This edited work presents a unique and authoritative look at morality - its development within the individual, its evolution within society, and its place within the law. The contributors represent some of the foremost authorities in these fields, and the book represents a collection of essays presented at a symposium on social constructivism and morality.

This is a concise commentary on Kant's aims and arguments in his celebrated "First Critique", within the context of the dominant schools of philosophy of his time. "How is Nature Possible?: Kant's Project in the First Critique" presents a clear and systematic appraisal of what is perhaps the most difficult treatise in the philosophical canon. Daniel N. Robinson situates Kant's undertaking in the "First Critique" within the context of the history of philosophy and as a response to the challenges of scepticism. Kant's central task in the "First Critique" is to tie his metaphysical analysis to the very possibility of nature itself. Where others assumed the validity or the weakness of perception and reason, Kant presents a critical appraisal of both, thereby establishing the very limits of sense and reason as instruments of discovery. Ideal for students at all levels, this fascinating introduction clarifies the aims and significance of Kant's project, locates its place within the history of philosophy and identifies the strengths and weaknesses reasonably attributed to this most significant contribution to the history of philosophical reflection.

Scientism: The New Orthodoxy is a comprehensive philosophical overview of the question of scientism, discussing the role and place of science in the humanities, religion, and the social sciences. Clarifying and defining the key terms in play in discussions of scientism, this collection identifies the dimensions that differentiate science from scientism. Leading scholars appraise the means available to science, covering the impact of the neurosciences and the new challenges it presents for the law and the self. Illustrating the effect of scientism on the social sciences, and the humanities, Scientism: the New Orthodoxy addresses what science is and what it is not. This provocative collection is an important contribution to the social sciences and the humanities in the 21st century. Contributors include: Peter Hacker, Bastiaan van Fraassen, Daniel N. Robinson, Kenneth Schaffner, Roger Scruton, James K.A. Smith, Richard Swinburne, Lawrence Principe and Richard N. Williams.

The principal aim of the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment was to preclude congressional imposition of a national church. A balance was sought between states' rights and the rights of individuals to exercise their religious conscience. While the founding fathers were debating such issues, the potential for serious conflict was confined chiefly to variations among the dominant Christian sects. Today, issues of marriage, child bearing, cultural diversity, and corporate personhood, among others, suffuse constitutional jurisprudence, raising difficult questions regarding the nature of beliefs that qualify as 'religious', and the reach of law into the realm in which those beliefs are held. The essays collected in this volume explore in a selective and instructive way the intellectual and philosophical roots of religious liberty and contemporary confrontations between this liberty and the authority of secular law.

The principal aim of the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment was to preclude congressional imposition of a national church. A balance was sought between states' rights and the rights of individuals to exercise their religious conscience. While the founding fathers were debating such issues, the potential for serious conflict was confined chiefly to variations among the dominant Christian sects. Today, issues of marriage, child bearing, cultural diversity, and corporate personhood, among others, suffuse constitutional jurisprudence, raising difficult questions regarding the nature of beliefs that qualify as 'religious', and the reach of law into the realm in which those beliefs are held. The essays collected in this volume explore in a selective and instructive way the intellectual and philosophical roots of religious liberty and contemporary confrontations between this liberty and the authority of secular law.

Early in 1986 I invited Professor Robinson to collaborate on a volume of the Annals devoted to the theme of the 'person' in psychology. He accepted my invitation later that year suggesting, instead, that the volume be devoted to the theme of explanation in psychology. I gladly compromised for, as I knew from his exterisive writings on the history and philosophy of psychology, the concept of explanation is firmly rooted in philosophical anthropology. The contributions by Rom Harre, James Lamiell, Joseph Margolis, and George Miller were available in June, 1988, and the commentaries and replies to commentaries early in 1989. Fortunately, foundational papers wear well, as the content of the present volume so aptly testifies. Beginning with Volume 6, the Annals will be entirely edited and prepared using the computer facilities at our Center. Thanks to the dedicated effort of my colleague, Professor William Baker, this is the first volume produced from camera-ready copy. His personal support and technical expertise made the transition to desk-top publishing somewhat less than formidable. Mrs. Valerie Welch, our Center secretary, entered the text and managed my personal correspondence; Casey Boodt proofread the entire manuscript; and the University of Alberta continues to support my involvement with this series. Dan Robinson's commitment to scholarship also extends to the more mundane task of editing. Every volume with a co-editor is a challenge; he made this one a delight.

In recent decades, issues that reside at the center of philosophical and psychological inquiry have been absorbed into a scientific framework variously identified as "brain science," "cognitive science," and "cognitive neuroscience." Scholars have heralded this development as revolutionary, but a revolution implies an existing method has been overturned in favor of something new. What long-held theories have been abandoned or significantly modified in light of cognitive neuroscience?

"Consciousness and Mental Life" questions our present approach to the study of consciousness and the way modern discoveries either mirror or contradict understandings reached in the centuries leading up to our own. Daniel N. Robinson does not wage an attack on the emerging discipline of cognitive science. Rather, he provides the necessary historical context to properly evaluate the relationship between issues of consciousness and neuroscience and their evolution over time.

Robinson begins with Aristotle and the ancient Greeks and continues through to Ren? Descartes, David Hume, William James, Daniel Dennett, John Searle, Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, and Derek Parfit. Approaching the issue from both a philosophical and a psychological perspective, Robinson identifies what makes the study of consciousness so problematic and asks whether cognitive neuroscience can truly reveal the origins of mental events, emotions, and preference, or if these occurrences are better understood by studying the whole person, not just the brain. Well-reasoned and thoroughly argued, "Consciousness and Mental Life" corrects many claims made about the success of brain science and provides a valuable historical context for the study of human consciousness.

How is Nature Possible?: Kants Project in the First Critique presents a clear and systematic appraisal of what is perhaps the most difficult treatise in the philosophical canon. Daniel N. Robinson situates Kants undertaking in the First Critique within the context of the history of philosophy and as a response to the challenges of scepticism. Kants central task in the First Critique is to tie his metaphysical analysis to the very possibility of nature itself. Where others assumed the validity or the weakness of perception and reason, Kant presents a critical appraisal of both, thereby establishing the very limits of sense and reason as instruments of discovery. Ideal for students at all levels, this fascinating introduction clarifies the aims and significance of Kants project, locates its place within the history of philosophy and identifies the strengths and weaknesses reasonably attributed to this most significant contribution to the history of philosophical reflection.

Robinson unfolds the vision of four influential writers on psychology---J.S. Mill, F. Hegel, Wilhelm Wundt, and William James---who considered the world, its persons and problems, its possibilities and conflicts, its scientific facts and its moral ambiguities, and proceeded to devise a means by which to improve it. Robinson shows how in thinking about psychology, these individuals provided an intellectual context within which the discipline could be refined.

In "Neuroscience and Philosophy" three prominent philosophers and a leading neuroscientist clash over the conceptual presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience. The book begins with an excerpt from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker's "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" (Blackwell, 2003), which questions the conceptual commitments of cognitive neuroscientists. Their position is then criticized by Daniel Dennett and John Searle, two philosophers who have written extensively on the subject, and Bennett and Hacker in turn respond.

Their impassioned debate encompasses a wide range of central themes: the nature of consciousness, the bearer and location of psychological attributes, the intelligibility of so-called brain maps and representations, the notion of qualia, the coherence of the notion of an intentional stance, and the relationships between mind, brain, and body. Clearly argued and thoroughly engaging, the authors present fundamentally different conceptions of philosophical method, cognitive-neuroscientific explanation, and human nature, and their exchange will appeal to anyone interested in the relation of mind to brain, of psychology to neuroscience, of causal to rational explanation, and of consciousness to self-consciousness.

In his conclusion Daniel Robinson (member of the philosophy faculty at Oxford University and Distinguished Professor Emeritus at Georgetown University) explains why this confrontation is so crucial to the understanding of neuroscientific research. The project of cognitive neuroscience, he asserts, depends on the incorporation of human nature into the framework of science itself. In Robinson's estimation, Dennett and Searle fail to support this undertaking; Bennett and Hacker suggest that the project itself might be based on a conceptual mistake. Exciting and challenging, "Neuroscience and Philosophy" is an exceptional introduction to the philosophical problems raised by cognitive neuroscience.

In "Neuroscience and Philosophy" three prominent philosophers and a leading neuroscientist clash over the conceptual presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience. The book begins with an excerpt from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker's "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" (Blackwell, 2003), which questions the conceptual commitments of cognitive neuroscientists. Their position is then criticized by Daniel Dennett and John Searle, two philosophers who have written extensively on the subject, and Bennett and Hacker in turn respond.

Their impassioned debate encompasses a wide range of central themes: the nature of consciousness, the bearer and location of psychological attributes, the intelligibility of so-called brain maps and representations, the notion of qualia, the coherence of the notion of an intentional stance, and the relationships between mind, brain, and body. Clearly argued and thoroughly engaging, the authors present fundamentally different conceptions of philosophical method, cognitive-neuroscientific explanation, and human nature, and their exchange will appeal to anyone interested in the relation of mind to brain, of psychology to neuroscience, of causal to rational explanation, and of consciousness to self-consciousness.

In his conclusion Daniel Robinson (member of the philosophy faculty at Oxford University and Distinguished Professor Emeritus at Georgetown University) explains why this confrontation is so crucial to the understanding of neuroscientific research. The project of cognitive neuroscience, he asserts, depends on the incorporation of human nature into the framework of science itself. In Robinson's estimation, Dennett and Searle fail to support this undertaking; Bennett and Hacker suggest that the project itself might be based on a conceptual mistake. Exciting and challenging, "Neuroscience and Philosophy" is an exceptional introduction to the philosophical problems raised by cognitive neuroscience.

Scientism: The New Orthodoxy is a comprehensive philosophical overview of the question of scientism, discussing the role and place of science in the humanities, religion, and the social sciences. Clarifying and defining the key terms in play in discussions of scientism, this collection identifies the dimensions that differentiate science from scientism. Leading scholars appraise the means available to science, covering the impact of the neurosciences and the new challenges it presents for the law and the self. Illustrating the effect of scientism on the social sciences, and the humanities, Scientism: the New Orthodoxy addresses what science is and what it is not. This provocative collection is an important contribution to the social sciences and the humanities in the 21st century. Contributors include: Peter Hacker, Bastiaan van Fraassen, Daniel N. Robinson, Kenneth Schaffner, Roger Scruton, James K.A. Smith, Richard Swinburne, Lawrence Principe and Richard N. Williams.

America's Founding Fathers shared similar beliefs on the nature of civic life and the character of those supposed to be able to self-govern. Although they studied the failed republics of the ancient world, they believed that classical ideals were still applicable to politics.
This unique contribution to the literature on American Founding gathers leading thinkers who set out not to relate its history, but its intellectual underpinnings. They explore the Founding Fathers' assumptions about civic life, human nature, political institutions, private morality, aesthetics, education, and history. Chapters on natural law, the Judeo-Christian conception of human nature, the influence of Aristotle and Cicero, the symbolic role of architecture, and the importance of education help understand the foundations that led to the Declaration of Independence and a constitutional charter that aimed to be universal in its human aspirations.
This authoritative work provides a conservative response to more liberal interpretations of America. It will enrich the debate on civic life and be a key resource to anyone interested in America's "experiment in ordered liberty."

America's Founding Fathers shared similar beliefs on the nature of civic life and the character of those supposed to be able to self-govern. Although they studied the failed republics of the ancient world, they believed that classical ideals were still applicable to politics.
This unique contribution to the literature on American Founding gathers leading thinkers who set out not to relate its history, but its intellectual underpinnings. They explore the Founding Fathers' assumptions about civic life, human nature, political institutions, private morality, aesthetics, education, and history. Chapters on natural law, the Judeo-Christian conception of human nature, the influence of Aristotle and Cicero, the symbolic role of architecture, and the importance of education help understand the foundations that led to the Declaration of Independence and a constitutional charter that aimed to be universal in its human aspirations.
This authoritative work provides a conservative response to more liberal interpretations of America. It will enrich the debate on civic life and be a key resource to anyone interested in America's "experiment in ordered liberty."

How does the law regard and define mental incompetence, when faced with the problem of meting out justice? To what extent has the law relied on extra-legal authorities-be they religious or scientific-to frame its own categories of mental incompetence and madness? Wild Beasts and Idle Humours takes us on an illuminating journey through the changing historical landscape of human nature and offers an unprecedented look at the legal conceptions of insanity from the pre-classical Greek world to the present. Although actual trial records are either totally lacking or incomplete until the eighteenth century, there are other sources from which the insanity defenses can be constructed. In this book Daniel N. Robinson, a distinguished historian of psychology, pores over centuries of written law, statements by legal commentators, summaries of crimes, and punishments, to glean from these sources an understanding of epochal views of responsibility and competence. From the Greek phrenesis to the Roman notions of furiosus and non compos mentis, from the seventeenth-century witch trials to today's interpretation of mens rea, Robinson takes us through history and provides the intricate story of how the insanity defense has been construed as a meeting point of the law and those professions that chart human behavior and conduct: namely religion, medicine, and psychology. The result is a rare historical account of "insanity" within Western civilization. Wild Beasts and Idle Humours will be essential reading for anyone interested in the evolution of thinking not merely about legal insanity but about such core concepts as responsibility, fitness for the rule of law, competence to enter into contracts and covenants, the role of punishments, and the place of experts within the overall juridical context.