This work examines both the failures and successes of intervention by the international community into the internal conflicts that are plaguing the post-Cold War world. It examines the legal framework and the bureaucratic and political realities that govern intervention and helps to explain why performance has been so uneven. The strategy offered by the authors operates within the parameters of legal and political limits to improve effectiveness by increasing international cooperation. Although radical in the context of international intervention, it has strong precedents in both industry and in actual conflict resolution. It involves a move to decentralization of operations to the field, permitting those on the scene to exercise far greater responsibility than is now the case. It details models of success and argues that effective decentralization can be institutionalized. For this proposed strategy to be effective, reponsible leadership of international organizations and their member states requires reassurance. This reassurance can be provided by a process of systematic and joint planning for intervention performed at the highest level as well as by careful training within civilian agencies that deal with diplomacy or humanitarian services. All of the arguments and strategies developed by the authors are supported with examples developed from case studies of how to effectively accomplish their goal of mitigating the outbreaks of violent conflicts through improved international cooperation in intervention.

Western politicians, pundits, and the public were wholly unprepared for the violent conflicts erupting in eastern and central Europe and the former Soviet Union after the end of the Cold War. The governments emerging from communism lack both the authoritarian control to suppress domestic differences and the democratic power to manage them.

Old conflicts resurfaced and new ones were kindled in virulent form from Bosnia to Chechnya. The stability of governments and the status quo of borders have been thrown into question. Actual and threatened disintegration of states in the area is widespread. No reference points have emerged to replace the cold war paradigm. Nor is there a way of knowing which conflicts can be contained within accepted borders and which may spill over. The prospect not only of widening conflict, but also of new precedents challenging old certainties of international life, causes deep concern in western Europe and the United States.

Europe has many experienced international organizations under whose umbrella states organize to achieve common purposes. This book asks how they have performed that function. How are these organizations attempting to deal with the many forms of internal conflict that are both the cause and the result of the end of communism and the East-West confrontation? Despite significant organizational and financial resources, the results have been meager. The authors show how difficult it is to achieve effective joint action on a sustained basis. They contend that a concerted effort to discover how to achieve joint action is the necessary next step in mobilizing international organizations for preventing ethno-national conflict.

In addition to the editors, the contributors are Diana Chigas, Jarat Chopra, Michael W. Doyle, Keitha Sapsin Fine, David S. Huntington, Christophe Kamp, Jean E. Manas, Elizabeth McClintock, John Pinder, Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Reinhardt Rummel, Melanie H. Stein, Shashi Tharoor, Thomas G. Weiss, Richard Weitz, and Mario Zucconi.

A Brookings Occasional Paper

In an increasingly complex and interdependent world, states resort to a bewildering array of regulatory agreements to deal with problems as disparate as climate change, nuclear proliferation, international trade, satellite communications, species destruction, and intellectual property. In such a system, there must be some means of ensuring reasonably reliable performance of treaty obligations. The standard approach to this problem, by academics and politicians alike, is a search for treaties with "teeth"--military or economic sanctions to deter and punish violation. The New Sovereignty argues that this approach is misconceived. Cases of coercive enforcement are rare, and sanctions are too costly and difficult to mobilize to be a reliable enforcement tool. As an alternative to this "enforcement" model, the authors propose a "managerial" model of treaty compliance. It relies on the elaboration and application of treaty norms in a continuing dialogue between the parties--international officials and nongovernmental organizations--that generates pressure to resolve problems of noncompliance. In the process, the norms and practices of the regime themselves evolve and develop. The authors take a broad look at treaties in many different areas: arms control, human rights, labor, the environment, monetary policy, and trade. The extraordinary wealth of examples includes the Iran airbus shootdown, Libya's suit against Great Britain and the United States in the Lockerbie case, the war in Bosnia, and Iraq after the Gulf War. The authors conclude that sovereignty--the status of a recognized actor in the international system--requires membership in good standing in the organizations and regimes through which the world manages its common affairs. This requirement turns out to be the major pressure for compliance with treaty obligations. This book will be an invaluable resource and casebook for scholars, policymakers, international public servants, lawyers, and corporate executives.