. This collection deals with the task at both general and specific levels, locating itself within the broader context of the relationship between law and market forces. Concepts are defined and analysed, in particular the distinction between the coercive approach of 'hard paternalism' in the law, and the 'nudge' approach of 'soft paternalism'. Attention is then focused on how the tensions between the concepts are resolved in the law of contract, where deficient information and mistakes can justify an interventionist approach. Besides overviews of the issues within the general law of contract, and historical studies of the relevant principles in the common law and Roman law, the book also includes studies of specific areas, notably insurance contracts and consumer bankruptcy. The authors, from North America, the United Kingdom and continental Europe, include economists, sociologists and traditional legal scholars.

The aim of this book is to provide an overview of how economic analysis can enrich an understanding of law and can provide standards for its critical evaluation. It eschews a dogmatic approach, acknowledging that non-economic goals play an important part in the law. It is directed primarily at lawyers and law students, particularly those who hitherto have been sceptical of the uses and value of law and economics. It is not a conventional textbook in the sense that it does not deal systematically with different areas of law. Rather each chapter is built on a particular theme or set of themes, with examples drawn from across legal categories. The approach is discursive, anecdotal and analytical, reflecting the ideas and convictions developed during the author's 30 years working in the field of law and economics. Winner of the Hart SLSA Book Prize 2007 for an outstanding piece of socio-legal scholarship.

This is a reprint of Anthony Ogus' classic study of regulation,first published in the 1990s. It examines how, since the last decades of the twentieth century there have been fundamental changes in the relationship between the state and industry. With the aid of economic theory Anthony Ogus critically examines the ways in which public law has been adapted to the task of regulating industrial activity and provides a systematic overview of the theory and forms of social and economic regulation. In particular, he explores the reasons why governments regulate, for which, broadly speaking, two theoretical frameworks exist. First 'public interest' theories determine that regulation should aim to improve social and economic welfare. Second, 'economic' theories suggest that regulation should aim to satisfy the demands of private interests. The book also looks at the evolution of the forms of regulation in Britain, extending to the policies of privatization and deregulation which were so characteristic of the period. The author skilfully evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of the different forms of regulation, particularly in the light of the two theoretical frameworks, but also by involving an analysis of how firms respond to the various kinds of incentives and controls offered by government. A significant feature of the book is its analysis of the choices made by governments between the different forms of regulation and the influence exerted by interest groups (including bureaucrats) and EC law.