This book explains the rapid evolution of the Blue Box municipal recycling program in Ontario between 1982 and 1994 and its social and environmental costs. The origins of the Blue Box municipal recycling program in Ontario can partly be traced back to the early 1970s when concerns about litter problems were attracting the public's attention. In 1976, a law under the Environmental Protection Act was passed allowing the Ontario government to enact regulations banning non-refillable soft drink containers. However, the regulations banning non-refillables cans and new plastic PET bottles were never passed and instead in 1978 the soft drink industry convinced the Minister of the Environment to sign a "voluntary agreement" that soft drink companies and retailers would sell 75 percent of its soft drinks in refillable containers. The 75 percent ratio for glass refillable soft drink containers was never reached though because the soft drink industry had trouble with the targets. The large pop producers and grocery retailers also had substantial connections to the Ontario Progressive Conservatives and made large annual donations to both the Liberals and the Progressive Conservative parties throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. In the early 1980s, environmentalists renewed their push to get the Ontario government to enforce the 75 percent "gentlemen's agreement" on refillables. At the same time, the soft drink industry contended that consumers preferred disposables such as cans and plastic bottles. What the soft drink industry really wanted was "packaging freedom" in other words, freedom to use cheaper packages for their products, freedom to concentrate ownership in their industry, freedom to eliminate the independent bottlers, freedom to increase profits and freedom to start challenging the role of unionized bottling workers. In contrast, steel workers were arguing in favour of greater use of cans to provide a more secure footing for the steel industry. Meanwhile the aluminum producers and the canning industry wanted to develop new highly mechanized production lines that made full use of aluminum and would cut labour costs for the soft drink companies. The plastics industry wanted access to markets to sell plastic bottles to consumers and the independent bottlers said they wanted a better refillable system. To resolve conflicts between these interests, a multi-stakeholder consultation process was established by the Ontario government in 1985, chaired by Professor Paul Emond of Osgoode Hall Law School. In this case, the former executive director of Pollution Probe, Colin Isaacs agreed to represent environmentalists. Isaacs decided that he would accept the concept of packaging freedom and greater reliance on plastic bottles and aluminum cans in return for greater support for recycling. Groups like Pollution Probe had been advocating recycling of newsprint, metal and glass for several years and using more valuable materials like aluminum to subsidize curbside recycling seemed like a way to break the barriers that had been encountered. With Pollution Probe's support, participants involved in the multi-stakeholder consultation agreed to relax the refillable quota to 40 percent, that is, down from 75 percent, if the soft drink industry contributed $1 million to help set up Ontario Multi-Material Recycling Inc. or OMMRI and develop a Blue Box system (BBS). Eventually the amount of the contribution was increased to $20 million. The consequences of this policy choice have been environmentally, socially and economically significant and have helped to spur a massive increase in the rate of soft drink consumption in Ontario, and a related increased in obesity among many adults and youths who consume sugar-laden soft drinks at a staggering rate. The book also explores how Ontario's BBS increased green house gas production related to aluminum production and energy consumption related to long-distance shipping.

This volume provides the background and more recent updates related to one of the most controversial environmental court decisions in Ontario history, Lafarge v. Ontario Environmental Review Tribunal (2008). In 2004, Lafarge, a multi-national cement producer, applied to the Ontario Ministry of the Environment (MOE) for air and waste approvals under the Ontario Environmental Protection Act (EPA) in order to burn "alternative fuels"(i.e. scrap tires, plastics, etc.) at its cement plant near Bath, Ontario. In late December 2006, two MOE Directors delivered their Christmas presents to the company and issued the approvals. Several parties then sought leave to appeal to the Environmental Review Tribunal (ERT) under the Environmental Bill of Rights, 1993 (EBR). In April 2007, the ERT granted some of the EBR leave applications. Key findings included: 1) the standard of proof at the EBR leave stage is less than "balance of probabilities"; 2) the MOE's Statement of Environmental Values under the EBR (i.e. requiring consideration of factors such as the ecosystem approach, cumulative effects, precautionary principle, etc.) should be applied to MOE's approval decisions; and 3) proposed compliance with an MOE numerical emission standard in an approval for air and water discharges is not necessarily determinative of whether significant environmental harm could occur. Lafarge then applied to the Divisional Court seeking to overturn the ERT leave decision and was unsuccessful, thus theoretically reinforcing the importance of the EBR in decision-making on approvals by Ontario government ministries. These cases and materials are intended to assist environmental and municipal lawyers in understanding the implications of the Lafarge case in their arguments before ERT, the Ontario Municipal Board and the courts.

This book provides a selection of documents from the lengthy fight about the infamous proposal to convert the Adams Mine - an open pit iron ore mine near Kirkland lake - into a mega dump for Toronto's garbage. The idea first was seriously proposed in 1989. In 1992, the Ontario government enacted the Waste Management Act, 1992 which was intended to ban waste export and promote local waste disposal in the Greater Toronto Area. By the late 1990s, the project had also been rejected by most of the municipal governments in Toronto, but was kept "alive" by a private sector promoter, Gord McGuinty (second cousin of current Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty). In addition, the project also was supported by Premier Mike Harris and the Progressive Conservatives (PCs) after they were elected to power in 1995. Harris, also was the Member of the Provincial Parliament (MPP) for North Bay-Nippissing, and he and all the other PC candidates who ran for the PCs in Northeastern Ontario in 1995 were staunch supporters of the project and on the public record, in the media and at public meetings, declaring that support. Accordingly, the project was pushed through, subject to the first and only scoped environmental assessment hearing in Ontario's history and approved, despite fierce local opposition. In 2004, the Adams Mine Lake Act, 2004 was passed, making the abandoned iron ore mine off-limits as a dump for solid waste, at least until the AMLA is amended. The AMLA revoked all existing approvals for the Adams Mine site as a landfill issued prior to 2004 and is intended to prevent development of the site as a land fill. The legislation also amends the Environmental Protection Act to prevent the use of other lakes that are larger than one hectare in size as landfill sites. This book provides support for the argument that garbage export is not sustainable or sensible as we attempt to move towards a sustainable society.

This book is a case study of the role of the Ontario Municipal Board, the key planning tribunal in the province, in protecting agricultural land between 1975 and 1986. The study highlights the need for provincial and municipal governments to increase density in land use planning so that fewer people live on less land. As well, the concluding sections discuss the economic challenges facing farmers operating on the rural-urban fringe.

In the past fifteen years, it has become evident that citizens and non-government organizations (NGOs) are facing increased financial and technical barriers to participating in environmental decision-making processes on approvals, planning, and assessments and hearing processes. In part this is due to the various effects of "downsizing," streamlining, and harmonization policies being implemented by all levels of government in Canada, the United States and other nations. In addition, there are greater demands on funding sources for all non-profit and volunteer-based organizations. Moreover, globalization and issues such as climate change are altering the complexity of legal and policy issues. One mechanism that is available to level the playing field is called participant or intervenor funding. The concept behind intervenor funding is fairly straightforward. By the mid 1980s many public hearing processes (for example, the Ontario Energy Board or OEB) were based on full-cost recovery, proponents-pay cost awards; cost awards to intervenors are determined at the end of the hearing to compensate them for their participation. Intervenor funding simply provides funding in advance of a hearing for those who cannot otherwise afford to participate without up-front funding. Intervenor awards are deducted from the cost awards at end. This book examines the early evolution of intervenor funding in the mid 1970s and early 1980s through the lens of the Berger Inquiry, the first major public inquiry in Canada which examined the environmental and social impacts of a pipeline mega-project through the Northwest Territories. In the Berger Inquiry, First Nations communities, environmental groups and individuals were able to better contribute to the public hearings because of the intervenor funding financial assistance provided to them. In June 1988, then Ontario Attorney General Ian Scott, introduced the Intervenor Funding Project Act in the Ontario Legislature. Scott had acted as commission counsel to the Berger Inquiry (1974-1978) and this provided a model for legislation subsequently passed in many other jurisdictions in Canada. This book explores key topics such as: Why was funding for participation in environmental decision-making important? When should it be used? What can groups do to achieve their goals in the event that they are unable to obtain adequate resources?