This is a collection of recent novel contributions in game theory from a group of prominent authors in the field. It covers Non-cooperative Games, Equilibrium Analysis, Cooperative Games and Axiomatic Values in static and dynamic contexts.Part 1: Non-cooperative Games and Equilibrium AnalysisIn game theory, a non-cooperative game is a game with competition between individual players and in which only self-enforcing (e.g. through credible threats) alliances (or competition between groups of players, called 'coalitions') are possible due to the absence of external means to enforce cooperative behavior (e.g. contract law), as opposed to cooperative games. In fact, non-cooperative games are the foundation for the development of cooperative games by acting as the status quo. Non-cooperative games are generally analysed through the framework of equilibrium, which tries to predict players' individual strategies and payoffs. Indeed, equilibrium analysis is the centre of non-cooperative games. This volume on non-cooperative games and equilibrium analysis contains a variety of non-cooperative games and non-cooperative game equilibria from prominent authors in the field.Part 2: Cooperative Games and Axiomatic ValuesIt is well known that non-cooperative behaviours, in general, would not lead to a Pareto optimal outcome. Highly undesirable outcomes (like the prisoner's dilemma) and even devastating results (like the tragedy of the commons) could appear when the involved parties only care about their individual interests in a non-cooperative situation. Cooperative games offer the possibility of obtaining socially optimal and group efficient solutions to decision problems involving strategic actions. In addition, axiomatic values serve as guidance for establishing cooperative solutions. This volume on cooperative games and axiomatic values presents a collection of cooperative games and axiomatic values from prominent authors in the field.

After several decades of rapid technological advancement and economic growth, alarming levels of pollution and catastrophe-bound environmental degradations are emerging all over the world. Even sizable reduction in industrial pollutant emissions would only slow down the accumulation of pollution. Given the complexity of the problem and the over-simplicity of international environmental initiatives (like the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal Protocol and Paris Agreement, which focused mainly on emissions reduction and regulations), limited success has been observed. The design of a comprehensive solution for solving this globally devastating problem is very much in order. Research in developing environmentally clean technology into efficient and affordable means of production plays a key role to effectively solving the continual worsening global industrial pollution problem and meeting the industrial growth needs. An essential element for success is that the participating nations well-being must not be worse than their non-cooperative well-being throughout the cooperation duration. In addition, for the cooperative scheme to be sustainable, the agreed-upon optimality principle in sharing the cooperative benefits must be upheld at every stage of the cooperation plan -- this condition is known as subgame consistency. This book provides an effective means for resolving the catastrophe-bound environmental problem through a Building Environmentally Sustainable Technology with Subgame Consistent, Optimal, Rational and Economically-viable Scheme (BEST SCORES). In particular, the solution scheme involves: (i) A set of policy instruments which includes levies on industrial pollution, royalties on natural resources, coordinated pollutant abatement efforts, cooperative development of clean technology, and transfer payments leading to an optimal cooperation solution; (ii) Joint development of environmentally sustainable technology and an optimal technology pattern over time; (iii) A cooperative maximisation program yielding the optimal (highest) joint payoff; (iv) An economically viable scheme for each participating nation with a cooperative payoff higher than its non-cooperative payoff through transfer payments; (v) A subgame consistent payoff distribution procedure, which ensures that the original agreed upon optimality principle in gain sharing will be maintainedl; (vi) An institutional mechanism design to guide the construction of relevant institutions and agencies to implement the cooperative scheme.

Economics is a science which studies human behaviours as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses. Since economic resources are scarce, optimisation forms an integral part in the study of economics. In addition, in the presence of imperfect market structure, externalities, imperfect information or public goods, the market fails to provide an efficient allocation mechanism. Optimisation of economic activities provides an effective remedial measure for market failures. This contributed volume collects advances in the studies of economics and optimisation. Contributions cover areas on analysis of optimal allocation of economic resources, economic optimisation techniques, the interface economics and optimisation, optimisation under market mechanism and history of development of optimisation techniques. The studies assembled in this volume are dedicated to the memory of a pioneering researcher and Nobel Laureate in the field of economic optimisation -- Leonid Vitalyevich Kantorovich. In his 100th birthday tribute in 2012, the International Conference Mathematics, Economic, Management: Kantorovich-100 in St-Petersburg was held in his memory. Selected papers from the conference are included in this Volume. In addition, contributed papers from authors who had worked closely with Kantorovich are also contained.

This book is the first treatise on consumer theory in a dynamic framework. It expands the conventional static consumer theory into a stochastic dynamic framework accommodating various combinations of uncertainties in future income, life-span and future preferences. These extensions incorporate realistic and intrinsic characteristics of the consumer decision into the analysis of consumer theory. Novel innovations to the field of consumer theory presented in the book include wealth-dependent ordinary demand, inter-temporal indirect utility function, wealth compensated demand, wealth expenditure function and inter-temporal Roy's identity under uncertainty. A prominent highlight of the book is the derivation of a series of stochastic dynamic Slutsky equations. New optimal consumption paradigms presented include: (i) utility maximisation in a dynamic framework, duality and wealth compensated demand, and dynamic Slutsky equations, (ii) dynamic consumption under random horizon and income, (iii) consumption amid uncertainties in income, life span and preferences, and (iv) stochastic future prices and consumption decision. The mathematical foundation of the book provides a fertile ground for the analysis of dynamic consumption under stochastic dynamic environments. The book paves the way for a new phase in optimal consumption analysis and will be of interest to economics and mathematics students, economists, mathematicians and researchers in consumer behaviour.

This book is an important and innovative addition to textbooks in game theory. It provides a detailed discourse on the extension of two of the worlds most prominent cooperative game solutions the seminal Shapley value in games with transferrable payoffs and the classic Nash bargaining scheme in games with non-transferrable payoffs to a dynamic framework. The extension of these two classic cooperative solution concepts into a dynamic setting is not just of theoretical interest, but also allows many real-life cooperation situations like global environmental management, nuclear disarmament, disease control, trade disputes and political unions to be analyzed in an effective way. This book provides: (i) A compendium of dynamic optimization techniques used in its analysis; (ii) a detailed disquisition on cooperative dynamic consistency; (iii) the extension of the Shapley Value to a dynamic framework; (iv) the establishment of a dynamic Nash bargaining paradigm; and (v) the incorporation of stochastic elements into the analyses. Interesting solvable examples are provided to illustrate the practicality and applicability of the dynamic Shapley value and dynamic Nash bargaining scheme in dynamic cooperation.