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conditions of the possibility of Experience ... must mean nothing
else than all that which lies immanently in the essence of
Experience ... and therefore belongs to it indispensably. The
essence of Experience that phenomenological analysis of Experience
elucidates is the same as the possibility of Experience, and all
that which is determined in the essence, in the possibility of
Experience, is eo ipso 1 condition of the possibility of
Experience. Through acquaintance with Husserl's work, then, I
developed my way of understand ing what, according to their very
possibility, lies in conscious activities of mentally representing
something, for example, by imagining or remembering it, or by
viewing it in a picture, all these understood as forms of modified
perception. As Husserl himself made clear, such reflective and
descriptive analyses of the mental activities according to their
very possibility are carried out regardless of the way they have
actually come to be. However, I was also interested in developmen
tal questions, especially with regard to the activity of imagining.
Hence I turned to cognitive developmental psychology in order to
get acquainted with the neces sary empirical material. Moreover, I
conducted a pilot-study with young children that I had conceived
according to phenomenologically relevant aspects concerning the
difference and yet inner connection of the activities of imagining
and viewing 2 pictures."
conditions of the possibility of Experience ... must mean nothing
else than all that which lies immanently in the essence of
Experience ... and therefore belongs to it indispensably. The
essence of Experience that phenomenological analysis of Experience
elucidates is the same as the possibility of Experience, and all
that which is determined in the essence, in the possibility of
Experience, is eo ipso 1 condition of the possibility of
Experience. Through acquaintance with Husserl's work, then, I
developed my way of understand ing what, according to their very
possibility, lies in conscious activities of mentally representing
something, for example, by imagining or remembering it, or by
viewing it in a picture, all these understood as forms of modified
perception. As Husserl himself made clear, such reflective and
descriptive analyses of the mental activities according to their
very possibility are carried out regardless of the way they have
actually come to be. However, I was also interested in developmen
tal questions, especially with regard to the activity of imagining.
Hence I turned to cognitive developmental psychology in order to
get acquainted with the neces sary empirical material. Moreover, I
conducted a pilot-study with young children that I had conceived
according to phenomenologically relevant aspects concerning the
difference and yet inner connection of the activities of imagining
and viewing 2 pictures."
"Allerdings, das ist eine grosse Frage, der ich zu sehr ausgewichen
bin, die Evidenz des Ich als ein Identisches, das also doch nicht
in dem Bundel bestehen kann." (Husserl, 1907) Bekanntlich verwirft
Husserl in den Logischen Untersuchungen die Auffassung, "dass die
Beziehung auf das Ich etwas zum we sentlichen Bestande des
intentionalen Erlebnisses selbst Gehoeriges sei'',! und bildet um
1907, nach Einfuhrung der phanomenolo gischen Reduktion, "die
Beziehung auf das Ich zu unterlassen, oder von ihr zu abstrahieren"
geradezu die Bedingung, ein "reines Phanomen im Sinne der
Phanomenologie" 2 zu gewinnen. Und bekanntlich heisst es
demgegenuber in den Ideen von 1913: "Unter den allgemeinen
Wesenseigentumlichkeiten des tran szendental gereinigten
Erlebnisgebietes gebuhrt eigentlich die erste Stelle der Beziehung
auf das ,reine' Ich",3 und revidiert Husserl in der zweiten Auflage
der Logischen Untersuchungen von 4 1913 seine Stellungnahme zur
Frage des reinen Ich. Weniger bekannt ist bisher, wie Husserl auf
seinem Denkweg von der einen zur anderen Stellungnahme zum Problem
des Ich gekommen ist. Was bewegte ihn, das "Ich" in die phanomeno
logische Problematik einzubeziehen? Zu vermuten war, dem Wandel in
der Stellung zum Problem des Ich liege ein Wandel im Verstandnis
der Phanomenologie selbst zugrunde. Welche Phanomene motivierten,
auf dem phanomenologischen Boden selbst, die Einbeziehung des Ich?
Vor allem dieser Frage gehen wir, unter Berucksichtigung des
Nachlassmaterials des Husserl Archivs (Leuven), in unserer Studie
nach.
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