This book represents the first attempt to deal with the problem of how to conceptualize the civil-military relations of communist systems within a common intellectual framework. It presents major constructs originally designed for analyzing civil-military relations in the USSR. .

This book represents the first attempt to deal with the problem of how to conceptualize the civil-military relations of communist systems within a common intellectual framework. The opening chapters present three major constructs originally designed for analyzing civil-military relations in the USSR: the interest group approach, the institutional congruence approach, and the participatory model. In subsequent chapters the utility of these approaches is tested against a wide variety of communist systems, including those of Cuba, the USSR, China, Romania, Hungary, the GDR, and Poland. In probing these issues for the first time, the authors shed considerable light on the transnational differences and similarities among communist systems, and the dynamics of civil-military relations in all communist systems.

This collaboration of distinguished presidential scholars offers one of the first book-length post-presidency analyses of President George W. Bush and his policies. Mark J. Rozell and Gleaves Whitney have assembled a varied list of contributors from both ends of the political spectrum, bringing together academics and professionals to provide a glimpse into the politics and policies that defined President George W. Bush's presidency. Testing the Limits discusses all aspects of the Bush policy and administration, from staff appointments to foreign and domestic policy to budgetary politics. Several contributors focus their energy on the expansion of presidential powers during Bush presidency, assessing the increased influence of the Vice-President, the politicization of federal court appointments, and the development of executive privilege and presidential secrecy.

While presidents have always kept a watchful eye on the military, our generals have been equally vigilant in assessing the commander-in-chief. Their views, however, have been relatively neglected in the literature on civil-military relations. By taking us inside the military's mind in this matter, Dale Herspring's new book provides a path-breaking, utterly candid, and much-needed reassessment of a key relationship in American government and foreign policymaking.

As Herspring reminds us, that relationship has often been a very tense, even extremely antagonistic one, partly because the military has become a highly organized and very effective bureaucratic interest group. Reevaluating twelve presidents-from Franklin D. Roosevelt to George W. Bush-Herspring shows how the intensity of that conflict depends largely on the military's perception of the president's leadership style. Quite simply, presidents who show genuine respect for military culture are much more likely to develop effective relations with the military than those who don't.

Each chapter focuses on one president and his key administrators--such as Robert McNamara, Henry Kissinger, and Donald Rumsfeld--and contains case studies showing how the military reacted to the president's leadership. In the final chapter, Herspring ranks the presidents according to their degree of conflict with the military: Lyndon Johnson received exceedingly low marks for being overbearing and dismissive of the armed forces, further aggravating his Vietnam problem. George H. W. Bush inspired respect for not micromanaging military affairs. And Bill Clinton was savaged both privately and publicly by military leaders for having been a "draft dodger," cutting Pentagon spending, and giving the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" tag an unnecessarily high profile.

From World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Herspring clearly shows how the nature of civilian control has changed during the past half century. He also reveals how the military has become a powerful bureaucratic interest group very much like others in Washington-increasingly politicized, media-savvy, and as much accountable to Congress as to the commander-in-chief.

Ultimately, "The Pentagon and the Presidency" illuminates how our leaders devise strategies for dealing with threats to our national security-and how the success of that process depends so much upon who's in charge and how that person's perceived by our military commanders.

Throughout its existence, the Red Army was viewed as a formidable threat. By the end of the Cold War, however, it had become the weakest link in the Soviet Union's power structure. Always subordinate to the Communist Party, the military in 1991 suddenly found itself answering instead to the president of a democratic state. Dale Herspring closely examines how that relationship influenced the military's viability in the new Russian Federation.

Herspring's book is the first to assess the relationship between the Russian military and the political leadership under Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin. He depicts an outmoded and demoralized military force still struggling to free itself from Cold War paradigms, while failing to confront not only debacles in Afghanistan and Chechnya but also a rise in crime and corruption within the ranks. He reveals how Gorbachev neglected the military to save Russia from internal collapse and Yeltsin reneged on continuing promises of support. And, while Putin claims a better understanding of the armed forces, he has severely tightened his control over the military while monitoring its struggle toward modernization.

Herspring argues that presidential leadership--or a significant lack thereof--has been the key variable determining the kind of military Russia puts in the field. It has been up to the president to ensure that the high command makes a successful transition to the new polity--otherwise combat readiness will decline and generals and admirals could become politicized. By focusing on how the high command has reacted to each president's decisions and leadership style, Herspring shows that, in spite of the continued importance of the military's bureaucratic structure, personality factors have assumed a much more important role than in the past.

"The Kremlin and the High Command" provides the most complete analysis to date of the Russian president's influence on the Russian officer corps, the soldiers they lead, and their army's combat readiness. Shedding light on the chaos that has plagued the USSR and Russia over the past 25 years, it also suggests how the often fraught relationship between the president and the high command must evolve if the Russian Federation is to evolve into a truly democratic nation.

..". a volume that provides both solid historical background for the novice reader and provocative and thoughtful material for the more advanced scholar. It should find wide classroom use at all levels and will be an important addition to the bookshelf of any analyst of post-Soviet security affairs." Slavic Review

"The history is both fascinating and timely..." European Security

"When military reform returns to its deservedly prominent place in the Russian political agenda, Herspring s book will offer invaluable guidance." Mark von Hagen

Dale Herspring analyzes three key periods of change in civil-military relations in the Soviet Union and postcommunist Russia: the Bolshevik construction of the communist Red Army in the 1920s; the era of perestroika, when Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to implement a more benign military doctrine and force posture; and the Yeltsin era, when a new civilian and military leadership set out to restructure civil-military relations. The book concludes with a timely discussion of the relationship of the military to the current political struggle in Russia."

We are in the midst of a Dwight Eisenhower revival. Today pundits often look to Eisenhower as a model of how a president can govern across party lines and protect American interests globally without resorting too quickly to the use of force. Yet this mix of nostalgia and frustration with the current polarized state of American politics may mislead us. Eisenhower's presidency has much to teach us today about how a president might avert crises and showdowns at home or abroad. But he governed under conditions so strikingly different from those a chief executive faces in the early 21st century that we need to question how much of his style could work in our own era. The chapters in this volume address the lessons we can draw from the Eisenhower experience for presidential leadership today. Although most of the authors find much to admire in the Eisenhower record, they express varying opinions on how applicable his approach would be for our own time. On one side, they appreciate his limited faith in the power of his words to move public opinion and his reluctance to turn to the use of force to solve international problems. On the other side, it was plain that Ike's exercise of "hidden-hand" leadership (in Fred Greenstein's evocative term) would not be possible in the modern media environment that makes Washington a giant fishbowl and instant revelation an acceptable norm. Both Eisenhower admirers and skeptics (and many of the authors are both) will find much in these essays to reinforce their preconceptions-and much that is unsettling. Eisenhower emerges as an effective but flawed leader. He was in many ways the right man for his time, but limited because he was also a man of his time.

We are in the midst of a Dwight Eisenhower revival. Today pundits often look to Eisenhower as a model of how a president can govern across party lines and protect American interests globally without resorting too quickly to the use of force. Yet this mix of nostalgia and frustration with the current polarized state of American politics may mislead us. Eisenhower's presidency has much to teach us today about how a president might avert crises and showdowns at home or abroad. But he governed under conditions so strikingly different from those a chief executive faces in the early 21st century that we need to question how much of his style could work in our own era. The chapters in this volume address the lessons we might draw from the Eisenhower experience for presidential leadership today. Although most of the authors find much to admire in the Eisenhower record, they express varying opinions on how applicable his approach would be for our own time. On one side, they appreciate his limited faith in the power of his words to move public opinion and his reluctance to turn to the use of force to solve international problems. On the other side, it was plain that Ike's exercise of "hidden-hand" leadership (in Fred Greenstein's evocative term) would not be possible in the modern media environment that makes Washington a giant fishbowl and instant revelation an acceptable norm. Both Eisenhower admirers and skeptics (and many of the authors are both) will find much in these essays to reinforce their preconceptions - and much that is unsettling. Eisenhower emerges as an effective but flawed leader. He was in many ways the right man for his time, but limited because he was also a man of his time.

This collaboration of distinguished presidential scholars offers one of the first book-length post-presidency analyses of President George W. Bush and his policies. Mark J. Rozell and Gleaves Whitney have assembled a varied list of contributors from both ends of the political spectrum, bringing together academics and professionals to provide a glimpse into the politics and policies that defined President George W. Bush's presidency. Testing the Limits discusses all aspects of the Bush policy and administration, from staff appointments to foreign and domestic policy to budgetary politics. Several contributors focus their energy on the expansion of presidential powers during Bush presidency, assessing the increased influence of the Vice-President, the politicization of federal court appointments, and the development of executive privilege and presidential secrecy.

Building on a strong foundation of primary sources, this unique study traces the role of East Germany's military (NVA) in the country's unification with West Germany. Utilizing interviews with and questionnaires from NVA officers, Herspring unravels the puzzle of the NVA's decision against using force to save the political system it was sworn to serve. The author also examines the integration of a select minority of officers and NCOs into the Bundeswehr. Illuminating the problems encountered by the Bundeswehr as it incorporated these individuals, Herspring constructs an ideal type of officer in one of the most politicized and tightly controlled of all communist militaries. His findings will be invaluable for all military-political specialists and for anyone interested in the process of transition from authoritarian/totalitarian to democratic systems.