Aristotle's De Anima has a claim to be the first systematic treatment of issues in the philosophy of mind, and also to be one of the greatest works on the subject. This volume provides an accurate translation of Books II and III, together with some sections of Book I; particular attention has been given to the translation of difficult terms, to help the student of philosophy who does not know Greek. A brief Introduction discusses Aristotle's approach to his subject, while the Notes provide a continuous philosophical commentary on the text. Since the original publication of this volume, Aristotle's philosophy of mind has been the focus of lively scholarly debate; for this revised edition, Christopher Shields has added a substantial review of this recent work, together with a new bibliography.

Originally published in 1957, the primary aim of this study was to shed light upon the logical character of the psychology of perception. D.W. Hamlyn begins by delimiting the field of psychological inquiry into perception, then gives a detailed account of the types of explanation appropriate in the field. He maintains that these explanations have certain important peculiarities which distinguish them from other scientific inquiries. In view of the central importance of Gestalt Theory in this field an account is given of its origins, and its main features are critically discussed. The work should still be of considerable interest to both philosophers and psychologists, as well as to all those interested in the relations between the two subjects.

First published in 1961, Sensation and Perception aims to cast light upon the nature of perception itself. This, the author believes, can be achieved only through an understanding of the concepts of sensation and perception. A survey of the principal attempts to arrive at such an understanding brings out the fact that perception has most often been assimilated to sensation or judgment. The author believes that both of these views are wrong but that an attention to the history of thought can provide an explanation of the temptation to accept them. A final chapter gives the author's own views on the nature of sensation and perception. As such it would be of interest both to philosophers and to those psychologists who are concerned with the nature of perception.

First published in 1983, Perception, Learning and the Self is a collection of essays demonstrating the incompleteness of the information-processing model in cognitive psychology and the connection between epistemic factors and social conditions in the making of the self. It is suggested that any framework employed to view cognition must be an essentially social one, in which knowers are seen as selves who are agents with feelings and attitudes. Professor Hamlyn argues that, by failing to acknowledge this social element, the information-processing model presents an overly simplistic view of the systems that underlie cognition, and thus is liable to distort what is at stake. Professor Hamlyn considers the contributions of a number of major psychologists to this area of study, including James Gibson, Jean Piaget and Sigmund Freud. This book will be of interest to students of philosophy and psychology.

This volume examines some of the arguments that have been put forward over the years to explain the way in which understanding is acquired. The author looks firstly at the empricist thesis of genesis without structure, and secondly at the opposing theory, represented by Chomsky of structure without genesis. His greatest sympathy is with the theory of Piaget, who represents structure with genesis. He considers that Piaget's account is flawed, however, by its biological model and by its failure to deal adequately with the problem of objectivity. The second part of the book contains chapters on language, the differences between early and later learning, and on teaching. The book provides a general understanding of the principles that make it possible, and the differences between the ways in which they work at different stages.

This volume examines some of the arguments that have been put forward over the years to explain the way in which understanding is acquired. The author looks firstly at the empricist thesis of genesis without structure, and secondly at the opposing theory, represented by Chomsky of structure without genesis. His greatest sympathy is with the theory of Piaget, who represents structure with genesis. He considers that Piaget's account is flawed, however, by its biological model and by its failure to deal adequately with the problem of objectivity. The second part of the book contains chapters on language, the differences between early and later learning, and on teaching. The book provides a general understanding of the principles that make it possible, and the differences between the ways in which they work at different stages.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Aristotle's "De Anima" has a claim to be the first systematic treatment of issues in the philosophy of mind, and also to be one of the greatest works on the subject. This volume provides an accurate translation of Books 2 and 3, together with some sections of Book 1. Particular attention has been given to the translation of difficult terms, to help the student of philosophy who does not know Greek. A brief introduction discusses Aristotle's approach to his subject, while notes provide a continuous philosophical commentary on the text. Since the original publication of this volume, Aristotle's philosophy of mind has been the focus of lively scholarly debate; for this revised edition, Christopher Shields has added a substantial review of this recent work, together with a new bibliography.

This book provides an introduction to metaphysics. At the outset Professor Hamlyn distinguishes two conceptions of metaphysics running through the history of the subject. One, which goes back to Aristotle, is concerned with ontology, and with what has to exist for beings such as we are; the other separates appearance and reality and attempts to establish what really exists. Professor Hamlyn's account of metaphysics conforms with the first tradition. This is not, however, primarily a historical exposition. The discussion concentrates on central metaphysical concepts and problems, including the principles of ontology, substance, particulars and universals, monism and pluralism, space and time, minds, selves and personal identity. Throughout, Professor Hamlyn's thoroughly informed and argued consideration of the topics presents both a persuasive view of the subject and an excellent grounding in it.

Originally published in 1957, the primary aim of this study was to shed light upon the logical character of the psychology of perception. D.W. Hamlyn begins by delimiting the field of psychological inquiry into perception, then gives a detailed account of the types of explanation appropriate in the field. He maintains that these explanations have certain important peculiarities which distinguish them from other scientific inquiries. In view of the central importance of Gestalt Theory in this field an account is given of its origins, and its main features are critically discussed. The work should still be of considerable interest to both philosophers and psychologists, as well as to all those interested in the relations between the two subjects.