Thinking about Reasons is a collection of fourteen new essays on topics in ethics and the philosophy of action, inspired in one way or another by the work of Jonathan Dancy-one of his generation's most influential moral philosophers. Many of the most influential living thinkers in the area are contributors to this collection, which also contains an autobiographical afterword by Dancy himself. Topics discussed in this volume include: * the idea that the facts that explain action are non-psychological ones * buck passing theories of goodness and rightness * the idea that some moral reasons justify action without requiring it * the particularist idea that there are no true informative moral principles * the idea that egoism and impartial consequentialism are self-defeating * the idea that moral reasons are dependent on either impersonal value, or benefits to oneself, or benefits to those with whom one has some special connection, but not on deontological constraints * the idea that we must distinguish between reasons and enablers, disablers, intensifiers, and attenuators of reasons * the idea that, although the lived ethical life is shaped by standing commitments, uncodifable judgement is at least sometimes needed to resolve what to do when these commitments conflict * the idea that the value of a whole need not be a mathematical function of the values of the parts of that whole * the idea that practical reasoning is based on inference the idea that there cannot be irreducibly normative properties.

Does human well-being consist in pleasure, the satisfaction of desires, or some set of goods such as knowledge, friendship, and accomplishment? Does being moral contribute to well-being, and is there a conflict between people's self-interest and the moral demands on them? Are the values of well-being and of morality measurable? Are such values objective? What is the relation between such values and the natural world? And how much can philosophical theory help us in our answers to these and similar questions? Issues such as these provide the focus for much of the work of James Griffin, White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford, in whose honour Well-Being and Morality has been prepared. They are also among the main topics of these fourteen new essays by an international array of leading philosophers. Professor Griffin himself provides a further discussion of central themes in his thought, specially written in response to contributions to this volume.

What determines whether an action is right or wrong? One appealing idea is that a moral code ought to contain a number of rules that tell people how to behave and that are simple and few enough to be easily learned. Another appealing idea is that the consequences of actions matter, often more than anything else. Rule consequentialism tries to weave these two ideas into a general theory of morality. This theory holds that morally wrong actions are the ones forbidden by rules whose acceptance would maximize the overall good. Morality, Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader explores for students and researchers the relationship between consequentialist theory and moral rules. Most of the chapters focus on rule consequentialism or on the distinction between act and rule versions of consequentialism. Contributors, among them the leading philosophers in the discipline, suggest ways of assessing whether rule consequentialism could be a satisfactory moral theory. These essays, all of which are previously unpublished, provide students in moral philosophy with essential material and ask key questions on just what the criteria for an adequate moral theory might be.

Ideal Code, Real World is a powerful presentation of rule-consequentialism, an ethical theory of which Brad Hooker is a leading contemporary exponent. According to rule-consequentialism, acts are to be assessed in terms of rules, and rules are to be assessed by their consequences. Hooker starts by establishing appropriate criteria for assessing a theory of morality. He then sets out his rule-consequentialism, discusses criticisms and rival theories, and considers implications of the theory for practical issues.

Twelve new essays by a distinguished international team of contributors, including some of the leading moral philosophers of the day, debate the plausibility of moral particularism. This will be the starting-point for all future discussion of the topic, and compelling reading for all who work in moral philosophy.