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This book collects original essays by top scholars that address
questions about the nature, origins, and effects of ambivalence.
While the nature of agency has received an enormous amount of
attention, relatively little has been written about ambivalence or
how it relates to topics such as agency, rationality,
justification, knowledge, autonomy, self-governance, well-being,
social cognition, and various other topics. Ambivalence presents
unique questions related to many major philosophical debates. For
example, it relates to debates about virtues, rationality, and
decision-making, agency or authenticity, emotions, and social or
political metacognition. It is also relevant to a variety of larger
debates in philosophy and psychology, including nature vs. nature,
objectivity vs. subjectivity, or nomothetic vs. idiographic. The
essays in this book offer novel and wide-ranging perspectives on
this emerging philosophical topic. They will be of interest to
researchers and advanced students working in ethics, epistemology,
philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and social cognition.
What are the things that we assert, believe, and desire? The
orthodox view among philosophers is eternalism: these are contents
that have their truth-values eternally. Transient Truths provides
the first book-length exposition and defense of the opposing view,
temporalism: these are contents that can change their truth-values
along with changes in the world. Berit Brogaard argues that
temporal contents are contents and propositions in the full sense.
This project involves a thorough analysis of how we talk about and
retain mental states over time, an examination of how the
phenomenology of mental states bear on the content of mental
states, an analysis of how we pass on information in temporally
extended conversations, and a revival of a Priorian tense logic.
The view suggests a broader view according to which some types of
representation have a determinate truth-value only relative to
features about the subject who does the representing. If this view
is right, successful semantic representation requires an eye on our
own position in the world.
This book collects original essays by top scholars that address
questions about the nature, origins, and effects of ambivalence.
While the nature of agency has received an enormous amount of
attention, relatively little has been written about ambivalence or
how it relates to topics such as agency, rationality,
justification, knowledge, autonomy, self-governance, well-being,
social cognition, and various other topics. Ambivalence presents
unique questions related to many major philosophical debates. For
example, it relates to debates about virtues, rationality, and
decision-making, agency or authenticity, emotions, and social or
political metacognition. It is also relevant to a variety of larger
debates in philosophy and psychology, including nature vs. nature,
objectivity vs. subjectivity, or nomothetic vs. idiographic. The
essays in this book offer novel and wide-ranging perspectives on
this emerging philosophical topic. They will be of interest to
researchers and advanced students working in ethics, epistemology,
philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and social cognition.
The Center Must Not Hold: White Women Philosophers on the Whiteness
of Philosophy functions as a textual site where white women
philosophers engage boldly in critical acts of exploring ways of
naming and disrupting whiteness in terms of how it has defined the
conceptual field of philosophy. Within this text, white women
philosophers critique the field of philosophy for its complicity
with whiteness as a structure of power, as normative, and as
hegemonic. In this way, the authority of whiteness to define what
is philosophically worthy is seen as reinforcing forms of
philosophical narcissism and hegemony. Challenging the whiteness of
philosophy in terms of its hubristic tendencies, white women
philosophers within this text assert their alliance with people of
color who have been both marginalized within the field of
philosophy and have had their philosophical and intellectual
concerns and traditions dismissed as particularistic. Aware that
feminist praxis does not necessarily lead to anti-racist praxis,
the white women philosophers within this text refuse to telescope
as a site of critical inquiry one site of hegemony (sexism) over
another (racism). As such, the white women philosophers within this
text are conscious of the ways in which they are implicated in
perpetuating whiteness as a site of power within the domain of
philosophy. Framed within a philosophical space that values the
multiplicity of philosophical voices, and driven by a feminist
framework that valorizes de-centering locations of hegemony,
interdisciplinary dialogue, and transformative praxis, The Center
Must Not Hold refuses to allow the white center of philosophy to
masquerade as universal and given. The text de-centers various
epistemic and value orders that are predicated upon maintaining the
center of philosophy as white. The white women philosophers who
contribute to this text explore ethics, epistemology, aesthetics,
taste, the nature of a dilemma, questions of the secularity of
philosophy, perception, discipline-based values around how to
listen and argue, the crucial role that social location plays in
the continued ignorance about the reality of oppression and
privilege as these relate to the subtle forms of white valorization
and maintenance, and more. Those interested in critical race theory
and critical whiteness studies will appreciate how the contributors
have linked these areas of critical inquiry within the often
abstract domain of philosophy.
The Center Must Not Hold: White Women Philosophers on the Whiteness
of Philosophy functions as a textual site where white women
philosophers engage boldly in critical acts of exploring ways of
naming and disrupting whiteness in terms of how it has defined the
conceptual field of philosophy. Within this text, white women
philosophers critique the field of philosophy for its complicity
with whiteness as a structure of power, as normative, and as
hegemonic. In this way, the authority of whiteness to define what
is philosophically worthy is seen as reinforcing forms of
philosophical narcissism and hegemony. Challenging the whiteness of
philosophy in terms of its hubristic tendencies, white women
philosophers within this text assert their alliance with people of
color who have been both marginalized within the field of
philosophy and have had their philosophical and intellectual
concerns and traditions dismissed as particularistic. Aware that
feminist praxis does not necessarily lead to anti-racist praxis,
the white women philosophers within this text refuse to telescope
as a site of critical inquiry one site of hegemony (sexism) over
another (racism). As such, the white women philosophers within this
text are conscious of the ways in which they are implicated in
perpetuating whiteness as a site of power within the domain of
philosophy. Framed within a philosophical space that values the
multiplicity of philosophical voices, and driven by a feminist
framework that valorizes de-centering locations of hegemony,
interdisciplinary dialogue, and transformative praxis, The Center
Must Not Hold refuses to allow the white center of philosophy to
masquerade as universal and given. The text de-centers various
epistemic and value orders that are predicated upon maintaining the
center of philosophy as white. The white women philosophers who
contribute to this text explore ethics, epistemology, aesthetics,
taste, the nature of a dilemma, questions of the secularity of
philosophy, perception, discipline-based
Most of the research on the epistemology of perception has focused
on visual perception. This is hardly surprising given that most of
our knowledge about the world is largely attributable to our visual
experiences. The present volume is the first to instead focus on
the epistemology of non-visual perception - hearing, touch, taste,
and cross-sensory experiences. Drawing on recent empirical studies
of emotion, perception, and decision-making, it breaks new ground
on discussions of whether or not perceptual experience can yield
justified beliefs and how to characterize those beliefs. The
Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception explores questions not only
related to traditional sensory perception, but also to
proprioceptive, interoceptive, multisensory, and event perception,
expanding traditional notions of the influence that conscious
non-visual experience has on human behavior and rationality.
Contributors investigate the role that emotions play in
decision-making and agential perception and what this means for
justifications of belief and knowledge. They analyze the notion
that some sensory experiences, like touch, have epistemic privilege
over others, as well as perception's relationship to introspection,
and the relationship between action perception and belief. Other
essays engage with topics in aesthetics and the philosophy of art,
exploring the role that artworks can play in providing us with
perceptional knowledge of emotions. The essays collected here,
written by top researchers in their respective fields, offer
perspectives from a wide range of philosophical disciplines and
will appeal to scholars interested in philosophy of mind,
epistemology, philosophical psychology, among others.
Under what circumstances can love generate moral reasons for
action? Are there morally appropriate ways to love? Can an
occurrence of love or a failure to love constitute a moral failure?
Is it better to love morally good people? This volume explores the
moral dimensions of love through the lenses of political
philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. It attempts to discern
how various social norms affect our experience and understanding of
love, how love, relates to other affective states such as emotions
and desires, and how love influences and is influenced by reason.
What love is affects what love ought to be. Conversely, our ideas
of what love ought to be partly determined by our conception of
what love is.
Imagine you are sitting at Starbuck glancing at the blue coffee mug
in front of you. The mug is blue on the outside, white on the
inside. It's large for a mug. And it's nearly full of freshly made
coffee. In the envisaged case, you see all those aspects of the
scene in front of you, but it remains a question of ferocious
debate whether the visual experience that makes up your seeing is a
direct "perceptual" relation between you and your environment or a
psychology state that has a content that represents the mug. If
your experience involves an external "perceptual" relation to an
external, mind-independent object, it is unlike familiar mental
states such as belief and desire states, which are widely
considered psychological states with a representational content
that stands between you and the external world. Your belief that
the coffee mug in front of you is blue has a content that
represents the coffee mug as being blue. Your desire that the
coffee in the mug is still hot has a content that represents a
state of affairs that may or may not in fact obtain, namely the
state of affairs that the coffee in the mug is still hot. In this
book, Brit Brogaard defends the view that visual experience is like
belief in having a representational content. Her defense differs
from most previous defenses of this view in that it begins by
looking at the language of ordinary speech. She provides a
linguistic analysis of what we say when we say that things look a
certain way or that the world appears to us to be a certain way.
She then argues that this analysis can be used to argue for the
view that visual experience has a representation content that
mediates between you and the world when you visually perceive.
What is this thing called Philosophy? is the definitive textbook
for all who want a thorough introduction to the field. It
introduces philosophy using a question-led approach that reflects
the discursive nature of the discipline. Edited by Duncan
Pritchard, each section is written by a high-profile contributor
focusing on a key area of philosophy, and contains three or four
question-based chapters offering an accessible point of engagement.
The core areas of philosophy covered are: Ethics Political
Philosophy Aesthetics Epistemology Philosophy of Mind Metaphysics
Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Religion The Meaning of Life.
The accompanying Routledge companion website features valuable
online resources for both instructors and students including links
to audio and video material, multiple-choice questions, interactive
flashcards, essay questions and annotated further reading. This is
the essential textbook for students approaching the study of
philosophy for the first time.
Within the contemporary philosophical debates over the nature of
perception, the question of whether perception has content in the
first place recently has become a focus of discussion. The most
common view is that it does, but a number of philosophers have
questioned this claim. The issue immediately raises a number of
related questions. What does it mean to say that perception has
content? Does perception have more than one kind of content? Does
perceptual content derive from the content of beliefs or judgments?
Should perceptual content be understood in terms of accuracy
conditions? Is naive realism compatible with holding that
perception has content? This volume brings together philosophers
representing many different perspectives to address these and other
central questions in the philosophy of perception.
What is this thing called Philosophy? is the definitive textbook
for all who want a thorough introduction to the field. It
introduces philosophy using a question-led approach that reflects
the discursive nature of the discipline. Edited by Duncan
Pritchard, each section is written by a high-profile contributor
focusing on a key area of philosophy, and contains three or four
question-based chapters offering an accessible point of engagement.
The core areas of philosophy covered are: Ethics Political
Philosophy Aesthetics Epistemology Philosophy of Mind Metaphysics
Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Religion The Meaning of Life.
The accompanying Routledge companion website features valuable
online resources for both instructors and students including links
to audio and video material, multiple-choice questions, interactive
flashcards, essay questions and annotated further reading. This is
the essential textbook for students approaching the study of
philosophy for the first time.
Romantic love presents some of life's most challenging questions.
Can we choose who to love? Is romantic love rational? Can we love
more than one person at a time? And can we make ourselves fall out
of love? In On Romantic Love, Berit Brogaard attempts to get to the
bottom of love's many contradictions. This short book, informed by
both historical and cutting edge philosophy, psychology, and
neuroscience, combines a new theory of romantic love with
entertaining anecdotes from real life and accessible explanations
of the neuroscience underlying our wildest passions. Against the
grain, Brogaard argues that love is an emotion; that it can be, at
turns, both rational and irrational; and that it can be manifested
in degrees. We can love one person more than another and we can
love a person a little or a lot or not at all. And love isn't even
always something we consciously feel. However, love - like other
emotions, both conscious and not - is subject to rational control,
and falling in or out of it can be a deliberate choice. This
engaging and innovative look at a universal topic, featuring
original line drawings by illustrator Gareth Southwell, illuminates
the processes behind heartbreak, obsession, jealousy, attachment,
and more.
Romantic love presents some of life's most challenging questions.
Can we choose who to love? Is romantic love rational? Can we love
more than one person at a time? And can we make ourselves fall out
of love? In On Romantic Love, Berit Brogaard attempts to get to the
bottom of love's many contradictions. This short book, informed by
both historical and cutting edge philosophy, psychology, and
neuroscience, combines a new theory of romantic love with
entertaining anecdotes from real life and accessible explanations
of the neuroscience underlying our wildest passions. Against the
grain, Brogaard argues that love is an emotion; that it can be, at
turns, both rational and irrational; and that it can be manifested
in degrees. We can love one person more than another and we can
love a person a little or a lot or not at all. And love isn't even
always something we consciously feel. However, love - like other
emotions, both conscious and not - is subject to rational control,
and falling in or out of it can be a deliberate choice. This
engaging and innovative look at a universal topic, featuring
original line drawings by illustrator Gareth Southwell, illuminates
the processes behind heartbreak, obsession, jealousy, attachment,
and more.
Hatred is often considered the opposite of love, but in many ways
is much more complicated. It also may be considered one of the
dominant emotions of our time, as individuals, groups, and even
nations express or enact hatred to varying degrees. What is hatred?
Where does it come from and what does it reveal about the hater?
And is hatred always a bad thing? Brogaard makes a deep dive into
the moral psychology of one of our most complex, and vivid
emotions. She explores how hatred arises between people and among
groups. She also shows how hate, like anger, can sometimes be
appropriate and fitting. Other other questions she addresses are,
how does hate differ from anger, disgust, fear, and other related
emotions? Is fear an essential part of hatred? How does hatred
affect what happens inside the brain? How did hate evolve in human
history? Is hatred ever morally justified? Can you hate and love at
the same time? Can one hate oneself? How do implicit biases trigger
hatred of groups? This accessible, timely, and novel look at an
underexplored emotion will employ examples from current events as
well as art and literature and popular culture.
A collection of essential readings that chart the development of a
diverse and flourishing field. Virtue epistemology is a diverse and
flourishing field, one of the most exciting developments in
epistemology to emerge over the last three decades. Virtue
epistemology begins with the premise that epistemology is a
normative discipline and, accordingly, a central task of
epistemology is to explain the sort of normativity that knowledge,
justified belief, and the like involve. A second premise is that a
focus on the intellectual virtues (individual intellectual
excellences) is essential to carrying out this central task. This
collection offers some of the most influential and agenda-setting
work at the heart of virtue epistemology's research program. Taken
together, they will equip the reader to enter the ongoing
discussion and debate in the field. The selections range from
seminal contributions by Ernest Sosa, who introduced the notion of
intellectual virtue into the contemporary literature, to a study of
"epistemic justice" that draws on To Kill a Mockingbird and The
Talented Mr. Ripley. The readings include overviews of the field
that also serve to advance the discussion; investigations of the
nature of knowledge; reflections on the value of knowledge;
examinations of credit and luck; and explorations of future
directions for research.
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