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This is the first study of the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918 based
extensively on key German records presumed to be lost forever after
Potsdam was bombed in 1944. In 1997, David T. Zabecki discovered
translated copies of these files in a collection of old
instructional material at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He presents his findings here
for the first time, with a thorough review of the surviving
original operational plans and orders, to offer a wealth of fresh
insights to the German Offensives of 1918. David T. Zabecki clearly
demonstrates how the German failure to exploit the vulnerabilities
in the BEF's rail system led to the failure of the first two
offensives, and how inadequacies in the German rail system
determined the outcome of the last three offensives. This is a
window into the mind of the German General Staff of World War I,
with thorough analysis of the German planning and decision making
processes during the execution of battles. This is also the first
study in English or in German to analyze the specifics of the
aborted Operation HAGEN plan. This is also the first study of the
1918 Offensives to focus on the 'operational level of war' and on
the body of military activity known as 'the operational art',
rather than on the conventional tactical or strategic levels. This
book will be of great interest to all students of World War I, the
German Army and of strategic studies and military theory in
general.
German general Hermann Balck (1897--1982) was considered to be one
of World War II's greatest battlefield commanders. His brilliantly
fought battles were masterpieces of tactical agility, mobile
counterattack, and the technique of Auftragstaktik, or "mission
command." However, because he declined to participate in the U.S.
Army's military history debriefing program, today he is known only
to serious students of the war. Drawing heavily on his meticulously
kept wartime journals, Balck discusses his childhood and his career
through the First and Second World Wars. His memoir details the
command decision-making process as well as operations on the ground
during crucial battles, including the Battle of the Marne in World
War I and his incredible victories against a larger and
better-equipped Soviet army at the Chir River in World War II.
Balck also offers observations on Germany's greatest generals, such
as Erich Ludendorff and Heinz Guderian, and shares his thoughts on
international relations, domestic politics, and Germany's place in
history. Available in English for the first time in an expertly
edited and annotated edition, this important book provides
essential information about the German military during a critical
era in modern history.
At the tactical level of war the Germans are widely regarded as
having had the most innovative and proficient army of World War I.
Likewise, many historians would agree that the Germans suffered
from serious, if not fatal, shortcomings at the strategic level of
war. It is at the middle level of warfare, the operational level,
that the Germans seem to be the most difficult to evaluate.
Although the operational was only fully accepted in the 1980s by
many Western militaries as a distinct level of warfare, German
military thinking well before the start of World War I clearly
recognized the Operativ as a realm of warfighting activity between
the tactical and the strategic. But the German concept of the
operational art was flawed at best, and actually came closer to
tactics on a grand scale. The flaws in their approach to operations
cost the Germans dearly in both world wars.
Through a thorough review of the surviving original operational
plans and orders, this book evaluates the German approachto the
operational art by analyzing the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918.
Taken as a whole, the five actually executed and two planned but
never executed major attacks produced stunning tactical results,
but ultimately left Germany in a far worse strategic position by
August 1918. Among the most serious operational errors made by the
German planners were their blindness to the power of sequential
operations and cumulative effects, and their insistence in mounting
force-on-force attacks, instead of attacking key Allied
vulnerabilities.
The Allies, and especially the British, were exceptionally
vulnerable in certain elements of their warfighting system. By
attacking those vulnerabilities theGermans might well have achieved
far better results than by attacking directly into the Allied
strength. Specifically, the British logistics system was extremely
fragile, and their rail system had two key choke points, Amiens and
Hazebrouck. During Operations MICHAEL and GEORGETTE, the Germans
came close to capturing both essential rail centers, but never
seemed to grasp fully their operational significance. The British
and French certainly did. After the Germans attacked south to the
Marne during Operation BLUCHER, they fell victims themselves to an
inadequate rail network behind their newly acquired lines. At the
operational level, then, the respective enemy and friendly rail
networks had a decisive influence on the campaign of March-August
1918.
The Allied invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, marked a critical
turning point in the European theater of World War II. The massive
landing on France's coast had been meticulously planned for three
years, and the Allies anticipated a quick and decisive defeat of
the German forces. Many of the planners were surprised, however, by
the length of time it ultimately took to defeat the Germans. While
much has been written about D-day, very little has been written
about the crucial period from August to September, immediately
after the invasion. In Ruckzug, Joachim Ludewig draws on military
records from both sides to show that a quick defeat of the Germans
was hindered by excessive caution and a lack of strategic boldness
on the part of the Allies, as well as by the Germans' tactical
skill and energy. This intriguing study, translated from German,
not only examines a significant and often overlooked phase of the
war, but also offers a valuable account of the conflict from the
perspective of the German forces.
The Allied invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, marked a critical
turning point in the European theater of World War II. The massive
landing on France's coast had been meticulously planned for three
years, and the Allies anticipated a quick and decisive defeat of
the German forces. Many of the planners were surprised, however, by
the length of time it ultimately took to defeat the Germans. While
much has been written about D-day, very little has been written
about the crucial period from August to September, immediately
after the invasion. In Ruckzug, Joachim Ludewig draws on military
records from both sides to show that a quick defeat of the Germans
was hindered by excessive caution and a lack of strategic boldness
on the part of the Allies, as well as by the Germans' tactical
skill and energy. This intriguing study, translated from German,
not only examines a significant and often overlooked phase of the
war, but also offers a valuable account of the conflict from the
perspective of the German forces.
Surrounded by potential adversaries, nineteenth-century Prussia and
twentieth-century Germany faced the formidable prospect of
multifront wars and wars of attrition. To counteract these threats,
generations of general staff officers were educated in operational
thinking, the main tenets of which were extremely influential on
military planning across the globe and were adopted by American and
Soviet armies. In the twentieth century, Germany's art of warfare
dominated military theory and practice, creating a myth of German
operational brilliance that lingers today, despite the nation's
crushing defeats in two world wars. In this seminal study, Gerhard
P. Gross provides a comprehensive examination of the development
and failure of German operational thinking over a period of more
than a century. He analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of five
different armies, from the mid--nineteenth century through the
early days of NATO. He also offers fresh interpretations of
towering figures of German military history, including Moltke the
Elder, Alfred von Schlieffen, and Erich Ludendorff. Essential
reading for military historians and strategists, this innovative
work dismantles cherished myths and offers new insights into
Germany's failed attempts to become a global power through military
means.
German general Hermann Balck (1897--1982) was considered to be one
of World War II's greatest battlefield commanders. His brilliantly
fought battles were masterpieces of tactical agility, mobile
counterattack, and the technique of Auftragstaktik, or "mission
command." However, because he declined to participate in the U.S.
Army's military history debriefing program, today he is known only
to serious students of the war. Drawing heavily on his meticulously
kept wartime journals, Balck discusses his childhood and his career
through the First and Second World Wars. His memoir details the
command decision-making process as well as operations on the ground
during crucial battles, including the Battle of the Marne in World
War I and his incredible victories against a larger and
better-equipped Soviet army at the Chir River in World War II.
Balck also offers observations on Germany's greatest generals, such
as Erich Ludendorff and Heinz Guderian, and shares his thoughts on
international relations, domestic politics, and Germany's place in
history. Available in English for the first time in an expertly
edited and annotated edition, this important book provides
essential information about the German military during a critical
era in modern history.
While scholarship abounds on the diplomatic and security aspects of
the Cold War, very little attention has been paid to military
planning at the operational level. In Blueprints for Battle,
experts from Russia, the United States, and Europe address this
dearth by closely examining the military planning of NATO and
Warsaw Pact member nations from the end of World War II to the
beginning of detente. Informed by material from recently opened
archives, this collection investigates the perceptions and actions
of the rival coalitions, exploring the challenges presented by
nuclear technology, examining how military commanders' perceptions
changed from the 1950s to the 1960s, and discussing logistical
coordination among allied states. The result is a detailed study
that offers much-needed new perspectives on the military aspects of
the early Cold War.
World War I had a profound impact on the United States of America,
which was forced to 'grow' an army almost overnight. The day the
United States declared war on Germany, the US Army was only the
17th largest in the world, ranking behind Portugal - the Regular
Army had only 128,00 troops, backed up by the National Guard with
some 182,000 troops. By the end of the war it had grown to
3,700,000, with slightly more than half that number in Europe.
Until the United States did so, no country in all history had tried
to deploy a 2-million-man force 3,000 miles from its own borders, a
force led by American Expeditionary Forces Commander-in-Chief
General John J. Pershing. This was America's first truly modern war
and rising from its ranks was a new generation of leaders who would
control the fate of the United States armed forces during the
interwar period and into World War II. This book reveals the
history of the key leaders working for and with John J. Pershing
during this tumultuous period, including George S. Patton (tank
commander and future commander of the US Third Army during World
War II); Douglas MacArthur (42nd Division commander and future
General of the Army) and Harry S. Truman (artillery battery
commander and future President of the United States). Edited by
Major General David T. Zabecki (US Army, Retired) and Colonel
Douglas V. Mastriano (US Army, Retired), this fascinating title
comprises chapters on individual leaders from subject experts
across the US, including faculty members of the US Army War
College.
Written by experts for use by nonexperts, this monumental work
probes Germany's "Genius for War" and the unmistakable pattern of
tactical and operational innovation and excellence evident
throughout the nation's military history. Despite having the best
military forces in the world, some of the most advanced weapons
available, and unparalleled tactical proficiency, Germany still
lost both World Wars. This landmark, four-volume encyclopedia
explores how and why that happened, at the same time examining
Germany as a military power from the start of the Thirty Years' War
in 1618 to the present day. Coverage includes the Federal Republic
of Germany, its predecessor states, and the kingdoms and
principalities that combined to form Imperial Germany in 1871. The
Seven Years' War is discussed, as are the Napoleonic Wars, the Wars
of German Unification (including the Franco-Prussian War), World
War I, World War II, and the Cold War. In all, more than 1,000
entries illuminate battles, organizations, leaders, armies,
weapons, and other aspects of war and military life. The most
comprehensive overview of German military history ever to appear in
English, this work will enable students and others interested in
military history to better understand the sociopolitical history of
Germany, the complex role conflict has played in the nation
throughout its history, and why Germany continues to be an
important player on the European continent.
"Steel Wind" is a piece of historical detective work that
explains how Colonel Georg Bruchmuller, an obscure German artillery
officer recalled from retirement, played a pivotal role in the
revolution of offensive tactics that took place in 1917-18.
Ironically, the methods developed by Bruchmuller ultimately were
rejected by the German Army of World War II, but they were taken up
and applied with a vengeance by the emerging Red Army. The Soviets
further developed Bruchmuller's principles and incorporated them
into their doctrine, where they remain to this day. Through Soviet
doctrine, they have become fundamental to the practice of many
other armies. Bruchmuller's influence in shaping the former Soviet
Army has also been mirrored in the shape of those armies designed
to oppose it.
This invaluable resource offers students a comprehensive overview
of the German war machine that overran much of Europe during World
War II, with close to 300 entries on a variety of topics and a
number of key primary source documents. This book provides
everything the reader needs to know about the German war machine
that developed into the potent armed force under Adolf Hitler. This
expansive encyclopedia covers the period of the German Third Reich,
from January 1933 to the end of World War II in Europe, in May
1945. Dozens of entries on key battles and military campaigns,
military and political leaders, military and intelligence
organizations, and social and political topics that shaped German
military conduct during World War II are followed by an
illuminating epilogue that outlines why Germany lost World War II.
A documents section includes more than a dozen fascinating primary
sources on such significant events as the Tripartite Pact among
Germany, Italy, and Japan; the Battle of Stalingrad; the Normandy
Invasion; the Ardennes Offensive; and Germany's surrender. In
addition, six appendices provide detailed information on a variety
of topics such as German aces, military commanders, and military
medals and decorations. The book ends with a chronology and a
bibliography of print resources. Presents a comprehensive overview
of how the German Army was able to rebuild itself from the ground
up following World War I Explains how flawed German strategy
blundered the country into a two- and even three-front war it could
not hope to win Explores the contradiction of Wehrmacht complicity
in the rise of the Nazis and the Holocaust, and the fact that a
group of Wehrmacht officers formed Germany's only viable internal
opposition to Hitler Examines many of the less popularly known but
key German military leaders such as Ludwig Beck, Adolf Heusinger,
Hans Speidel, Johannes Steinhoff, and Siegfried Westphal
General Fritz von Lossberg (1868--1942) directed virtually all the
major German defensive battles on the Western Front during the
First World War. Hailed as "the Lion of the Defensive," he was an
extremely influential military tactician and, unlike many other
operations officers of his era, was quick to grasp the changes
wrought by technology. Now available for the first time in English,
Lossberg's memoir explains how he developed, tested, and
implemented his central principles -- flexibility, decentralized
control, and counterattack -- which were based on a need to adapt
to shifting conditions on the battlefield. Lossberg first put his
theory of elastic defense combined with defense-in-depth into
practice during the Battle of Arras (April--May 1917), where it
succeeded. At the Battle of Passchendaele (June--November 1917),
his achievements on the field proved the feasibility of his
strategy of employing a thinly manned front line that minimized the
number of soldiers exposed to artillery fire. Lossberg's tactical
modernizations have become essential components of army doctrine,
and Lossberg's War: The World War I Memoirs of A German Chief of
Staff will take readers inside the mind of one of the most
significant military innovators of the twentieth century.
The two-volume Chief of Staff examines the history, development,
and role of the military duty position of the chief of staff. Many
books have studied history's great commanders and the art of
command. None have focused exclusively on the chief of staff −the
key staff officer responsible for translating the ideas of the
commander into practical plans that common soldiers can execute
successfully on the battlefield. In some cases, it is almost
impossible to think of certain great commanders without also
thinking of their chief of staff. Napoleon’s chief of staff
Berthier and Eisenhower’s chief of staff Bedell Smith are two
examples that are profiled in this work. Zabecki and his
collaborators examine the history, development, and role of the
chief of staff primarily through profiles of the most important
practitioners of the art. These books are published in co-operation
with the Association of the United States Army.
"Steel Wind" is a piece of historical detective work that
explains how Colonel Georg Bruchmuller, an obscure German artillery
officer recalled from retirement, played a pivotal role in the
revolution of offensive tactics that took place in 1917-18.
Ironically, the methods developed by Bruchmuller ultimately were
rejected by the German Army of World War II, but they were taken up
and applied with a vengeance by the emerging Red Army. The Soviets
further developed Bruchmuller's principles and incorporated them
into their doctrine, where they remain to this day. Through Soviet
doctrine, they have become fundamental to the practice of many
other armies. Bruchmuller's influence in shaping the former Soviet
Army has also been mirrored in the shape of those armies designed
to oppose it.
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1918: Winning the War, Losing the War (Hardcover)
Matthias Strohn; Contributions by Matthias Strohn, James S. Corum, Mungo Melvin Cb Obe; Foreword by Nicholas Carter; Contributions by …
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In 2018, the world will be commemorating the centenary of the end of the First World War. In many ways, 1918 was the most dramatic year of the conflict. After the defeat of Russia in 1917, the Germans were able to concentrate their forces on the Western Front for the first time in the war, and the German offensives launched from March 1918 onward brought the Western Allies close to defeat. Having stopped the German offensives, the Entente started its counter-attacks on all fronts with the assistance of fresh US troops, driving the Germans back and, by November 1918, the Central Powers had been defeated.
This new study is a multi-author work containing ten chapters by some of the best historians of the First World War from around the world writing today. It provides an overview and analysis of the different levels of war for each of the main armies involved within the changing context of the reality of warfare in 1918. It also looks in detail at the war at sea and in the air, and considers the aftermath and legacy of the First World War.
"Indispensable."--Prof. Robert Citino, author of The Path to
Blitzkrieg "The most influential doctrinal manual ever
written."--Prof. Williamson Murray, author of A War to Be Won:
*Highly readable translation of the military manual that guided the
German Army in World War II*Crystal-clear introduction and notes
place the text in its social and military context*Topics include
command, attack, defense, tanks, chemical warfare, logistics, and
more: Truppenfhrung ("unit command") served as the basic manual for
the German Army from 1934 until the end of World War II, creating
the doctrinal framework for blitzkrieg and the early victories of
Hitler's armies. All commissioned and senior noncommissioned
officers received a copy of the book, which set forth guidelines to
be applied to complex and constantly changing battle conditions.
Reading it is essential to understanding how the German Army fought
the war.
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