Political science is an intensely quantitative discipline, and models are central. Political scientists use models-formal and informal, statistical and qualitative-to investigate and illuminate causal mechanisms, generate comparative data, and understand the conditions under which certain outcomes are expected to occur. But even though the use of models has grown dramatically in the discipline, there is very little understanding among political scientists of the role or function that models play in the scientific enterprise more generally. Moreover, theoretical models and empirical models have traditionally been treated as separate (hence the division between theorists and empiricists). Today, however, the emphasis is on using models to generate testable predictions that serve as hypotheses for subsequent data analysis. But how do we justify and rationalize the method? Why test predictions from a deductive, and thus truth-preserving, system? David Primo and Kevin Clarke tackle these central questions in this novel work of methodology. They argue that the lack of a suitable justification for model testing is not the only reason to revisit the role of models in political science. Most importantly, they contend that models should be seen as 'objects' and thus neither true nor false. Rather, they should be evaluated in the same fashion as models are evaluated in the physical sciences-good models are useful for particular purposes. Nothing more, nothing less. Divided into two parts, the book first establishes that no social scientific endeavor is philosophy-free. The second part focuses on different types of models, and closes with a framework for integrating theoretical and statistical models.

In recent decades, and particularly since the Supreme court's controversial Citizens United decision, lawmakers and other elites have told Americans that stricter campaign finance laws are needed to improve people's faith in the election process, increase trust in the government, and counter cynicism toward politics more generally. But as David M. Primo and Jeffrey D. Milyo argue, politicians and the public alike would do well to reconsider the conventional wisdom in light of surprising empirical evidence to the contrary. Primo and Milyo probe original survey data to determine Americans' sentiments on the role of money in politics, what drives these sentiments, and why they matter. What Primo and Milyo find is that while many individuals support the idea of reform, they are also skeptical that reform would successfully limit corruption, which Americans believe stains almost every fiber of the political system. Moreover, support for campaign finance restrictions is deeply divided along party lines, reflecting the polarization of our times. Ultimately, Primo and Milyo contend, American attitudes toward money in politics reflect larger fears about the health of American democracy, fears that will not be allayed by campaign finance reform.

In recent decades, and particularly since the Supreme court's controversial Citizens United decision, lawmakers and other elites have told Americans that stricter campaign finance laws are needed to improve people's faith in the election process, increase trust in the government, and counter cynicism toward politics more generally. But as David M. Primo and Jeffrey D. Milyo argue, politicians and the public alike would do well to reconsider the conventional wisdom in light of surprising empirical evidence to the contrary. Primo and Milyo probe original survey data to determine Americans' sentiments on the role of money in politics, what drives these sentiments, and why they matter. What Primo and Milyo find is that while many individuals support the idea of reform, they are also skeptical that reform would successfully limit corruption, which Americans believe stains almost every fiber of the political system. Moreover, support for campaign finance restrictions is deeply divided along party lines, reflecting the polarization of our times. Ultimately, Primo and Milyo contend, American attitudes toward money in politics reflect larger fears about the health of American democracy, fears that will not be allayed by campaign finance reform.

Government spending has increased dramatically in the United States since World War II despite the many rules intended to rein in the insatiable appetite for tax revenue most politicians seem to share. Drawing on examples from the federal and state governments, "Rules and Restraint" explains in lucid, nontechnical prose why these budget rules tend to fail, and proposes original alternatives for imposing much-needed fiscal discipline on our legislators.
One reason budget rules are ineffective, David Primo shows, is that politicians often create and preserve loopholes to protect programs that benefit their constituents. Another reason is that legislators must enforce their own provisions, an arrangement that is seriously compromised by their unwillingness to abide by rules that demand short-term sacrifices for the sake of long-term gain. Convinced that budget rules enacted through such a flawed legislative process are unlikely to work, Primo ultimately calls for a careful debate over the advantages and drawbacks of a constitutional convention initiated by the states--a radical step that would bypass Congress to create a path toward change. "Rules and Restraint" will be required reading for anyone interested in institutional design, legislatures, and policymaking.

Flying is an extremely safe way to travel. Fewer than 14,000 individuals perished in U.S. airline disasters during the twentieth century. In contrast, nearly three times as many people lose their lives in automobile accidents every year. Yet plane crashes have a tremendous impact on public perceptions of air safety in the United States. When a crash occurs domestically, media coverage is immediate and continuous. Government teams rush to investigate, elected officials offer condolences and promise to find the cause, and airlines and plane manufacturers seek to avoid responsibility. Regulations are frequently proposed in response to a particular incident, but meaningful change often does not occur. In The Plane Truth, Roger Cobb and David Primo examine the impact of high-visibility plane crashes on airline transportation policy. Regulation is disjointed and reactive, in part due to extensive media coverage of airline disasters. The authors describe the typical responses of various players -elected officials, investigative agencies, airlines, and the media. While all agree that safety is the primary concern in air travel, failure to agree on a definition of safety leads to policy conflicts. Looking at all airline crashes in the 1990s, the authors examine how particular features of an accident correspond to the level of media attention it receives, as well as how airline disasters affect subsequent actions by the National Transportation Safety Board, Federal Aviation Administration, and others. Three accidents are considered in detail: USAir flight 427 (September 1994), ValuJet flight 592 (May 1996), and TWA flight 800 (July 1996). The authors also discuss how the September 11 terrorist attacks turned attention away from safety and toward security. Cobb and Primo make several policy recommendations based on their findings. These include calling on lawmakers and regulators to avoid reactive regulation and instead to focus on systematic problems in airline safety, like the antiquated air traffic control system. Concerned that aviation security is eclipsing aviation safety in the wake of September 11, they encourage federal agencies to strike a better balance between the two. Finally, in order to address the FAA's poor track record in balancing airline safety regulation with its other duties, they recommend the creation of a new federal agency that is responsible for aviation safety. The Plane Truth provides a framework for understanding conflicts about the meaning of air safety and the implications of these battles for public policy.

Political science is an intensely quantitative discipline, and models are central. Political scientists use models-formal and informal, statistical and qualitative-to investigate and illuminate causal mechanisms, generate comparative data, and understand the conditions under which certain outcomes are expected to occur. But even though the use of models has grown dramatically in the discipline, there is very little understanding among political scientists of the role or function that models play in the scientific enterprise more generally. Moreover, theoretical models and empirical models have traditionally been treated as separate (hence the division between theorists and empiricists). Today, however, the emphasis is on using models to generate testable predictions that serve as hypotheses for subsequent data analysis. But how do we justify and rationalize the method? Why test predictions from a deductive, and thus truth-preserving, system? David Primo and Kevin Clarke tackle these central questions in this novel work of methodology. They argue that the lack of a suitable justification for model testing is not the only reason to revisit the role of models in political science. Most importantly, they contend that models should be seen as 'objects' and thus neither true nor false. Rather, they should be evaluated in the same fashion as models are evaluated in the physical sciences-good models are useful for particular purposes. Nothing more, nothing less. Divided into two parts, the book first establishes that no social scientific endeavor is philosophy-free. The second part focuses on different types of models, and closes with a framework for integrating theoretical and statistical models.

Government spending has increased dramatically in the United States since World War II despite the many rules intended to rein in the insatiable appetite for tax revenue most politicians seem to share. Drawing on examples from the federal and state governments, "Rules and Restraint" explains in lucid, nontechnical prose why these budget rules tend to fail, and proposes original alternatives for imposing much-needed fiscal discipline on our legislators.
One reason budget rules are ineffective, David Primo shows, is that politicians often create and preserve loopholes to protect programs that benefit their constituents. Another reason is that legislators must enforce their own provisions, an arrangement that is seriously compromised by their unwillingness to abide by rules that demand short-term sacrifices for the sake of long-term gain. Convinced that budget rules enacted through such a flawed legislative process are unlikely to work, Primo ultimately calls for a careful debate over the advantages and drawbacks of a constitutional convention initiated by the states--a radical step that would bypass Congress to create a path toward change. "Rules and Restraint" will be required reading for anyone interested in institutional design, legislatures, and policymaking.