|
Showing 1 - 10 of
10 matches in All Departments
From Disability Theory to Practice pays tribute to Professor Jerome
Bickenbach's highly influential and immensely important work.
Professor Bickenbach is a scholar, policy-maker, and activist, of
international stature. This volume brings together ten friends,
mentors, and mentees, who have penned eight chapters engaging in
topics that range, as the title suggests and as Professor
Bickenbach's work has spanned, from theory to practice. This volume
begins, much as Professor Bickenbach's career has, by grappling
with philosophical and sociological issues related to the
definition of disability, its relation to health, and conceptions
of justice for people with disabilities. Subsequently, these
conceptions are utilized to advance policy suggestions that range
from assisted dying legislation, mental health policy, and the
implementation of the International Classification of Functioning,
Disability and Health.
Using New York City as a research model, this study explores the
organizational, tactical, and ethical challenges of providing
zealous advocacy for every convicted indigent wishing to appeal.
David Wasserman, a former staff attorney with New York's Legal Aid
Society, examines the unique form of representation that has
emerged since the Supreme Court recognized the right to free
appellate counsel, and details the conflict between the role of
assigned appellate counsel and the demands of an overcrowded and
underfunded criminal justice system. As the first study of indigent
criminal appellate representation in the United States, this work
brings a neglected form of legal service into the mainstream of
criminal justice policy analysis.
The book is divided into three parts. Through the use of
existing research and commentary, Part I analyzes the impact of the
Supreme Court's Douglas v. California decision on the appellate
courts and representation and on the organization of defense
services. Part II offers an empirical study of criminal appeals in
New York City, addressing such issues as the quality and impact of
appellate defenders and the division of the indigent caseload. In
Part III, Wasserman discusses the implications of this research in
relation to the analysis of indigent defense developed in Part I,
and considers measures for improving the quality of assigned
appellate counsel. The work concludes with an appendix listing
suggestions for further reading. This study, which provides the
only available information on criminal appellate dispositions in
New York City, will be an important resource for courses in law and
social science, criminal justice, and appellate or trial practice.
It will also be useful to the criminal justice community,
particularly to public defender and legal aid groups, and appellate
judges and their staffs.
This study brings together two important literatures together in
the one volume. One concerns the role of quality assessments in
social policy, especially health policy. The second concerns
ethical and social issues raised by prenatal testing for
disability. Hitherto, these two literatures have had little contact
with each other: few scholars have written about both, or have
compared the two domains in a systematic way, while people with
disabilities and disability scholars are underrepresented in recent
discussion on health policy and quality of assessment. This book
turns the perspectives of disability scholars on issues that have
largely been the province of health methodology, policy and
philosophy, while angling philosophical policy analysis on problems
that have largely been the province of disability scholarship. This
volume will be sought after by bioethicists, philosophers, and
specialists in disability studies and healthcare economics.
This study brings together two important literatures together in
the one volume. One concerns the role of quality assessments in
social policy, especially health policy. The second concerns
ethical and social issues raised by prenatal testing for
disability. Hitherto, these two literatures have had little contact
with each other: few scholars have written about both, or have
compared the two domains in a systematic way, while people with
disabilities and disability scholars are underrepresented in recent
discussion on health policy and quality of assessment. This book
turns the perspectives of disability scholars on issues that have
largely been the province of health methodology, policy and
philosophy, while angling philosophical policy analysis on problems
that have largely been the province of disability scholarship. This
volume will be sought after by bioethicists, philosophers, and
specialists in disability studies and healthcare economics.
This volume brings together a group of essays by leading philosophers of science, ethicists, and legal scholars, commissioned for an important and controversial conference on genetics and crime. The essays address basic conceptual, methodological, and ethical issues raised by genetic research on criminal behavior but largely ignored in the public debate. They explore the complexities in tracing any genetic influence on criminal, violent, or antisocial behavior, the varieties of interpretation to which evidence of such influences is subject, and the relevance of such influences to the moral and legal appraisal of criminal conduct. The volume provides a critical overview of the assumptions, methods, and findings of recent behavioral genetics.
While procreation is ubiquitous, attention to the ethical issues
involved in creating children is relatively rare. In Debating
Procreation, David Benatar and David Wasserman take opposing views
on this important question. David Benatar argues for the
anti-natalist view that it is always wrong to bring new people into
existence. He argues that coming into existence is always a serious
harm and that even if it were not always so, the risk of serious
harm is sufficiently great to make procreation wrong. In addition
to these "philanthropic" arguments, he advances the "misanthropic"
one that because humans are so defective and cause vast amounts of
harm, it is wrong to create more of them. David Wasserman defends
procreation against the anti-natalist challenge. He outlines a
variety of moderate pro-natalist positions, which all see
procreation as often permissible but never required. After
criticizing the main anti-natalist arguments, he reviews those
pronatalist positions. He argues that constraints on procreation
are best understood in terms of the role morality of prospective
parents, considers different views of that role morality, and
argues for one that imposes only limited constraints based on the
well-being of the future child. He then argues that the expected
good of a future child and of the parent-child relationship can
provide a strong justification for procreation in the face of
expected adversities without giving individuals any moral reason to
procreate
While procreation is ubiquitous, attention to the ethical issues
involved in creating children is relatively rare. In Debating
Procreation, David Benatar and David Wasserman take opposing views
on this important question. David Benatar argues for the
anti-natalist view that it is always wrong to bring new people into
existence. He argues that coming into existence is always a serious
harm and that even if it were not always so, the risk of serious
harm is sufficiently great to make procreation wrong. In addition
to these "philanthropic" arguments, he advances the "misanthropic"
one that because humans are so defective and cause vast amounts of
harm, it is wrong to create more of them. David Wasserman defends
procreation against the anti-natalist challenge. He outlines a
variety of moderate pro-natalist positions, which all see
procreation as often permissible but never required. After
criticizing the main anti-natalist arguments, he reviews those
pronatalist positions. He argues that constraints on procreation
are best understood in terms of the role morality of prospective
parents, considers different views of that role morality, and
argues for one that imposes only limited constraints based on the
well-being of the future child. He then argues that the expected
good of a future child and of the parent-child relationship can
provide a strong justification for procreation in the face of
expected adversities without giving individuals any moral reason to
procreate
|
|