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In this volume, Baz offers a wide-ranging discussion of
Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect-perception, with special focus on
Wittgenstein's method. Baz starts out with an interpretation of
Wittgenstein's remarks on aspects and continues with attempts to
characterize and defend Wittgenstein's approach to the
understanding and dissolution of philosophical difficulties. Baz
ends with attempts to articulate-under the inspiration of
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology-certain dissatisfactions, both with
Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect perception, and with his
philosophical approach more generally. On the way, Baz explores
connections between Wittgenstein's remarks on aspects and Kant's
aesthetics. He examines ways in which the remarks on aspects may be
brought to bear on contemporary philosophical work on perception.
He discusses some of the implications of Wittgenstein's work on
aspect perception for issues in moral philosophy and the philosophy
of action.
In this volume, Baz offers a wide-ranging discussion of
Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect-perception, with special focus on
Wittgenstein's method. Baz starts out with an interpretation of
Wittgenstein's remarks on aspects and continues with attempts to
characterize and defend Wittgenstein's approach to the
understanding and dissolution of philosophical difficulties. Baz
ends with attempts to articulate-under the inspiration of
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology-certain dissatisfactions, both with
Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect perception, and with his
philosophical approach more generally. On the way, Baz explores
connections between Wittgenstein's remarks on aspects and Kant's
aesthetics. He examines ways in which the remarks on aspects may be
brought to bear on contemporary philosophical work on perception.
He discusses some of the implications of Wittgenstein's work on
aspect perception for issues in moral philosophy and the philosophy
of action.
A new form of philosophizing known as ordinary language philosophy
took root in England after the Second World War, promising a fresh
start and a way out of long-standing dead-end philosophical
debates. Pioneered by Wittgenstein, Austin, and others, OLP is now
widely rumored, within mainstream analytic philosophy, to have been
seriously discredited, and consequently its perspective is ignored.
Avner Baz begs to differ. In When Words Are Called For, he shows
how the prevailing arguments against OLP collapse under close
scrutiny. All of them, he claims, presuppose one version or another
of the very conception of word-meaning that OLP calls into question
and takes to be responsible for many traditional philosophical
difficulties. Worse, analytic philosophy itself has suffered as a
result of its failure to take OLP's perspective seriously. Baz
blames a neglect of OLP's insights for seemingly irresolvable
disputes over the methodological relevance of "intuitions" in
philosophy and for misunderstandings between contextualists and
anti-contextualists (or "invariantists") in epistemology. Baz goes
on to explore the deep affinities between Kant's work and OLP and
suggests ways that OLP could be applied to other philosophically
troublesome concepts. When Words Are Called For defends OLP not as
a doctrine but as a form of practice that might provide a viable
alternative to work currently carried out within mainstream
analytic philosophy. Accordingly, Baz does not merely argue for OLP
but, all the more convincingly, practices it in this eye-opening
book.
The perception of what he calls 'aspects' preoccupied Wittgenstein
and gave him considerable trouble in his final years. The
Wittgensteinian aspect defies any number of traditional
philosophical dichotomies: the aspect is neither subjective (inner,
metaphysically private) nor objective; it presents perceivable
unity and sense that are (arguably) not (yet) conceptual; it is
'subject to the will', but at the same time is normally taken to be
genuinely revelatory of the object perceived under it. This Element
begins with a grammatical and phenomenological characterization of
Wittgensteinian 'aspects'. It then challenges two widespread ideas:
that aspects are to be identified with concepts; and that aspect
perception has a continuous version that is characteristic of
(normal) human perception. It concludes by proposing that aspect
perception brings to light the distinction between the world as
perceived and the world as objectively construed, and the role we
play in the constitution of the former.
Avner Baz offers a critique of leading work in mainstream analytic
philosophy, and in particular challenges assumptions underlying
recent debates concerning philosophical method. In the first part
of The Crisis of Method, Baz identifies fundamental confusions
about what the widely-employed philosophical "method of cases" is
supposed to accomplish, and how. He then argues that the method, as
commonly employed by both "armchair" and "experimental"
philosophers, is underwritten by substantive, and poorly supported,
"representationalist" assumptions about languageassumptions to
which virtually all of the participants in the recent debates over
philosophical method have shown themselves committed. In the second
part of the book, Baz challenges those assumptions, both
philosophically and empirically. Drawing on Austin, Wittgenstein,
and Merleau-Ponty, as well as on empirical studies of first
language acquisition, he presents and motivates a broadly
pragmatist conception of language on which the method of cases as
commonly practiced is fundamentally misguidedmore misguided than
even its staunchest critics have hitherto recognized.
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