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The most likely means of delivering a nuclear bomb on a major city
is through a successful smuggling effort by a terrorist
organization. The catastrophic damage it would cause demands
cooperative action by all responsible governments. Several U.S.
Government programs are in place to deal with this threat.
Ever since man took to the battlefield, biology has played a
significant role-both unintentionally and intentionally-in
conflict. Prior to the discovery of the germ theory of disease,
most combat deaths were the result of infections. And even before
that understanding, biology was used in an offensive role. An early
example was the Tatars' hurling of plague victims' bodies over the
wall of the Crimean city of Kaffa in 1346, which probably helped
spread the Black Death. Despite various treaties and protocols,
offensive biological weapons use has continued to this day, with
the anthrax attacks of 2001 being the most recent incident. Such
activity has led to a strong defensive program, with medical
science developing numerous countermeasures that have benefited
both civilian and military populations. But that is the "old"
biological warfare. Covert programs for the development of novel
weapons will advance; likewise, the development of countermeasures
will also continue. The present volume, however, does not address
these issues. Rather, it reviews and analyzes current research and
likely future developments in the life sciences and how they will
significantly influence the biological material available to
warfighters-not as weapons systems, but as augmentation to
currently available equipment. This is the "new" face of biological
warfare. The editors of this volume have assembled experts in
research, warfighting, and defense policy to describe biological
applications from the smallest to the largest scale. In addition,
they show how thinking in biological terms can improve our
procurement cycle and enhance our development time and costs.
Finally, no description of biotechnology would be complete without
a consideration of ethical and legal issues related to such
research and development. This edited book is an important
contribution to the literature and nicely captures a number of
ongoing military basic science research projects with long-term
implications for the Department of Defense. It does not purport to
be an exhaustive accounting, but it is an excellent introduction
for policymakers to garner an understanding of where biology is
going to fit into 21st-century readiness and preparedness for our
fighting force.
Over the past 35 years, dozens of new and frightening diseases have
been identified, among them hepatitis C virus, Ebola and other
hemorrhagic viruses, Legionnaires' disease, Nipahencephalitis, H5N1
influenza, SARS, the new arenavirus Lujo, which causes hemorrhagic
fever in its victim s, and, most pervasively, the hum an
immunodeficiency virus (HIV/AIDS). The emergence of H5N1 avian flu
in 1996, coupled with the recent declaration of an H1N1 influenza
pandemic, demonstrate the urgent need for countries to have
pandemic preparedness plans in place. For nations that are
unprepared, a pandemic could result in devastating social,
economic, and health consequences, including a high number of
fatalities. Nowhere is this more so the case than in countries with
underdeveloped health care systems.
For over fifty years, the Air Force Research Laboratory's (AFRL)
Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) has produced major
scientific discoveries that have led to the creation and
development of revolutionary capabilities for the Air Force. These
scientific discoveries have laid the ground work for the
technological innovation that has created the superior air and
space force that is the modern United States Air Force. A continued
robust investment in basic research will lead to capabilities that
have the potential to reshape Air Force thinking, doctrine and
operations in the future.
Monitoring covert offensive biological weapons research from afar
has always been a daunting task. The problems facing analysts today
are even more difficult, as advances in life sciences and dual-use
biotechnology are rapidly spreading the knowledge, equipment, and
materials needed to produce crude and sophisticated biological
weapons around the world. Unlike nuclear programs, a well-defined
and limited set of equipment and material that can be controlled
through various import/export controls does not exist. Future
monitoring will become more challenging as the distinctions among
military, civilian and dual-use research and applications continue
to blur. Managing proliferation risks in this environment will
constitute the greatest challenge to policymakers in the biological
weapons arena over the next two decades.
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