The perception of what he calls 'aspects' preoccupied Wittgenstein
and gave him considerable trouble in his final years. The
Wittgensteinian aspect defies any number of traditional
philosophical dichotomies: the aspect is neither subjective (inner,
metaphysically private) nor objective; it presents perceivable
unity and sense that are (arguably) not (yet) conceptual; it is
'subject to the will', but at the same time is normally taken to be
genuinely revelatory of the object perceived under it. This Element
begins with a grammatical and phenomenological characterization of
Wittgensteinian 'aspects'. It then challenges two widespread ideas:
that aspects are to be identified with concepts; and that aspect
perception has a continuous version that is characteristic of
(normal) human perception. It concludes by proposing that aspect
perception brings to light the distinction between the world as
perceived and the world as objectively construed, and the role we
play in the constitution of the former.
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