The most likely means of delivering a nuclear bomb on a major city is through a successful smuggling effort by a terrorist organization. The catastrophic damage it would cause demands cooperative action by all responsible governments. Several U.S. Government programs are in place to deal with this threat.

Ever since man took to the battlefield, biology has played a significant role-both unintentionally and intentionally-in conflict. Prior to the discovery of the germ theory of disease, most combat deaths were the result of infections. And even before that understanding, biology was used in an offensive role. An early example was the Tatars' hurling of plague victims' bodies over the wall of the Crimean city of Kaffa in 1346, which probably helped spread the Black Death. Despite various treaties and protocols, offensive biological weapons use has continued to this day, with the anthrax attacks of 2001 being the most recent incident. Such activity has led to a strong defensive program, with medical science developing numerous countermeasures that have benefited both civilian and military populations. But that is the "old" biological warfare. Covert programs for the development of novel weapons will advance; likewise, the development of countermeasures will also continue. The present volume, however, does not address these issues. Rather, it reviews and analyzes current research and likely future developments in the life sciences and how they will significantly influence the biological material available to warfighters-not as weapons systems, but as augmentation to currently available equipment. This is the "new" face of biological warfare. The editors of this volume have assembled experts in research, warfighting, and defense policy to describe biological applications from the smallest to the largest scale. In addition, they show how thinking in biological terms can improve our procurement cycle and enhance our development time and costs. Finally, no description of biotechnology would be complete without a consideration of ethical and legal issues related to such research and development. This edited book is an important contribution to the literature and nicely captures a number of ongoing military basic science research projects with long-term implications for the Department of Defense. It does not purport to be an exhaustive accounting, but it is an excellent introduction for policymakers to garner an understanding of where biology is going to fit into 21st-century readiness and preparedness for our fighting force.

Over the past 35 years, dozens of new and frightening diseases have been identified, among them hepatitis C virus, Ebola and other hemorrhagic viruses, Legionnaires' disease, Nipahencephalitis, H5N1 influenza, SARS, the new arenavirus Lujo, which causes hemorrhagic fever in its victim s, and, most pervasively, the hum an immunodeficiency virus (HIV/AIDS). The emergence of H5N1 avian flu in 1996, coupled with the recent declaration of an H1N1 influenza pandemic, demonstrate the urgent need for countries to have pandemic preparedness plans in place. For nations that are unprepared, a pandemic could result in devastating social, economic, and health consequences, including a high number of fatalities. Nowhere is this more so the case than in countries with underdeveloped health care systems.

For over fifty years, the Air Force Research Laboratory's (AFRL) Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) has produced major scientific discoveries that have led to the creation and development of revolutionary capabilities for the Air Force. These scientific discoveries have laid the ground work for the technological innovation that has created the superior air and space force that is the modern United States Air Force. A continued robust investment in basic research will lead to capabilities that have the potential to reshape Air Force thinking, doctrine and operations in the future.

Monitoring covert offensive biological weapons research from afar has always been a daunting task. The problems facing analysts today are even more difficult, as advances in life sciences and dual-use biotechnology are rapidly spreading the knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to produce crude and sophisticated biological weapons around the world. Unlike nuclear programs, a well-defined and limited set of equipment and material that can be controlled through various import/export controls does not exist. Future monitoring will become more challenging as the distinctions among military, civilian and dual-use research and applications continue to blur. Managing proliferation risks in this environment will constitute the greatest challenge to policymakers in the biological weapons arena over the next two decades.