An indepth work on the origins of the Merlin of Arthurian legend, this book examines early texts, thirteenth century romances focusing particularly on Merlin as a character, rather than those where Merlin is a background cast member. The outline here starts with looking at the genre and the place of fantasy, moving on to consider the attitudes towards magic and magic-users in medieval times. Main works considered are Geoffrey of Monmouth's Historia Regum Britanniae and Vita Merlini; the Vulgate cycle, Suite du Merlin; and finally Malory's work. The author asserts that each portrays a different approach to Merlin but all are tied to history and to the Christian religion.

An indepth work on the origins of the Merlin of Arthurian legend, this book examines early texts, thirteenth century romances focusing particularly on Merlin as a character, rather than those where Merlin is a background cast member. The outline here starts with looking at the genre and the place of fantasy, moving on to consider the attitudes towards magic and magic-users in medieval times. Main works considered are Geoffrey of Monmouth's Historia Regum Britanniae and Vita Merlini; the Vulgate cycle, Suite du Merlin; and finally Malory's work. The author asserts that each portrays a different approach to Merlin but all are tied to history and to the Christian religion.

This book deals with moral dilemmas and the development of ethical reasoning in two senses. First, the editor focuses on dilemmas, both real and hypothetical, which require moral judgments. The ""Heinz dilemma,"" part of Kohlberg's scoring system for level of moral development, is in some cases used as a point of departure for discussion. Problems with this particular dilemma as a scoring item are examined in detail, along with problems generated by similar dilemmas for moral reasoning in everyday life.

Those who study moral reasoning and its development are in somewhat of a dilemma as they attempt to integrate information from the domains of philosophy and psychology. These essays investigate domain issues in varied cultural settings, and across genders and age ranges for what have been proposed as universals in moral judgment, as well as formulate theories that reflect both empirical evidence and logical process.

The essays share a conception of human nature as inherently social, as well as a healthy respect for the problems or dilemmas which human sociality carries in its wake. Some of these problems are theoretical, such as those having to do with the moral reasoning or the classic issues of values justification. Other problems are practical, such as those having to do with distributive justice or methods of moral education. This volume will shed light on the process of resolving dilemmas both within philosophy and psychology.

There are many ways of writing about the moral life; Moral Obligations follows the way of what philosophers call ""meta-ethics"" the analysis, not of particular moral problems, but of how the concepts used in formulating and solving them, concepts like ""right"" and ""obligatory,"" have significance and power over us. The meta-ethical part of this book is preceded by a discussion of action, in which Wren lays the foundations for the argument that moral obligation is a part of the formal structure of human agency.

Wren's argument is practical and social-psychological: it is to help all, starting with those who are already committed to some version of the ethic of individual dignity, to promote interagency fellowship and peace as a result of seeing a certain truth, namely, the truth that the urgency of their feelings of moral obligation derives from a unspoken intention to belong to a community of agents.

Moral Obligations begins with the philosophy of action, and then it reviews the historical debate about the nature of obligation and its social context. This is followed by a section about action in general: it establishes the standpoint of the agent and makes an inventory of several species of action. Later chapters summarize the foregoing themes, with emphasis on the unspoken side of intention, and develop them in conjunction with an analysis of the hypothetical imperative. The work closes with a discussion of the dilemma of membership in competing moral communities.

This book deals with moral dilemmas and the development of ethical reasoning in two senses. First, the editor focuses on dilemmas, both real and hypothetical, which require moral judgments. The ""Heinz dilemma,"" part of Kohlberg's scoring system for level of moral development, is in some cases used as a point of departure for discussion. Problems with this particular dilemma as a scoring item are examined in detail, along with problems generated by similar dilemmas for moral reasoning in everyday life. Those who study moral reasoning and its development are in somewhat of a dilemma as they attempt to integrate information from the domains of philosophy and psychology. These essays investigate domain issues in varied cultural settings, and across genders and age ranges for what have been proposed as universals in moral judgment, as well as formulate theories that reflect both empirical evidence and logical process. The essays share a conception of human nature as inherently social, as well as a healthy respect for the problems or dilemmas which human sociality carries in its wake. Some of these problems are theoretical, such as those having to do with the moral reasoning or the classic issues of values justification. Other problems are practical, such as those having to do with distributive justice or methods of moral education. This volume will shed light on the process of resolving dilemmas both within philosophy and psychology.

There are many ways of writing about the moral life; Moral Obligations follows the way of what philosophers call ""meta-ethics"": the analysis, not of particular moral problems, but of how the concepts used in formulating and solving them, concepts like ""right"" and ""obligatory,"" have significance and power over us. The meta-ethical part of this book is preceded by a discussion of action, in which Wren lays the foundations for the argument that moral obligation is a part of the formal structure of human agency. Wren's argument is practical and social-psychological: it is to help all, starting with those who are already committed to some version of the ethic of individual dignity, to promote interagency fellowship and peace as a result of seeing a certain truth, namely, the truth that the urgency of their feelings of moral obligation derives from a unspoken intention to belong to a community of agents. Moral Obligations begins with the philosophy of action, and then it reviews the historical debate about the nature of obligation and its social context. This is followed by a section about action in general: it establishes the standpoint of the agent and makes an inventory of several species of action. Later chapters summarize the foregoing themes, with emphasis on the unspoken side of intention, and develop them in conjunction with an analysis of the hypothetical imperative. The work closes with a discussion of the dilemma of membership in competing moral communities.