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In Role Compatibility as Socialization, Dorothée Vandamme examines
Pakistan’s socialization process in terms of role compatibility
in the 2008-2018 period. Adopting an Interpretative
phenomenological analysis (IPA) method of analysis, Vandamme builds
on role theory to develop a theory of socialization as role
compatibility to explain the dynamics of Pakistan’s
(dys)functioning position and its status-seeking process as a fully
functioning member of the international system. Specifically, she
focuses on how Pakistani civilian and military leaders define their
country’s positioning towards India, the United States and China.
In doing so, she traces the link between domestic role contestation
at the country’s inception and the resulting domination of the
military’s conception of their country, state identity, how it
projects itself externally and how it is received by others.
Departing from strictly structural or agent-oriented explanations,
Vandamme expertly demonstrates Pakistan’s perceived role
compatibility with significant others and underlines the causality
between state identity, foreign policy behavior and socialization.
Role Compatibility as Socialization will be of interest to graduate
students and researchers who work on and with role theory and
socialization theory, and for those with a research interest on
South Asia.
The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of
non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction
arising in biology, economics, political science and the social
sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of
subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various
disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds
innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis.
The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center
for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The
close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of
researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable
results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on
the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game
theory. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game
equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at
bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of
two-person and n-person bargaining are explored.
The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of
non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction
arising in biology, economics, political science and the social
sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of
subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various
disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds
innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis.
The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center
for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The
close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of
researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable
results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on
the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game
theory. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game
equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at
bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of
two-person and n-person bargaining are explored.
In this monograph, noncooperative games are studied. Since in a
noncooperative game binding agreements are not possible, the
solution of such a game has to be self enforcing, i. e. a Nash
equilibrium (NASH [1950,1951J). In general, however, a game may
possess many equilibria and so the problem arises which one of
these should be chosen as the solution. It was first pointed out
explicitly in SELTEN [1965J that I not all Nash equilibria of an
extensive form game are qualified to be selected as the solution,
since an equilibrium may prescribe irrational behavior at unreached
parts of the game tree. Moreover, also for normal form games not
all Nash equilibria are eligible, since an equilibrium need not be
robust with respect to slight perturba tions in the data of the
game. These observations lead to the conclusion that the Nash
equilibrium concept has to be refined in order to obtain sensible
solutions for every game. In the monograph, various refinements of
the Nash equilibrium concept are studied. Some of these have been
proposed in the literature, but others are presented here for the
first time. The objective is to study the relations between these
refine ments;to derive characterizations and to discuss the
underlying assumptions. The greater part of the monograph (the
chapters 2-5) is devoted to the study of normal form games.
Extensive form games are considered in chapter 6.
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