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The Korean War was the first armed engagement for the newly formed
U.S. Air Force, but far from the type of conflict it expected or
wanted to fight. As the first air war of the nuclear age, it posed
a major challenge to the service to define and successfully carry
out its mission by stretching the constraints of limited war while
avoiding the excesses of total war. Conrad Crane analyzes both the
successes and failures of the air force in Korea, offering a
balanced treatment of how the air war in Korea actually unfolded.
He examines the Air Force's contention that it could play a
decisive role in a non-nuclear regional war but shows that the
fledgling service was held to unrealistically high expectations
based on airpower's performance in World War II, despite being
constrained by the limited nature of the Korean conflict. Crane
exposes the tensions and rivalries between services, showing that
emphasis on strategic bombing came at the expense of air support
for ground troops, and he tells how interactions between army and
air force generals shaped the air force's mission and strategy. He
also addresses misunderstandings about plans to use nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons in the war and includes new
information from pilot correspondence about the informal policy of
"hot pursuit" over the Yalu that existed at the end of the war. The
book considers not only the actual air effort in Korea but also its
ramifications. The air force doubled in size during the war and
used that growth to secure its position in the defense
establishment, but it wagered its future on its ability to deliver
nuclear weapons in a high-intensity conflict-a position that left
it unprepared to fight the next limited war in Vietnam. As America
observes the fiftieth anniversary of its initial engagement in
Korea, Crane's book is an important reminder of the lessons learned
there. And as airpower continues to be a cornerstone of American
defense, this examination of its uses in Korea provides new
insights about the air force's capabilities and limitations. Conrad
C. Crane is professor of history at the United States Military
Academy and the author of Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American
Airpower Strategy in World War II.
As American operations against terrorism spread around the globe to
places like Afghanistan and the Philippines, an increasing tendency
has been for commentators to draw parallels with past experience in
Vietnam. Even soldiers on the ground have begun to speak in such
terms. Dr. Conrad Crane analyzes the Army's response to that defeat
in Southeast Asia and its long-term impact. Contrary to the
accepted wisdom that nations which lose wars tend to learn best how
to correct their mistakes, he argues that Americans tried to forget
the unhappy experience with counterinsurgency by refocusing on
conventional wars. While that process eventually produced the
powerful force that won the Persian Gulf War, it left an Army with
force structure, doctrine, and attitudes that are much less
applicable to the peace operations and counterterrorism campaign it
now faces.
During World War II, the U.S. military's extensive planning for the
occupation of Germany was a major factor in achieving long-term
strategic objectives after the war was won. More recent examples of
military operations also emphasize the challenges of post-conflict
operations and the criticality of detailed planning and
preparation. As the possibility of war with Iraq looms on the
horizon, it is important to look beyond the conflict to the
challenges of occupying the country. In October 2002, the U.S. Army
War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the
Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to
analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the
requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a
war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine and
analyze probable missions for military forces in a post-Saddam
Iraq; examine associated challenges; and formulate strategic
recommendations for transferring responsibilities...
During World War II, the U. S. military's extensive planning for
the occupation of Germany was a major factor in achieving long-term
strategic objectives after the war was won. More recent examples of
military operations also emphasize the challenges of post-conflict
operations and the criticality of detailed planning and
preparation. As the possibility of war with Iraq looms on the
horizon, it is important to look beyond the conflict to the
challenges of occupying the country. In October 2002, the U. S.
Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination
with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a
study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address
the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory
in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine
and analyze probable missions for military forces in a post-Saddam
Iraq; examine associated challenges; and formulate strategic
recommendations for transferring responsibilities to coalition
partners or civilian organizations, mitigating local animosity, and
facilitating overall mission accomplishment in the war against
terrorism. The Strategic Studies Institute organized an
interdisciplinary team under the leadership of Dr. Conrad C. Crane
and Dr. W. Andrew Terrill. The team's initial findings were vetted
at a joint and interagency workshop conducted in December. The
final report of the project consists of three parts: a discussion
of historical insights from 20th century postwar occupations and
post-conflict operations; an analysis of the unique challenges Iraq
will present for an occupying power; and a mission matrix that
lists 135 specific tasks that mustbe performed to build and sustain
a state. The matrix arrays those tasks across four phases of
occupation and designates whether coalition military forces or
civilian agencies should perform them. The study has much to offer
planners and executors of operations to occupy and reconstruct
Iraq, but also has many insights that will apply to achieving
strategic objectives in any conflict after hostilities are
concluded. In recent decades, U. S. civilian and military
leadership have shied away from nation-building. However, the
current war against terrorism has highlighted the danger posed by
failed and struggling states. If this nation and its coalition
partners decide to undertake the mission to remove Saddam Hussein,
they will also have to be prepared to dedicate considerable time,
manpower, and money to the effort to reconstruct Iraq after the
fighting is over. Otherwise, the success of military operations
will be ephemeral, and the problems they were designed to eliminate
could return or be replaced by new and more virulent difficulties.
Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. Director, Strategic Studies Institute
Resistance is a Product of will times means, Carl von Clausewitz
postulated in his treatise On War. In his 1993 Bombs, Cities, and
Civilians, which the American Historical Review judged “must
reading for anyone interested in the Subject of air warfare,”
Conrad C. Crane focused on the moral dimension of American air
strategy in World War II—specifically, the Allied effort to break
the enemy’s will through targeting civilians. With decades of
research and reflection, and a wealth of new material at his
command, Crane returns to the Subject of America's WWII airpower
strategy to offer an analysis fully engaged with the 'means' side
of Clausewitz's equation: the design and impact of strategic
bombing of the enemy's infrastructure and thus its capacity to
fight. A marked advance in our understanding of the use of airpower
in war in general and the Second World War in particular, Crane's
work shows how, despite an undeniable lack of concern about
civilian casualties in Germany and Japan late in the war, American
strategic bombing in WWII consistently focused on destroying the
enemy's war-making capacity instead of its collapsing will.
Further, Crane persuasively argues that in the limited wars since
then, separating such targets has become increasingly more
difficult, and all air campaigns against states have subsequently
escalated to accept greater risks for civilians. American Airpower
Strategy in World War II also provides an expanded close look at
the use of airpower in the last three months of the strategic air
war against Germany, when so many bombing missions relied upon
radar aids, as well as the first direct comparison of 8th and 15th
Air Force bombing campaigns in Europe. The result is the most
coherent and concise analysis of the application and legacy of
Allied strategic airpower in WWII and a work that will inform all
future practical and theoretical consideration of the use, and the
role, of airpower in war.
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