Is science unified or disunified? Over the last century, the question has raised the interest (and hackles) of scientists, philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science, for at stake is how science and society fit together. Recent years have seen a turn largely against the rhetoric of unity, ranging from the please of condensed matter physicists for disciplinary autonomy all the way to discussions in the humanities and social sciences that involve local history, feminism, multiculturalism, postmodernism, scientific relativism and realism, and social constructivism. Many of these varied aspects of the debate over the disunity of science are reflected in this volume, which brings together a number of scholars studying science who otherwise have had little to say to each other: feminist theorists, philosophers of science, sociologists of science. How does the context of discover shape knowledge? What are the philosophical consequences of a disunified science? Does, for example, an antirealism, a realism, or an arealism become defensible within a picture of local scientific knowledge? What politics lies behind and follows from a picture of the world of science more like a quilt than a pyramid? Who gains and loses if representation of science has standards that vary from place to place, field to field, and practitioner to practitioner.

In this book, David Stump traces alternative conceptions of the a priori in the philosophy of science and defends a unique position in the current debates over conceptual change and the constitutive elements in science. Stump emphasizes the unique epistemological status of the constitutive elements of scientific theories, constitutive elements being the necessary preconditions that must be assumed in order to conduct a particular scientific inquiry. These constitutive elements, such as logic, mathematics, and even some fundamental laws of nature, were once taken to be a priori knowledge but can change, thus leading to a dynamic or relative a priori. Stump critically examines developments in thinking about constitutive elements in science as a priori knowledge, from Kant's fixed and absolute a priori to Quine's holistic empiricism. By examining the relationship between conceptual change and the epistemological status of constitutive elements in science, Stump puts forward an argument that scientific revolutions can be explained and relativism can be avoided without resorting to universals or absolutes.

In this book, David Stump traces alternative conceptions of the a priori in the philosophy of science and defends a unique position in the current debates over conceptual change and the constitutive elements in science. Stump emphasizes the unique epistemological status of the constitutive elements of scientific theories, constitutive elements being the necessary preconditions that must be assumed in order to conduct a particular scientific inquiry. These constitutive elements, such as logic, mathematics, and even some fundamental laws of nature, were once taken to be a priori knowledge but can change, thus leading to a dynamic or relative a priori. Stump critically examines developments in thinking about constitutive elements in science as a priori knowledge, from Kant's fixed and absolute a priori to Quine's holistic empiricism. By examining the relationship between conceptual change and the epistemological status of constitutive elements in science, Stump puts forward an argument that scientific revolutions can be explained and relativism can be avoided without resorting to universals or absolutes.

Is science unified or disunified? Over the last century, the question has raised the interest (and hackles) of scientists, philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science, for at stake is how science and society fit together. Recent years have seen a turn largely against the rhetoric of unity, ranging from the please of condensed matter physicists for disciplinary autonomy all the way to discussions in the humanities and social sciences that involve local history, feminism, multiculturalism, postmodernism, scientific relativism and realism, and social constructivism. Many of these varied aspects of the debate over the disunity of science are reflected in this volume, which brings together a number of scholars studying science who otherwise have had little to say to each other: feminist theorists, philosophers of science, sociologists of science. How does the context of discover shape knowledge? What are the philosophical consequences of a disunified science? Does, for example, an antirealism, a realism, or an arealism become defensible within a picture of local scientific knowledge? What politics lies behind and follows from a picture of the world of science more like a quilt than a pyramid? Who gains and loses if representation of science has standards that vary from place to place, field to field, and practitioner to practitioner.

Science and Hypothesis is a classic text in history and philosophy of science. Widely popular since its original publication in 1902, this first new translation of the work in over a century features unpublished material missing from earlier editions. Addressing errors introduced by Greenstreet and Halsted in their early 20th-century translations, it incorporates all the changes, corrections and additions Poincare made over the years. Taking care to update the writing for a modern audience, Poincare's ideas and arguments on the role of hypotheses in mathematics and in science become clearer and closer to his original meaning, while David J. Stump's introduction gives fresh insights into Poincare's philosophy of science. By approaching Science and Hypothesis from a contemporary perspective, it presents a better understanding of Poincare's hierarchy of the sciences, with arithmetic as the foundation, geometry as the science of space, then mechanics and the rest of physics. For philosophers of science and scientists working on problems of space, time and relativity, this is a much needed translation of a ground-breaking work which demonstrates why Poincare is still relevant today.

Science and Hypothesis is a classic text in history and philosophy of science. Widely popular since its original publication in 1902, this first new translation of the work in over a century features unpublished material missing from earlier editions. Addressing errors introduced by Greenstreet and Halsted in their early 20th-century translations, it incorporates all the changes, corrections and additions Poincare made over the years. Taking care to update the writing for a modern audience, Poincare's ideas and arguments on the role of hypotheses in mathematics and in science become clearer and closer to his original meaning, while David J. Stump's introduction gives fresh insights into Poincare's philosophy of science. By approaching Science and Hypothesis from a contemporary perspective, it presents a better understanding of Poincare's hierarchy of the sciences, with arithmetic as the foundation, geometry as the science of space, then mechanics and the rest of physics. For philosophers of science and scientists working on problems of space, time and relativity, this is a much needed translation of a ground-breaking work which demonstrates why Poincare is still relevant today.