Christopher Hookway presents a series of essays on the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1913), the 'founder of pragmatism' and one of the most important and original American philosophers. Peirce made significant contributions to the development of formal logic and to the study of the normative standards we should follow in carrying out inquiries and enhancing our knowledge in science and mathematics. In The Pragmatic Maxim, Hookway explores Peirce's writings on truth, science, and the nature of meaning, which have become steadily more influential over recent decades. He demonstrates how Peirce's ideas can contribute to and inform philosophical understanding in debates that continue today. The first seven chapters explore the framework of Peirce's thought, especially his fallibilism and his rejection of scepticism, and his contributions to the pragmatist understanding of truth and reality. Like Frege and Husserl, among others, Peirce rejected psychologism and used phenomenological foundations to defend the system of categories. The final three chapters are concerned with 'the pragmatic maxim', a rule for clarifying the contents of concepts and ideas. Hookway explores the different strategies Peirce employed to demonstrate the correctness of the maxim, and thus of pragmatism. As well as studying and evaluating Peirce's views, The Pragmatic Maxim discusses the relations between the views of Peirce and other pragmatist philosophers such as William James, C. I. Lewis, and Richard Rorty.

Scepticism is a subject which has preoccupied philosophers for two thousand years. This book presents an historical perspective on scepticism by considering contrasting views, such as those of Sextus Empiricus, Descartes and Hume, on why scepticism is important.
With its historical perspective and analysis of contemporary discussions, Scepticism provides a broad focus on the subject, differing from other discussions of the topic in the importance it attaches to scepticism both in Greek thought and in pre-twentieth century views generally.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Scepticism is a subject which has preoccupied philosophers for two thousand years. This book presents an historical perspective on scepticism by considering contrasting views, such as those of Sextus Empiricus, Descartes and Hume, on why scepticism is important.
With its historical perspective and analysis of contemporary discussions, Scepticism provides a broad focus on the subject, differing from other discussions of the topic in the importance it attaches to scepticism both in Greek thought and in pre-twentieth century views generally.

Christopher Hookway presents a series of studies of themes from the work of the great American philosopher Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), often described as the founder of pragmatism. These themes centre on the question of how we are able to investigate the world rationally; Peirce's ideas about this continue to play an important role in philosophy, as Hookway shows. Topics discussed include Peirce's theory of truth, his metaphysical views, his claim that emotions and sentiments guide us in reasoning well, and his religious views.

This is a volume of original essays written by philosophers and scientists and dealing with philosophical questions arising from work in evolutionary biology and artificial intelligence. In recent years both of these areas have been the focus for attempts to provide a scientific, model of a wide range of human capacities - most prominently perhaps in sociobiology and cognitive psychology. The book therefore examines a number of issues related to the search for a 'naturalistic' or scientific account of human experience and behaviour. Some of the essays deal with the application of such models to particular behaviour, stressing the problems raised by consciousness, and the information to be derived from the differing capacities of animals and people; others consider more general questions about the logic of the explanations provided by these kinds of approach. The volume continues the informal series stemming from meetings sponsored by the Thyssen Foundation.

Whether the interpretations made by social scientists of the thoughts, utterances and actions of other people, including those from an alien culture or a different period in history, are objectively correct, whether the forms of explanation they employ conform to those of the natural sciences, and whether values have a role in arriving at the theory that delivers the interpretations, are the main questions addressed by the contributors to this volume. Of particular importance in the discussion of the issues are developments in the philosophy of language and mind. The eight essays converge on the themes of intentionality, realism and theory choice, reflecting the amount of attention being given to these matters when this book was first published in 1980. Together they make a distinguished contribution to discussion in the area and serve to underline the importance of intellectual collaboration on such discussion between philosophy and the social sciences.