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N: Economic Policy (Hardcover)
David Besanko, David E.M. Sappington, Robert W. Hahn, Ingo Vogelsang
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R6,984
Discovery Miles 69 840
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Ships in 12 - 17 working days
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Examines policy design when the policy maker in imperfectly
informed, focusing on cases where the regulated firm possesses
better information about its technology than the regulator.
Economics of Strategy focuses on the key economic concepts students
must master in order to develop a sound business strategy. Ideal
for undergraduate managerial economics and business strategy
courses, Economics of Strategy offers a careful yet accessible
translation of advanced economic concepts to practical problems
facing business managers. Armed with general principles, today's
students--tomorrows future managers--will be prepared to adjust
their firms business strategies to the demands of the ever-changing
environment.
First published in 1987. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor &
Francis, an informa company.
A firm's reputation is an asset that can be built or harmed over
time and most companies invest in their good standing. This can be
challenged or threatened by activists seeking to change the firm's
behavior, especially to reduce negative externalities and other
social harms that a company may be creating. The strategic
interaction takes place in the realm of private politics and
corporate social responsibility-perceptions and actions of the
company, activists, and the public audience-rather than that of
public policy, including regulation. In Corporate Reptutation and
Social Activism Jose Miguel Abito, David Besanko, and Daniel
Diermeier argue that harm to a firm's reputation is one of the
strongest and most practical tools of contemporary corporate
activism and explains the numerous campaigns as well as the
response of companies. Through a straightforward dynamic model
focusing on the interaction of the firm and activists, the authors
show how both the firm's existing reputation and various activist
tactics influence actions and outcomes of both the firm and the
activists. Among their insights are that as a firm's reputation
grows, it tends to coast on its reputation by reducing its private
regulation, or voluntary adoption of internal rules that constrain
certain company behavior. Activists can keep the firm from coasting
in two ways: the firm acts more responsibly to protect its
reputation in anticipation of activist campaigns, and a firm whose
reputation is harmed by a campaign engages more responsibly to
repair its reputation. The book explores how activists choose among
potential targets and the different tactics activists can use to
harm firms' reputations, including criticism, which has a
potentially mild impact on the firm's reputation, confrontation,
which can cause a reputational crisis in which the firm's
reputation can be dramatically impaired, and rewards, which
increase a firm's reputation. These can have different effects on
firm behavior. The authors also examine whether campaigns by
activists advance or harm social welfare. The result is a sweeping
overview of an evolving and increasingly important phenomenon that
combines rigorous modeling and that generates a rich set of
empirical implications that will interest researchers in economics,
business and management, sociology, and political science.
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