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Showing 1 - 9 of 9 matches in All Departments
Following the Inchon landings and the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, UN forces crossed the North Korean border on 9 October and moved on the capital Pyongyang. Many in America believed the war would be over by Christmas, but some Washington diplomatic, military, and intelligence experts continued to raise dire warnings that the People's Republic of China might intervene. Nevertheless, General MacArthur decided to push on to the Chinese/North Korean border, the Yalu River. On 25 October, Communist Chinese Forces unexpectedly attacked Republic of Korea forces near Unsan. Then, on 25 November, the day after MacArthur announced a 'final offensive to end the war', the Chinese 13th Army Group struck in mass against the Eighth Army in the north-west corner of North Korea, overrunning the US 2nd and 25th Infantry Divisions. The Chinese attacks quickly shattered Truman's dream of a unified Korea. American, UN, and ROK forces could not hold a successful defensive line against the combined CCF and NKPA attacks. At the Chosin Reservoir, US Marine Corps and Army units retreated south whilst MacArthur's forces withdrew from Pyongyang and X Corps later pulled out of Hungnam. Using expert research, bird's-eye views, and full-colour maps, this study tells the fascinating history of the critical Yalu campaign, including the famous retreat past the 38th Parallel.
This monograph explores the impact that oil revenue had on the national defense spending of five oil-exporting countries. Despite periods of falling oil revenues, these countries typically did not lower defense spending. In some cases, defense spending increased sharply, or the rate of decrease was much lower than the drop in oil revenues. This condition creates challenges for national security professionals. If nations face falling oil revenues and still have the will and ability to expand their military or security capabilities, then they might do so through the sacrifice of domestic spending or regional stability. Economic sanctions, worldwide recession, or falling oil demand may not stop these oil-exporting nations from purchasing weapons and creating large security forces. Policies that attempt to limit oil revenues of potential enemies alone may not be sufficient to inhibit them from creating regional instability through expansion of their defense capabilities. Hopes for reduced defense expenditures, by countries like Iran, as a result of a drop in energy demand seem to be diminished by these findings. A more complex picture emerges that forces analysts and policymakers to search more broadly for options to stem potential arms races that may be fueled by the riches of oil-exporting countries.
The U.S. Army faces global challenges that have required it to use reserve components in a manner unseen since World War II and the Korean War. Today, there are many questions and concerns about the future of the Army Reserve and National Guard due to the unprecedented, continued mobilization of these reserve components and problems involving retention. Without adequate retention of personnel, valuable experience and unit readiness are at risk. The Army would have to spend its limited resources to replace many seasoned soldiers with junior personnel or use more contractors who may not be as effective or efficient. This monograph examines Army Reserve and National Guard enlisted retention patterns from 1995-2002. It provides a necessary background to compare retention patterns in the past with those of today. This information will help reserve component leadership to assess their personnel retention efforts and adjust appropriate public policies to improve their force structure.
The authors begin with an examination of prewar planning for various contingencies, then move to the origins of "Germany first" in American war planning. They then focus on the concept, favored by both George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, that the United States and its Allies had to conduct a cross-channel attack and undertake an offensive aimed at the heartland of Germany. Following this background contained in the initial chapters, the remainder of the book provides a comprehensive discussion outlining how the European Campaign was was carried out. The authors conclude that American political leaders and war planners established logical and achievable objectives for the nation's military forces. However during the campaign's execution, American military leaders were slow to put into practice what would later be called operational level warfare. For comparison, the authors include an appendix covering German efforts at war planning in the tumultuous 1920s and 1930s.
Colonel Chun undertakes a case study of an experimental US antisatellite defense fielded by the Air Force in the 1960s as a departure for assessing the need for an ASAT system today. The author argues that the US Air Force was able to develop a relatively effective system based on rudimentary technology. Using aging booster rockets (the Thor ICBM) and existing tracking and targeting radar systems, the Air Force was able to intercept satellites. Colonel Chun argues that extrapolating from this historical example several states, particularly North Korea, Iran, India, and the Peoples Republic of China, could use widely available improved missiles and radar systems to develop ASAT weapons that would make critical US and allied space systems (military and commercial) vulnerable to attack, thus seriously undermining our offensive and defensive capabilities and perhaps wreak havoc on our economic system.
Since the end of World War II, there has been a stream of publications about the War in Europe, but despite the volume of literature, interest in the topic remains high. Given the significance of this conflict and the interest in this campaign, the Strategic Studies Institute offers a fresh look at the campaign in Europe. This publication begins with an examination of prewar planning for various contingencies, then moves to the origins of "Germany first"in American war planning. The authors then focus on the concept, favored by both George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, that the United States and its Allies had to conduct a cross-channel attack and undertake an offensive aimed at the heartland of Germany. Following the background provided in these initial chapters, the remainder of the book provides a comprehensive discussion outlining how the European Campaign was was carried out.
In this general history of the development of rockets and missiles, Chun traces the technology that made attack from beyond the horizon possible. A former missile launch officer, he focusess not only on the development and employment of the ballistic missile—from early German V-2 use to today—but on their subsequent impact on national strategies, doctrine, force structure, and politics. The development of ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads had a profound impact on superpower rivalries and structured international relations for decades. The advent of the ballistic missile changed the way nations believed war was to be fought in the future. Ballistic missiles (land based and submarine-launched) are now global in scope. Accordingly, the book covers Russia, China, North Korea, South Asia, and the Middle East. It details actual use in combat, as well as current countermeasures and future missile defense systems. In this general history of the development of rockets and missiles, Chun traces the technology that made attack from beyond the horizon possible. A former missile launch officer, he focuses not only on the development and employment of the ballistic missile—from early German V-2 use to today—but on their subsequent impact on national strategies, doctrine, force structure, and politics. The development of ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads had a profound impact on superpower rivalries and structured international relations for decades. The advent of the ballistic missile changed the way nations believed war was to be fought in the future. Ballistic missiles (land based and submarine-launched) are now global in scope. Accordingly, the book covers Russia, China, North Korea, South Asia, and the Middle East. It details actual use in combat, as well as current countermeasures and future missile defense systems. The ballistic missile is still a relevant weapon system. Advancements in miniaturization, spread of technology, availability of weapons of mass destruction, desire to gain strategic advantage among rivals, and other concerns have stimulated the growth of interested parties that either have or are able to build ballistic missiles. Tracing the development and issues regarding such missiles serves as a primer on these complex systems, and explains why international parties are still concerned about their proliferation.
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