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The Governor's Dilemma develops a general theory of indirect
governance based on the tradeoff between governor control and
intermediary competence; the empirical chapters apply that theory
to a diverse range of cases encompassing both international
relations and comparative politics. The theoretical framework paper
starts from the observation that virtually all governance is
indirect, carried out through intermediaries. But governors in
indirect governance relationships face a dilemma: competent
intermediaries gain power from the competencies they contribute,
making them difficult to control, while efforts to control
intermediary behavor limit important intermediary competencies,
including expertise, credibility, and legitimacy. Thus, governors
can obtain either high intermediary competence or strong control,
but not both. This competence-control tradeoff is a common
condition of indirect governance, whether governors are domestic or
international, public or private, democratic or authoritarian; and
whether governance addresses economic, security, or social issues.
The empirical chapters analyze the operation and implications of
the governor's dilemma in cases involving the governance of
violence (e.g., secret police, support for foreign rebel groups,
private security companies), the governance of markets (e.g., the
Euro crisis, capital markets, EU regulation, the G20), and
cross-cutting governance issues (colonial empires, "Trump's
Dilemma"). Competence-control theory helps explain many features of
governance that other theories cannot: why indirect governance is
not limited to principal-agent delegation, but takes multiple
forms; why governors create seemingly counter-productive
intermediary relationships; and why indirect governance is
frequently unstable over time.
The Oxford Handbook of International Relations offers the most
authoritative and comprehensive overview to date of the field of
international relations. Arguably the most impressive collection of
international relations scholars ever brought together within one
volume, the Handbook debates the nature of the field itself,
critically engages with the major theories, surveys a wide spectrum
of methods, addresses the relationship between scholarship and
policy making, and examines the field's relation with cognate
disciplines. The Handbook takes as its central themes the
interaction between empirical and normative inquiry that permeates
all theorizing in the field and the way in which contending
approaches have shaped one another. In doing so, the Handbook
provides an authoritative and critical introduction to the subject
and establishes a sense of the field as a dynamic realm of argument
and inquiry. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations will be
essential reading for all of those interested in the advanced study
of global politics and international affairs.
International Organizations as Orchestrators reveals how IOs
leverage their limited authority and resources to increase their
effectiveness, power, and autonomy from states. By 'orchestrating'
intermediaries - including NGOs - IOs can shape and steer global
governance without engaging in hard, direct regulation. This volume
is organized around a theoretical model that emphasizes voluntary
collaboration and support. An outstanding group of scholars
investigate the significance of orchestration across key issue
areas, including trade, finance, environment and labor, and in
leading organizations, including the GEF, G20, WTO, EU, Kimberley
Process, UNEP and ILO. The empirical studies find that
orchestration is pervasive. They broadly confirm the theoretical
hypotheses while providing important new insights, especially that
states often welcome IO orchestration as achieving governance
without creating strong institutions. This volume changes our
understanding of the relationships among IOs, nonstate actors and
states in global governance, using a theoretical framework
applicable to domestic governance.
International institutions vary widely in terms of key institutional features such as membership, scope, and flexibility. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal argue that this is so because international actors are goal-seeking agents who make specific institutional design choices to solve the particular cooperation problems they face in different issue-areas. Using a Rational Design approach, they explore five important features of institutions--membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility--and explain their variation in terms of four independent variables that characterize different cooperation problems: distribution, number of actors, enforcement, and uncertainty. The contributors to the volume then evaluate a set of conjectures in specific issue areas. (This book is Volume 55, part 4 of International Organization.)
International Organizations as Orchestrators reveals how IOs
leverage their limited authority and resources to increase their
effectiveness, power, and autonomy from states. By 'orchestrating'
intermediaries - including NGOs - IOs can shape and steer global
governance without engaging in hard, direct regulation. This volume
is organized around a theoretical model that emphasizes voluntary
collaboration and support. An outstanding group of scholars
investigate the significance of orchestration across key issue
areas, including trade, finance, environment and labor, and in
leading organizations, including the GEF, G20, WTO, EU, Kimberley
Process, UNEP and ILO. The empirical studies find that
orchestration is pervasive. They broadly confirm the theoretical
hypotheses while providing important new insights, especially that
states often welcome IO orchestration as achieving governance
without creating strong institutions. This volume changes our
understanding of the relationships among IOs, nonstate actors and
states in global governance, using a theoretical framework
applicable to domestic governance.
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